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Collective Narcissism and Its Social Consequences

Agnieszka Golec de Zavala
Middlesex University

Aleksandra Cichocka
University of Warsaw

Roy Eidelson
Eidelson Consulting

Nuwan Jayawickreme
University of Pennsylvania

This article introduces the concept of collective narcissism—an emotional investment in an unrealistic belief about the in group's greatness—aiming to explain how feelings about an ingroup shape a tendency to aggress against outgroups. The results of 5 studies indicate that collective, but not individual, narcissism predicts intergroup aggressiveness. Collective narcissism is related to high private and low public collective self-esteem and low implicit group esteem. It predicts perceived threat from outgroups, unwillingness to forgive outgroups, preference for military aggression over and above social dominance orientation, right-wing authoritarianism, and blind patriotism. The relationship between collective narcissism and aggressiveness is mediated by perceived threat from outgroups and perceived insult to the ingroup. In sum, the results indicate that collective narcissism is a form of high but ambivalent group esteem related to sensitivity to threats to the ingroup's image and retaliatory aggression.

Keywords: collective narcissism, intergroup aggression, group esteem, threat

Research has demonstrated that certain forms of positive ingroup identification and group esteem are more likely than others to be accompanied by outgroup enmity (e.g., Brown, 2000; Rubin & Hewstone, 1998; but see also Heaven, Rajab, & Ray, 1984; Sherif, 1958; Sumner, 1906; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; in the context of national groups, see, e.g., de Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003; Federico, Golec, & Dial, 2005; Feshbach, 1987; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Mummendey, Klink, & Brown, 2001; Struch & Schwartz, 1989; Viroli, 1995). Despite the insights this rich literature provides, there is no agreement as to what kind of ingroup attachment is most likely to produce outgroup negativity and why. In this article, we propose a concept of *collective narcissism*, which describes an ingroup identification tied to an emotional investment in an unrealistic belief about the unparalleled greatness of an ingroup. By introducing this concept, we seek to shed new light on the capacity of positive group esteem to inspire intergroup aggressiveness.

The concept of collective narcissism extends into the intergroup domain, the concept of individual narcissism: an excessive self-love or inflated, grandiose view of oneself that requires continual external validation (e.g., Crocker & Park, 2004; Emmons, 1987; Horney, 1937; Morf, & Rhodewalt, 2001; Raskin & Terry, 1988; Rhodewalt & Morf, 1995; Rhodewalt & Sorrow, 2003).[1] Following the studies that project ego-related processes onto a group level (e.g., Bizman & Yinon, 2004; Bizman, Yinon, & Krotman, 2001; Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990; Eidelson & Eidelson, 2003; Hornsey, 2003; Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992), we expect that if people can be narcissistic about their personal identities, they can also be narcissistic about their collective identities. A similar search for the group-level equivalent of individual narcissism can be found in recent work of Bizumic and Duckitt (2008). These authors suggested that ethnocentrism understood as group self-importance and group-centeredness can be seen as group narcissism. The account presented in this article is different. We assume that collective narcissism is an exaggerated and unstable collective self-esteem. What lies in the core of collective narcissism is an inflated image of an ingroup, rather than of the self. Thus, although group self-importance and centeredness are part of the concept of collective narcissism, we also assume that the positive image of the ingroup is excessive and difficult to sustain. Our predictions about the intergroup effects of collective narcissism are an extension of

Agnieszka Golec de Zavala, Department of Psychology, School of Health and Social Sciences, Middlesex University, London, United Kingdom; Aleksandra Cichocka, Department of Psychology, University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland; Roy Eidelson, Edielson Consulting, Philadelphia, PA; Nuwan Jayawickreme, Center for the Treatment and Study of Anxiety, University of Pennsylvania.

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Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Agnieszka Golec de Zavala, Department of Psychology, Middlesex University, The Town Hall, The Burroughs, Hendon, London NW4 4BT, United Kingdom. E-mail: a.golec@MDX.ac.uk

[1] Note that individual narcissism is understood here as personality characteristic rather than as individual pathology (see Kernberg, 1970, or Kohut, 1966).

threatened egotism theory (Baumeister, Bushman, & Campbell, 2000; Bushman & Baumeister, 1998) into the intergroup relations.

Individual and Collective Narcissism

Collective narcissism is seen as an extension of individual narcissism to the social aspects of self. It is an ingroup, rather than an individual self, that is idealized. A positive relationship between individual and collective narcissism can be expected because the self-concept consists of personal self *and* social identities based on the groups to which people belong (Hornsey, 2003). Idealization of self may be followed by idealization of ingroups (see Rocass, Klar, & Liviatan, 2006). It has been demonstrated that the evaluation of novel ingroups (created in minimal group paradigm tasks) is shaped by peoples' evaluations of themselves: Individuals with high personal self-esteem evaluate their new ingroups more positively than do individuals with low self-esteem (Gramzow & Gaertner, 2005). Collective narcissists may see groups as extensions of themselves and expect everybody to recognize not only their individual greatness but also the prominence of their ingroups. It has also been suggested that, especially in collectivistic cultures, individual narcissism may stem from the reputation and honor of the groups to which one belongs (e.g., Warren & Capponi, 1996).

However, narcissistic idealization of a group may also be a strategy to protect a weak and threatened ego. This possibility has been suggested by Adorno (1998; see also Arendt, 1971; Vaknin, 2003), Fromm (1941), and status politics theorists (Gusfield, 1963; Hofstadter, 1965; Lipset & Raab, 1970). These authors suggested that narcissistic identification with an ingroup is likely to emerge in social and cultural contexts that diminish the ego and/or socialize individuals to put their group in the center of their lives, attention, emotions, and actions. Thus, the development of narcissistic group identification can be fostered by certain social contexts independent of individual-level narcissism.

Therefore, one form of narcissism does not have to automatically lead to another, and people can be narcissistic only at an individual or only at a collective level. The relationship between individual and collective narcissism, although positive, is likely not to be high. Most important, collective narcissism is expected to predict intergroup attitudes and actions, whereas individual narcissism is expected to be related to interpersonal actions and attitudes (see Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990; but see also Jordan, Spencer, & Zanna, 2005).

Collective Narcissism and Intergroup Aggression

The threatened egotism theory provides an explanation for numerous findings linking individual narcissism and interpersonal aggressiveness and hostility (Baumeister et al., 2000; Baumeister, Smart, & Boden, 1996; Bushman & Baumeister, 1998; Raskin, Novacek, & Hogan, 1991; Rhodewalt & Morf, 1995, 1998), interpersonal dominance tendencies (Ruiz, Smith, & Rhodewalt, 2001), and the inability to forgive (Exline, Baumeister, Bushman, Campbell, & Finkel, 2004), accompanied by a tendency to seek vengeance (Brown, 2004).

According to the threatened egotism theory, individual narcissism is a risk factor that contributes to a violent and aggressive response to perceived provocation: unfair treatment, criticism, doubts, or insult. Interpersonal aggression is a means of defending the grandiose self-image. Narcissists invest emotionally in their high opinion of themselves, demand that others confirm that opinion, and punish those who seem unlikely to do so. Because they require constant validation of unrealistic greatness of the self, narcissists are likely to continually encounter threats to their self-image and be chronically intolerant of them (Baumeister et al., 1996). Individual narcissists are suggested to possess high but unstable personal self-esteem (e.g., Kernis, 1993). Such personal self-esteem is vulnerable to sudden drops that produce heightened sensitivity to ego threats, in turn leading to hostility (Bushman & Baumeister, 1998; Kernis, 1993). Thus, individual narcissism is related to cognitive, motivational, and emotional functioning that impairs *interpersonal* relations (e.g., Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001), even though it is, at the same time, associated with subjective well-being (Sedikides, Rudich, Gregg, Kumashiro, & Rusbult, 2004). Few studies suggest that defensive personal self-esteem that is proposed to characterize individual narcissists (Jordan, Spencer, Zanna, Hoshino-Browne, & Correll, 2003) may be also related to *intergroup* bias (Jordan, Spencer, & Zanna, 2005).

The threatened egotism theory explains the link between individual aggressiveness and retaliatory aggression in interpersonal contexts. We argue that collective (rather than individual) narcissism explains variance in intergroup (rather than interpersonal) aggressiveness and hostility. The mechanism underlying this relationship should be analogous to the mechanism underlying the link between individual narcissism and interpersonal aggressiveness (see Baumeister et al., 1996; Emmons, 1987; Staub, 1989, for suggestions that some form of group-level narcissism should be linked to intergroup aggressiveness). Collective narcissists are assumed to be emotionally invested in a grandiose image of their ingroup. This image is excessive and demands constant validation. Therefore, it is vulnerable to challenges from within (e.g., internal criticism) or from outside (e.g., from outgroups that endanger or put into doubt the prominence of an ingroup). It is expected that intergroup hostility and aggression are a means of protecting the group's image. Thus, collective narcissists are expected to be particularly prone to interpret the actions of others as signs of disrespect, criticism, or disapproval of an ingroup and to react aggressively. They are also expected to react aggressively to actual criticism and other situations that threaten a positive image of an ingroup. They are expected often to feel unfairly and unjustly treated in an intergroup context, because no treatment or recognition is seen as good enough for the deserving ingroup. Moreover, it is expected that collective narcissists are not willing to forgive and forget previous insults or unfairness to an ingroup experienced from other groups. Thus, they are likely to hold prejudice toward outgroups with whom they share a history of mutual grievances and wrongdoings. Collective narcissism is also expected to predict a preference for violent and coercive actions toward outgroups in intergroup conflicts and a likelihood of perceiving intergroup situations as conflictual, even before they turn into open conflicts. In an intergroup situation that is not yet an open conflict, people who are sensitive to signs of disrespect are more likely to interpret ambiguous events in an ingroup-threatening manner and to react aggressively.

Aims of the Present Studies

To test the above predictions and demonstrate the construct validity and explanatory power of the concept of collective narcissism, we conducted a series of five studies. In Study 1, conducted among American participants, we looked at collective narcissism with reference to a national ingroup. We tested the factorial structure; the reliability; and the divergent, convergent, and predictive validity of the Collective Narcissism Scale. Most important, we tested the hypothesis that collective narcissism predicts the perception of threat to the ingroup, intergroup aggressiveness, and the inability to forgive past wrongdoings by outgroups, independent of other variables frequently associated with outgroup enmity, such as blind patriotism (Schatz, Staub, & Lavine, 1999), social dominance orientation (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994), and right-wing authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1996). The study was conducted in the context of the war on terrorism.

In Study 2, conducted in Britain, we tested the prediction that collective and individual narcissism, although positively correlated, are separate variables. We tested the hypothesis that individual rather than collective narcissism predicts interpersonal aggressiveness, whereas collective rather than individual narcissism predicts outgroup negativity. In this study, we examined collective narcissism in the context of ethnic ingroups.

In Study 3, conducted among Polish participants, we looked at the relationship between collective narcissism and psychological entitlement, an aspect of individual narcissism associated with unconstructive interpersonal behavior (W. K. Campbell, Bonacci, Shelton, Exline, & Bushman, 2004). We tested the assumption that only collective narcissism predicts outgroup negativity. The narcissistic identification with a national ingroup was measured.

In Study 4, conducted in Poland, we examined feelings and beliefs about the ingroup underlying national collective narcissism, and we tested the hypotheses that collective narcissism is predicted by an interaction between private collective self-esteem (Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990) and negative implicit national group esteem, as well as a high private and low public collective self-esteem.

In Study 5, conducted in a Mexican sample, we tested the hypothesis, derived from the threatened egotism theory, that the tendency to perceive ambiguous outgroup behaviors as disrespectful to the ingroup mediates the relationship between collective narcissism and intergroup aggressiveness. In this study, social dominance orientation and right-wing authoritarianism were expected to be related to different perceptions and different behavioral preferences.

Study 1: Development and Validation of the Collective Narcissism Scale

In the first study, we tested the psychometric propensities of the Collective Narcissism Scale. To initially test the divergent validity of the scale, we examined the relationship between collective narcissism and personal self-esteem. We assumed that this relationship may be positive but should not be strong and may not even reach the level of statistical significance. We hypothesized that collective narcissism may be positively associated with individual narcissism. Individual narcissism is related to high and unstable personal self-esteem (Kernis, 1993; Rhodewalt, Madrian, & Cheney, 1998; for discussion of the relationship between individual narcissism and personal self-esteem, see also Sedikides et al., 2004). Empirical evidence indicates that level and stability of personal self-esteem are distinct and, at least partially, autonomous dimensions (Kernis, 2005; Kernis & Waschull, 1995).[2] Thus, although it is likely to be associated with high and unstable personal self-esteem, collective narcissism is not necessarily equally likely to be linked to general assessment of individual self-worth.

To test the convergent and predictive validity of the Collective Narcissism Scale, we examined the relationships between collective narcissism and national group identification, patriotism, right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation. In addition, we tested an assumption that these variables and collective narcissism independently predict intergroup aggressiveness, perceived ingroup threat, and inability to forgive outgroups for wrongs done to the ingroup.

Collective Narcissism, National Group Identification, and Patriotism

We expected that national collective narcissism would be positively related to national identification and blind, rather than constructive, patriotism. Studies show that blind patriotism is an uncritical idealization of the nation, whereas constructive patriotism does not avoid criticism of the national group but welcomes it as a prospect of betterment. In addition, blind patriotism is related to outgroup negativity, prejudice, and aggressiveness, whereas constructive patriotism is associated with tolerance and more benevolent intergroup attitudes (Schatz & Staub, 1997; Schatz et al., 1999).

Collective narcissism and blind patriotism overlap in the uncritical approach toward the national ingroup. However, collective narcissism is a broader concept than blind patriotism. It is assumed that people can narcissistically identify with groups other than their nation. Moreover, collective narcissism is likely to be primarily preoccupied with validating and protecting the ingroup's image, less so with securing its dominant position. This last concern is, however, often associated with blind patriotism (Schatz et al., 1999; see also Bar-Tal, 1996; de Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003).

Collective Narcissism and Social Dominance Orientation

We expected that collective narcissism would be positively related to social dominance orientation, a desire for hierarchical social order and unequal relations among social groups (Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Social dominance orientation is composed of two factors: support for group-based dominance and generalized opposition to equality, regardless of the ingroup's position in the power structure. The group-based dominance is theorized to be responsible for the ingroup favoritism associated with social dominance orientation (Jost & Thompson, 2000), and

[2] Studies have reported that level and stability of personal self-esteem are uncorrelated (Kernis, Grannemann, & Barclay, 1989), correlated "from .15 to the high .20s" (Kernis & Waschull, 1995, p. 96), or highly correlated (Roberts, Kassel, & Gotlib, 1995; see also using alternative assessment of personal self-esteem stability, De Cremer & Sedikides, 2005; Neiss, Sedikides, & Stevenson, 2006).

this is where this variable intersects with collective narcissism. The two variables overlap in their preoccupation with the ingroup's greatness. However, collective narcissism is expected to be unrelated to opposition to equality. For collective narcissists, the persistence of social hierarchies is not likely to be a vital concern. It is important to note that the grandiose image of an ingroup does not have to be based on its power, social status, or economic dominance. Any other excuse or group characteristic can be used to support the belief in the uniqueness and greatness of an ingroup. In addition, social dominance orientation and collective narcissism are likely to predict intergroup aggressiveness for different reasons. For social dominance orientation, the primary reason is securing the dominant position of an ingroup, whereas aggressiveness related to collective narcissism is responsive to perceived threats to the ingroup's image.

Collective Narcissism and Right-Wing Authoritarianism

We expected these two variables to be positively correlated. *Right-wing authoritarianism* is defined as the convergence of (a) submissiveness to established and legitimate social authorities, (b) adherence to social conventions that are endorsed by society and its authorities, and (c) aggressiveness against those who question or endanger social order and those indicated by authorities (e.g., Altemeyer, 1998). Both collective narcissism and authoritarianism are concerned with the coherence and homogeneity of an ingroup. In the case of authoritarianism, the cohesiveness secures order and predictability in the social environment and reduces the possibility of experiencing undesirable cognitive uncertainty (e.g., Duckitt, 2006; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). For collective narcissists, ingroup coherence is likely to confirm the assumed, unanimously accepted greatness of the ingroup. Authoritarianism and collective narcissism are likely to predict sensitivity to threat to the ingroup and outgroup negativity (for the relationship between authoritarianism and responsiveness to threat, see, e.g., Duckitt & Fisher, 2003). However, whereas in the case of authoritarianism, aggressiveness serves to protect the group as predictable social environment, collective narcissism is likely to be more concerned with securing the ingroup's positive image.

Method

Participants and Procedure

The first study was conducted among 263 students at a large American university in late 2005. Their ages ranged from 17 to 26 years ($M = 18.69$, $SD = .99$; 2 students failed to provide information about age). There were 191 women and 72 men. Participants were asked to complete an online questionnaire containing several psychological measures in return for research participation credit.

Measures

Item generation. To create the Collective Narcissism Scale, items were generated on the basis of the definition of the construct and existing inventories of individual narcissism, mostly the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI; Emmons, 1987; Raskin & Terry, 1988) and Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory—III (Millon, 2006). The items that corresponded to the core aspects of the concept of individual narcissism but that could also be meaningfully translated onto a group level were used. More specifically, items loading on Leadership/Authority, Exploitativeness/Entitlement, and Superiority/Arrogance factors differentiated by Emmons (1987) or Authority, Superiority, Exploitativeness and Entitlement factors differentiated by Raskin and Terry (1988) were used. Only a few items from the Self-Absorption/Self-Admiration factor differentiated by Emmons (1987) and Vanity, Self-Sufficiency and Exhibitionism factors differentiated by Raskin and Terry (1988) were used, because most of the items that loaded on these factors reflected opinions about physical aspect of the self, individual actions, or relationships between self and others that cannot be meaningfully converted into group actions (e.g., "I like to look at myself in the mirror a lot" or "Everybody likes to hear my stories").

Items corresponding to perceived exceptionality, superiority, and authority over others (e.g., "People always seem to recognize my authority" became "I wish other groups would more quickly recognize authority of my group" or "I have a natural talent for influencing people" became "My group has all predispositions to influence and direct others"); a special contribution or significance of the self (e.g., "If I ruled the world, it would be a much better place" became "If my group had a major say in the world, the world would be a much better place"); self-absorption (e.g., "I am an extraordinary person" became "My group is extraordinary"); the need to be the center of attention (e.g., "I like to be the center of attention" became "I like when my group is a center of attention"); special deservingness and entitlement (e.g., "I will be never satisfied until I get all I deserve" became "I will never be satisfied until my group gets all it deserves"; "I insist upon getting the respect that is due to me" became "I insist upon my group getting the respect that is due to it" or "I want to amount to something in the eyes of the world" became "I want my group to amount to something in the eyes of the world"); and items reflecting sensitivity to criticism and lack of recognition, adopted mostly from the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory—III (Millon, 2006; e.g., "People have never given me enough recognition for the things that I have done" became "Not many people seem to fully understand the importance of my group") were used.

For selected items, beliefs about the self were replaced with beliefs about one's ingroup, and whole sentences were adjusted where necessary. The construct of collective narcissism and the items selected to measure it were then discussed with experts in the fields of political and social psychology, clinical psychology, political science, and conflict resolution. After this discussion, the wording of some items was again adjusted to better reflect the crucial aspects of the concept of collective narcissism. Twenty-three items were generated for further analyses (see Table 1). For Study 1, the scale was constructed in which participants were asked to think about their national ingroup and indicate the degree to which they agreed with a given item using a 6-point scale (1 = *I strongly disagree*, 6 = *I strongly agree*).

To assess the divergent, convergent, and predictive validity of the Collective Narcissism Scale, additional measures were included in the questionnaire. The 7-point Likert scale (1 = *totally disagree* to 7 = *totally agree*) was used throughout the rest of the questionnaire.

Table 1
Items of the Collective Narcissism Scale With Factors Loading in Study 1 and British and Polish Validation Samples

Item	Factor loading		
	Study 1	British	Polish
1. I wish other groups would more quickly recognize authority of my group.[a]	.68	.77	.68
2. My group deserves special treatment.[a]	.68	.65	.66
3. I will never be satisfied until my group gets all it deserves.[a]	.67	.77	.63
4. I insist upon my group getting the respect that is due to it.[a]	.66	.72	.59
5. It really makes me angry when others criticize my group.[a]	.63	.58	.70
6. If my group had a major say in the world, the world would be a much better place.[a]	.63	.86	.59
7. I do not get upset when people do not notice achievements of my group. (reversed)[a]	.63	.73	.65
8. Not many people seem to fully understand the importance of my group.[a]	.61	.66	.76
9. The true worth of my group is often misunderstood.[a]	.58	.60	.65
10. I love my group almost as much as I love myself.	.58	—	—
11. My group is extraordinary.	.58	—	—
12. My group stands out positively among other groups.	.52	—	—
13. I like when my group is a center of attention.	.50	—	—
14. My group rarely fails.	.50	—	—
15. People in my group are more attractive than others.	.49	—	—
16. I want my group to amount to something in the eyes of the world.	.39	—	—
17. My group has all predispositions to influence and direct others.	.31	—	—
18. If it only wanted, my group could convince other groups to do almost anything.	.30	—	—
19. My group has made significant contributions to humanity.	.30	—	—
20. Other groups are envious of my group.	.24	—	—
21. My group is a great influence over other groups.	.21	—	—
22. My group never forgives an insult caused by other groups.	.10	—	—
23. I am envious of other groups' good fortune.	.08	—	—

[a] Items that formed the final Collective Narcissism Scale.

Personal self-esteem. Participants were asked to what extent they agree with the statement "I have high self-esteem" ($M = 5.07$, $SD = 1.57$).

Constructive patriotism and blind patriotism. Five items measuring constructive ($\alpha = .71$; $M = 4.00$, $SD = .55$) and five items measuring blind patriotism ($\alpha = .78$; $M = 2.17$, $SD = .65$) were randomly selected from the original scale proposed by Schatz et al. (1999).

Social dominance orientation. An abbreviated 10-item version of the Social Dominance Orientation Scale (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) was used ($\alpha = .85$; $M = 2.25$, $SD = .64$), following its successful application by McFarland (2005). According to the suggestions of Jost and Thompson (2000), a group-based dominance subscale ($\alpha = .83$; $M = 2.48$, $SD = .78$) and an opposition to equality subscale ($\alpha = .82$; $M = 1.92$, $SD = .69$) were constructed.

Right-wing authoritarianism. The abbreviated version of the original Right Wing Authoritarianism Scale proposed by Altemeyer (1988) was used ($\alpha = .82$; $M = 2.17$, $SD = .60$), following McFarland (2005).

National group identification. A six-item scale ($\alpha = .82$; $M = 3.01$, $SD = .58$) was adapted from Brown, Condor, Mathews, Wade, and Williams (1986) to assess the strength of identification with the national ingroup.

Unwillingness to forgive outgroups. To measure this variable, four items ($\alpha = .63$; $M = 2.73$, $SD = .61$) were adapted from the scale proposed by Hewstone et al. (2004).

Perception of threat to the United States from outgroups. This variable was measured by the following three items: "Islamic fundamentalism is a critical threat to the U.S." "Unfriendly countries with nuclear weapons are a critical threat to the U.S." and "International terrorism is a critical threat to the U.S." ($\alpha = .73$; $M = 3.77$, $SD = .69$).

Preference for military aggression. The scale measuring this variable consisted of the following 10 items: "Military strength is more important than respect abroad"; "U.S. military spending should be increased"; "Military strength is more important than economic strength"; "I supported going to war against Iraq"; "U.S. made the right decision going to war with Iraq"; "The situation in Iraq is improving"; "Most Iraqis want the U.S. to leave" (reversed); "Iraq gave support to Al Qaeda"; "U.S. military has tried to avoid civilian casualties in Iraq"; and "President Bush should have built more international support for war in Iraq" (reversed; $\alpha = .89$; $M = 2.43$; $SD = .64$).

Results

Factor Structure of the Collective Narcissism Scale

To test the factor structure of the Collective Narcissism Scale, we performed a maximum likelihood exploratory factor analysis on the data collected in Study 1. A scree plot analysis indicated that a one-factor solution was most appropriate. The one factor explained 26% of the variance (eigenvalue = 5.91; the second factor had an eigenvalue of 1.31 and explained only 4% more variance over and above the first). However, a maximum likelihood confirmatory factor analysis showed that the one-factor model underlying all 23 items did not fit the data very well (see Table 2).

Thus, the initial 23-item scale was shortened to nine items. These items were selected on the basis of their face validity as evaluated by experts, the strength of their factor loadings, and the strength of their contribution to the overall reliability of the scale. Experts in political, social, and clinical psychology evaluated the relevance and representativeness of the items. Items with factor loadings of .60 and higher were retained. One item with factor loading .58 was also retained because of its face valid connection to the concept of collective narcissism. However, Items 10 and 11, with similar factor loadings, did not receive expert consensus because of their excessive resemblance to items measuring nationalism, national pride, and group identification, and they were

Table 2
Fit Indices for the CFA Models for the Collective Narcissism Scale in Study 1 and Polish Validation Sample

Model	*df*	χ^2	χ^2/df	RMSEA	GFI	AGFI	NNFI	CFI	RMR
One-factor model for 23-item scale (Study 1, $N = 263$)	231	780.23***	3.38	.09	.79	.74	.61	.57	.08
One-factor model for nine-item scale (Study 1)	27	86.09***	3.19	.09	.93	.88	.90	.86	.04
Modified one-factor model for nine-item scale (error covariances added; Study 1)	23	47.22**	2.05	.06	.96	.93	.94	.97	.027
Modified one-factor model for nine-item scale (error covariances added; Polish validation sample, $N = 257$)	22	42.21**	1.92	.06	.97	.94	.91	.95	.08

Note. The error covariances of Items 5, 3, and 9; 2 and 8 were added in modified models. CFA = confirmatory factor analysis; RMSEA = root-mean-squared error of approximation; GFI = goodness-of-fit index; AGFI = adjusted goodness-of-fit index; NNFI = nonnormed fit index; CFI = comparative fit index; RMR = root-mean-square residual index.
** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$.

dropped from the scale (Simms & Watson, 2007). The results of the maximum likelihood confirmatory factor analysis indicate that the corrected model with nine items relating to one latent factor had a very good fit to the data that improved after adjusting for correlated error variances. The same solution with one latent factor measured by nine items was confirmed in a Polish validation sample of 401 students and in a British validation sample of 47 students (see Table 2).[3]

Collective Narcissism Scale Reliability

The final nine-item Collective Narcissism Scale has high internal consistency. The Cronbach's alpha of the scale in Study 1 is .86 ($M = 3.18$, $SD = .58$). The scale produced item-total correlations greater than .24. The mean interitem correlation was .42. In both validation samples, the nine-item scale had reasonable to high reliability ($\alpha = .74$ in the Polish study, and $\alpha = .84$ in the British study).

Collective Narcissism Scale Validation: Relationship With Social Dominance Orientation, Right-Wing Authoritarianism, National Group Identification, and Patriotism

In Study 1, participants were asked to think about their national group while completing the Collective Narcissism Scale. Therefore, to test the convergent validity of the scale, correlations of collective narcissism with national group identification, blind, and constructive patriotism were assessed. We also examined correlations between collective narcissism and right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation, especially its group-based dominance factor (see Table 3).

Positive correlations were expected and found between collective narcissism and national group identification, blind patriotism, and social dominance orientation and right-wing authoritarianism. Both factors of social dominance orientation—group-based dominance, $r(260) = .56$, $p < .001$, and opposition to equality, $r(260) = .29$, $p < .001$—are related to collective narcissism. The factors are positively correlated, $r(260) = .45$, $p < .001$. Thus, to assess the unique relationship between collective narcissism and aspects of social dominance orientation, we performed the multiple regression analysis in which group-based dominance and opposition to equality were included as predictors and collective narcissism was a criterion variable (controlling for age and gender). The results confirm that collective narcissism has a unique and positive relationship with group-based dominance ($b = .40$, $SE = .04$, $p < .001$) but not with opposition to equality ($b = .04$, $SE = .05$, $p = .46$), $F(2, 256) = 29.57$, $p < .001$, $R^2 = .316$.

The data show that collective narcissism is positively correlated with blind patriotism and negatively correlated with constructive patriotism. Constructive and blind patriotism are negatively correlated. Thus, to assess the unique relationship between collective narcissism and each form of patriotism, we performed the multiple regression analysis in which two forms of patriotism were included as predictors and collective narcissism was a criterion variable (controlling for age and gender). The results reveal that collective narcissism is independently related to blind patriotism ($b = 55$, $SE = .05$, $p < .001$) but not to constructive patriotism ($b = 08$, $SE = .06$, $p = .16$), $F(4, 256) = 35.03$, $p < .001$, $R^2 = .354$. These results confirm the convergent validity of the Collective Narcissism Scale.

In addition, to preliminarily test the divergent validity of the Collective Narcissism Scale, we examined its correlation with personal self-esteem, a variable corresponding to attitude toward the self that should not bear common variance with collective narcissism. The correlational analyses reveal that the relationship between collective narcissism and personal self-esteem is positive, very small, and not significant, $r(260) = .002$, $p = .98$.

[3] The original Collective Narcissism Scale was translated from English to Polish by a bilingual translator. It was then back-translated by an expert in social psychology to ensure the equivalence of meaning of items on both scales. The same method of translation was used in all studies that used non-English-speaking samples. In the British sample, participants were asked to think about their national group while responding to the items. In the Polish sample, participants were first asked to read the items of the Collective Narcissism Scale and decide whether they could think of any group to which these items applied and then respond to the items of the scale. Participants indicated four groups (Poles, Catholics, students of private university, groups of lower social status) to which the items could be meaningfully applied.

Table 3
Correlations Between Collective Narcissism, Right-Wing Authoritarianism, Social Dominance Orientation, Two Aspects of Patriotism, National Group Identification, Personal Self-Esteem, Threat, the Inability to Forgive, and Military Aggression (Study 1, N = 263)

Measure	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Collective narcissism	—									
2. Social dominance orientation	.53****	—								
3. Right-wing authoritarianism	.38****	.33****	—							
4. Blind patriotism	.58****	.53****	.52****	—						
5. Constructive patriotism	−.18***	−.27****	−.45****	−.43****	—					
6. Personal self-esteem	.002	.03	.03	.001	.09	—				
7. National group identification	.49****	.27***	.33****	.45****	−.03	.08	—			
8. Unforgivingness	.43****	.37****	.23****	.36****	−.15*	−.06	.16***	—		
9. Threat	.40****	.28****	.23****	.34****	−.04	.05	.30****	.26****	—	
10. Importance of US military	.47****	.44****	.44****	.45****	−.33****	.10	.34****	.35****	.30****	—
11. Support for war in Iraq	.49****	.45****	.45****	.54****	−.33****	.12†	.33****	.26****	.35****	.62****

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. *** $p < .001$. **** $p < .000$.

Predictive Validity of the Collective Narcissism Scale: Relationship With Perceived Threat From Outgroups, Inability to Forgive, and Support for Military Aggression

We examined the predictive validity of the Collective Narcissism Scale by looking at the relationship between collective narcissism, the inability to forgive for wrongs done to the ingroup by other groups, perceived threat from outgroups' aggression, and support for military aggression. We expected that collective narcissism would account for the variance in all three dependent variables over and above other related variables, such as social dominance orientation, right-wing authoritarianism, patriotism, and national group identification. We also assumed that the pattern of relationships between collective narcissism and the dependent variables might be complex. More specifically, we expected that the relationship between collective narcissism and support for military aggression would likely be mediated by perceived threat to the ingroup.

To test the hypotheses, we performed the path analysis that tested a model that assumed that collective narcissism, national group identification, social dominance orientation, authoritarianism, blind patriotism, and constructive patriotism independently predict all dependent variables. In addition, this model assumed that the relationship between collective narcissism and preference for military aggression is partially mediated by perceived threat to the ingroup. Most research in social sciences confirms the direction of causality assumed in this model, suggesting that broader ideological orientations and basic ingroup identification constrain specific attitudes, such as opinions about the use of force in international relations or perceived threat (rather than vice versa; see, e.g., Cohrs, Moschner, Maes, & Kielmann, 2005; de Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003; Duckitt, 2006; Duckitt & Sibley, 2006; Feshbach, 1994; Sidanius, Feshbach, Levin, & Pratto, 1997).

The analyses were conducted using LISREL 8.80 (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 2006). The data were analyzed using maximum likelihood estimation. We ran all the analyses controlling for age (centered at the sample mean) and gender (dummy coded on the −1/1 basis). Then we deleted all nonsignificant links. Age, gender, national group identification, and constructive patriotism were dropped from the initial model because they did not significantly explain the variance in the dependent variables. In addition, we allowed the indirect relationship between blind patriotism and military aggression through perceived threat suggested by model modification indices and consistent with the theory.

The improved model has a very good fit to the data. The standardized path coefficients for this model are displayed in Figure 1. This model was tested against an alternative model in which the effects of collective narcissism were not taken into account. The results indicate that the alternative model has worse fit to the data (see Table 4). The difference between chi-squares amounts to 16.53 ($df = 3$) and is significant ($p < .001$).

The improved model reveals that collective narcissism ($b = .38$, $SE = .13$, $p < .01$), social dominance orientation ($b = .34$, $SE = .11$, $p < .01$), authoritarianism ($b = .51$, $SE = .11$, $p < .01$), and blind patriotism ($b = .32$, $SE = .12$, $p < .01$) independently predict support for military aggression. In addition, perceived threat from outgroups predicts support for military aggression ($b = .27$, $SE = .09$, $p < .01$). Perceived threat partially mediates the relationship between collective narcissism (indirect effect [*IE*] = .05, $p < .01$) and blind patriotism ($IE = .02$, $p < .05$) and support for military aggression. Collective narcissism ($b = .34$, $SE = .07$, $p < .01$) and social dominance orientation ($b = .18$, $SE = .06$, $p < .01$) independently predict the inability to forgive the wrongdoings of the outgroups. The inability to forgive is not related to military aggression or the threat of aggression of others. Taken together, the independent and mediating variables account for approximately 45% of the variance in military aggression. Collective narcissism and blind patriotism account for 18% of the variance in perceived threat. Collective narcissism and social dominance orientation account for 21% of variance in the inability to forgive.

Discussion

The results of Study 1 establish the reliability and validity of the Collective Narcissism Scale used with reference to a national ingroup. In addition, the data from the Polish validation sample indicate that the scale can be effectively used with reference to other social groups (e.g., religious, political, social class). The common characteristic that these groups seem to share is the fact that they are realistic social groups (Reynolds, Turner, & Haslam, 2000) with high entitativity (Yzerbyt, Castano, Leyens, & Paladino, 2000). The results collected in three different countries (the



Figure 1. Structural equation modeling of the relationships between collective narcissism, social dominance orientation, right-wing authoritarianism, blind patriotism, threat, the inability to forgive, and military aggression (Study 1, $N = 263$). The numerical values indicate standardized regression weights.

American sample and Polish and British validation samples) indicate that the Collective Narcissism Scale can be meaningfully used in different sociocultural contexts.

The results of the correlational analyses and path analyses confirm the divergent, convergent, and predictive validity of the Collective Narcissism Scale. They show that collective narcissism is not associated with personal self-esteem, but it is related to variables that indicate identification with a national group, high and uncritical positive attachment to a national group (blind patriotism), belief in its greatness and superiority (social dominance orientation, especially group-based dominance component), and attachment to its authorities (right-wing authoritarianism).

Moreover, collective narcissism predicts aggressiveness and support for violence in intergroup relations, a tendency to perceive threat from outgroup aggression, and unwillingness to forgive outgroups for wrongs done to an ingroup in the past. The results reveal also that the relationship between collective narcissism and outgroup aggression is partially mediated by perceived threat to the ingroup from the aggression of others. These results provide preliminary support for the assumption that the link between collective narcissism and intergroup aggressiveness is mediated by perceived threat to the ingroup and its positive image. Most important, the results indicate that collective narcissism has predictive value over and above the contribution of related variables, such as blind patriotism, social dominance orientation, and right-wing authoritarianism.

Although the results of Study 1 confirm the convergent and predictive validity of the Collective Narcissism Scale, the verification of its divergent validity should be treated as preliminary. Although the results show that collective narcissism is different from personal self-esteem, it is vital to demonstrate that collective narcissism is not just a form of individual narcissism. Thus, in Studies 2 and 3, we tested the hypothesis that collective and individual narcissism are separate, although positively related, variables. Most important, we assumed that the two variables predict different attitudes and behaviors. We also examined whether the Collective Narcissism Scale can be effectively used with reference to an ethnic group.

Study 2: Collective and Individual Narcissism, Interpersonal Aggressiveness, and Intergroup Antagonism

In Study 2, we tested predictions regarding the relationships between individual and collective narcissism and interpersonal and intergroup hostility. We expected the collective and individual forms of narcissism to be positively but not highly related. First,

Table 4
Fit Indices for Models of Relationships Between Collective Narcissism, Social Dominance Orientation, Authoritarianism, Blind Patriotism, Threat, the Inability to Forgive, and Military Aggression (Study 1, N = 263)

Model	*df*	χ^2	χ^2/df	RMSEA	GFI	AGFI	NNFI	CFI	RMR
With collective narcissism	6	6.14	1.02	.005	.99	.97	.99	1.00	.01
Without collective narcissism	9	24.19	2.68	.08	.97	.93	.94	.98	.07

Note. RMSEA = root-mean-squared error of approximation; GFI = goodness-of-fit indext; AGFI = adjusted goodness-of-fit index; NNFI = nonnormed fit index; CFI = comparative fit index; RMR = root-mean-square residual index.

these variables correspond to different levels of functioning of the self: individual and social (for a discussion of the relationships between processes associated with individual and collective self, see, e.g., Schopler & Insko, 1992). Second, the two forms of narcissism can develop separately. They are also likely to have different effects on attitudes and behaviors. Individual narcissists are chronically intolerant of criticism and doubts regarding the greatness of the self and are likely to react with anger and hostility in interpersonal relations. They are likely to find signs of provocation in the behavior of others (Baumeister et al., 1996; Bushman & Baumeister, 1998). Thus, we expected that individual, but not collective, narcissism would be related to interpersonal aggressiveness.

The relationship between individual narcissism and intergroup negativity has rarely been studied. The few studies of this relationship indicated that individual narcissism is positively, although moderately, related to ethnocentrism (Bizumic & Duckitt, 2008) and that defensive personal self-esteem (which is related to individual narcissism) predicts ethnic prejudice (Jordan et al., 2005; Kernis et al., 2005). We expected that when we controlled the common variance of collective and individual narcissism, only collective narcissism would reliably predict intergroup aggressiveness. Collective narcissists are emotionally invested in a grandiose image of their ingroup and are on constant guard for perceived criticism or disrespect toward an ingroup. We expected that collective narcissism would be related to negativity toward typical outgroups with whom the ingroup shares a history of mutual grievances. In Study 2, we used the Collective Narcissism Scale in a sample of Black and White British participants, and we explored ethnic, rather than national, collective narcissism as a predictor of intergroup animosity.

Method

Participants and Procedure

Study 2 was conducted among 92 undergraduate students of a British, London-based university in early 2008. There were 52 women and 40 men aged from 18 to 49 years ($M = 28.80$, $SD = 7.10$). Forty-eight participants identified their ethnicity as Black and 44 as White. The age and gender distribution in both groups was similar. All participants were British citizens. Participants were asked to complete a questionnaire in return for research participation credit.

Measures

Collective narcissism. This was measured by the newly constructed nine-item Collective Narcissism Scale ($\alpha = .82$; $M = 3.30$, $SD = .99$). We asked participants to provide their answer using a scale from 1 (*I strongly disagree*) to 6 (*I strongly agree*) while thinking about their ethnic group. The maximum likelihood exploratory factor analysis and scree plot indicated a one-factor solution that explained 46.57% of variance (eigenvalue = 2.79; no other eigenvalues greater than 1).

Individual narcissism. This variable was measured by the NPI (Emmons, 1987; $\alpha = 91$; $M = 2.97$, $SD = .78$). Instead of the forced-choice format typically used in administering the NPI, we employed a less time- and space-consuming approach and asked participants to respond using a scale from 1 (*not like me at all*) to 5 (*definitely like me*) to the items indicating individual narcissism (following the successful application of this method in earlier studies; see Ang & Yusof, 2006; Bazínska & Drat-Ruszczak, 2000).

Interpersonal aggressiveness. This variable was measured with a shortened version of the Aggression Questionnaire (Buss & Perry, 1992) proposed by Bryant and Smith (2001; $\alpha = .90$; $M = 2.15$, $SD = .88$). This scale measures a tendency for physical and verbal aggression toward other people as well as a tendency to get angry and hostile in interpersonal relations.

Pro-Black antagonism. This variable reflects Black people's perceived relative deprivation in comparison with White people and anti-White sentiment ($\alpha = .83$; $M = 3.23$, $SD = .70$). It consists of following items adopted from the measure of symbolic racism (Henry & Sears, 2002): with answers provided on a scale from 1 (*I strongly disagree*) to 5 (*I strongly agree*), "Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten less than they deserve from society"; "Over the past few years, Whites have gotten more economically than they deserve"; with answers provided on scale from 1 (*none*) to 5 (*a great deal*), "How much discrimination against Blacks do you feel there is in the United Kingdom today, limiting their chances to get ahead?" and "How much of the racial tension that exists in the United Kingdom today do you think Whites are responsible for creating?" In addition, participants responded to the following statement: "Please indicate which statement best describes your feelings." The answers were provided on a scale from 1 (*strongly prefer White people to Black people*) to 5 (*strongly prefer Black people to White people*) with a midpoint of 3 (*like Black people and White people equally*). The higher the score in this scale, the higher the belief in Black people's relative deprivation and preference for Black people over White people. Low scores in this scale indicate rejection of the belief that Black people in Great Britain are disadvantaged in comparison with White people and preference of White people over Black people.

Results

The correlations presented in Table 5 confirm that collective and individual forms of narcissism are positively and moderately related. They also reveal that individual, rather than collective, narcissism is significantly related to interpersonal aggressiveness, but the relationship between individual narcissism and pro-Black antagonism is nonsignificant ($p = .15$). Collective narcissism is positively and significantly related to pro-Black antagonism and

Table 5
Correlations of Collective and Individual Narcissism, Interpersonal Aggressiveness, and Pro-Black Antagonism (Study 2, N = 92)

Measure	1	2	3
1. Collective narcissism	—		
2. Individual narcissism	.27***	—	
3. Interpersonal aggressiveness	.10	.44****	—
4. Pro-Black antagonism	.27***	−.10	−.13

*** $p < .001$. **** $p < .000$.

positively but not significantly related to interpersonal aggressiveness.

Individual and Collective Narcissism and Interpersonal and Intergroup Negativity

To test the hypothesis that individual, rather than collective, narcissism predicts interpersonal aggressiveness, we performed a multiple regression analysis using collective and individual narcissism as predictors and interpersonal aggressiveness as the criterion variable (controlling for age, gender, and ethnic group). The analysis confirmed that only individual narcissism significantly predicts interpersonal aggressiveness ($b = .52$, $SE = .11$, $p < .001$), $F(5, 86) = 5.92$, $p < .001$, $R^2 = .26$. For collective narcissism, $b = .02$, $SE = .10$, $p = .85$.

To test the hypothesis that collective, rather than individual, narcissism predicts pro-Black antagonism, we performed a hierarchical multiple regression analysis testing two models. In Model 1, we looked at the first-order effects of the ethnic group and both forms of narcissism on pro-Black antagonism (controlling for age and gender). In the second model, we tested two interaction effects: between collective narcissism and the ethnic group and between individual narcissism and the ethnic group. The dichotomous variables—gender and the dummy variable for the ethnic group—were coded on a −1/1 basis. We tested the hypothesis that collective narcissism would be positively related to the belief in Black people's deprivation and animosity against White people among Black participants and negatively related among White participants. We expected no such relationships for individual narcissism.

The results for Model 1 revealed a significant first-order effect of the ethnic group: Black people in Great Britain tend to believe in their group's deprivation and prefer Black people over White people, whereas White people tend not to believe in Black people's deprivation and prefer White people over Black people ($b = -.46$, $SE = .08$, $p = .001$), $F(5, 86) = 11.39$, $p < .001$, $R^2 = .398$. The relationship between collective narcissism and pro-Black antagonism is positive but not significant ($b = .11$, $SE = .07$, $p = .12$). The relationship between individual narcissism and pro-Black antagonism is negative and not significant ($b = -.04$, $SE = .11$, $p = .89$). The addition of the interaction terms in Model 2 led to a significant increase in the amount of variance explained by the model, $\Delta R^2(2, 84) = .11$, $p < .001$. Only the interaction between an ethnic group and collective narcissism is significant ($b = -.23$, $SE = .07$, $p < .001$). To probe this interaction, we computed simple slopes for the relationship between collective narcissism and pro-Black antagonism among White and Black participants, according to a procedure proposed by Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken (2003). This analysis indicated that among Black participants, collective narcissism is related to the belief in Black people's deprivation and anti-White sentiment ($b = .33$, $SE = .08$, $p < .001$), whereas among White participants, collective narcissism is related to the rejection of the belief in Black people's deprivation and anti-Black sentiment ($b = -.18$, $SE = .10$, $p < .05$; see Figure 2).

Discussion

Results of Study 2 indicate that although individual and collective forms of narcissism are moderately and positively related, they predict aggressiveness on different levels of individual functioning. Individual, but not collective, narcissism is related to a tendency to get angry and physically or/and verbally aggress against other people in interpersonal relations. On the other hand, collective, rather than individual, narcissism is related to pro-Black antagonism. Thus, individual and collective narcissism do not account for the same variance in intergroup attitudes. The results of Study 2 indicate the existence of dissociation and tension between Black people and White people in Great Britain. These results corroborate earlier findings of few studies that investigated this issue (e.g., Hodson, Hooper, Dovidio, & Gaertner, 2005).



Figure 2. Relationship between collective narcissism (CN) and pro-Black antagonism among Black and White participants (Study 2). * $p < .05$. *** $p < .001$.

In Study 2, we used the NPI to assess all factors of individual narcissism and used the aggregate measure in the analyses. However, recent studies have suggested that psychological entitlement—a pervasive sense that one deserves more than others (W. K. Campbell et al., 2004)—may be the aspect of individual narcissism that is responsible for most of its destructive social effects and its relationship with interpersonal aggressiveness (W. K. Campbell et al., 2004). Therefore, in Study 3, we investigated the relationships between collective narcissism, psychological entitlement, and prejudice.

Study 3: Collective Narcissism, Psychological Entitlement, and Prejudice

In Study 3, we tested the hypothesis that collective narcissism is a variable that is distinct from a component of individual narcissism that inspired psychological entitlement, a separate domain of research. Psychological entitlement was demonstrated to relate to unconstructive interpersonal behavior, such as competitive choices in common dilemmas, selfishness in romantic relationships, and interpersonal aggression following ego threat (W. K. Campbell et al., 2004). In Study 3, we tested the assumption that collective narcissism and psychological entitlement are positively correlated but that only collective narcissism is related to ethnic prejudice. More specifically, in a Polish sample we tested the assumption that only collective narcissism is associated with anti-Semitism.

Method

Participants and Procedure

Study 3 was conducted among 148 students of a large Polish university in early 2008. Their ages ranged from 18 to 45 years ($M = 23.12$, $SD = 4.90$), and there were 135 women and 13 men. Participants were asked to take part in an online questionnaire containing several psychological measures in return for research participation credit and the possibility to participate in a prize drawing.

Measures

Collective narcissism. The nine-item Collective Narcissism Scale was used ($\alpha = .77$; $M = 3.27$, $SD = .67$). We asked participants to think about their national group and provide their answers using a scale from 1 (*I strongly disagree*) to 6 (*I strongly agree*). The same translation of the Collective Narcissism Scale that was used in the Polish validation study was used in this study. The maximum likelihood exploratory factor analysis and scree plot indicated a one-factor solution that explained 30.41% of the variance (eigenvalue = 2.74; no other eigenvalues greater than 1).

Psychological entitlement. This variable was measured with a Polish translation of the nine-item Psychological Entitlement Scale proposed by W. K. Campbell et al. (2004; $\alpha = .83$; $M = 3.59$, $SD = .99$). Here and in all cases in which no published version of the scale existed in Polish, items were translated from English and back-translated by an independent social psychologist who was also fluent in Polish, to ensure equivalence of meaning.

Anti-Semitic prejudice. Prejudice against Jewish people was measured using an adjusted Social Distance Scale adopted from Struch and Schwartz (1989; $\alpha = .71$; $M = 5.62$, $SD = 1.01$). Four items measured desirable social distance from persons of Jewish origin: "Would you like a Jew to be your neighbor?"; "Would you like a Jew to be your friend?"; "Would you mind your child playing with a Jewish child?" (reverse coded); "Would you mind your child marrying a person of Jewish origin?" (reverse coded). Participants were asked to respond to the four items, using a scale from 1 (*definitely no*) to 7 (*definitely yes*). The higher the number, the higher the anti-Semitic prejudice it indicates.

Results

Correlational analyses indicate that there is a significant but low positive relationship between collective narcissism and psychological entitlement, $r(147) = .18$, $p < .03$. Most important, the results reveal that collective narcissism, $r(146) = .33$, $p < .001$, but not psychological entitlement, $r(146) = .07$, $p = .37$, is related to anti-Semitism.

Collective Narcissism, Psychological Entitlement, and Anti-Semitism

To confirm that only collective narcissism significantly explains the variance in anti-Semitism, we performed a multiple regression analysis in which collective narcissism and psychological entitlement were included as predictors and anti-Semitic prejudice was a criterion variable (controlling for age and gender). The results confirmed that collective narcissism ($b = .66$, $SE = .16$, $p < .001$), $F(4, 142) = 7.17$, $p < .001$, $R^2 = .168$, but not psychological entitlement ($b = .07$, $SE = .11$, $p = .54$) is positively related to anti-Semitism.

Discussion

Study 3 reveals that collective narcissism and psychological entitlement, an aspect of individual narcissism associated with interpersonal aggressiveness, are positively but not strongly correlated. Moreover, Study 3 reveals that collective narcissism, but not psychological entitlement, accounts for variance in intergroup attitudes. Thus, Study 3 replicates the results of Study 2 in a different cultural and social context using the Collective Narcissism Scale with reference to a different social group. After confirming that collective narcissism is not just a form of individual narcissism, in Study 4, we examined what kind of feelings and beliefs about the ingroup lie behind collective narcissism.

Study 4: Collective Narcissism and Explicit and Implicit Collective Self-Esteem

We used the theoretical accounts of individual narcissism to shed light on the group-based feelings that lie behind collective narcissism. Although the phenomenon of individual narcissism has been discussed in psychology for a long time, it has been recently emphasized that it is a complex phenomenon that psychology has only started to untangle (Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001). Most accounts of individual narcissism agree that a grandiose self-image and seeking external admiration are among its defining features. Thus, individual narcissism can be interpreted as personal self-esteem that is contingent on approval and validation from others (Crocker & Park, 2004). According to this account, "narcissists put the goal

of self-worth above other goals and are caught up in the question of whether they are worthless or wonderful" (Crocker & Park, 2004, p. 404). People with contingent self-esteem feel a need to validate their self-worth in the domains on which the self-worth is contingent. Thus, narcissists are motivated to monitor expressions of external approval and admiration versus criticism or disapproval of their self-image. Because people with contingent self-worth tend to exaggerate failures and underestimate successes in the domains of contingency, the acknowledgment of the ingroup by others is never satisfactory (Crocker & Park, 2004; Kernis, 2003; Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001). Narcissists quickly develop tolerance to known sources of social admiration, and they are constantly on the lookout for the new signs of disrespect and criticism (Baumeister & Vohs, 2001; Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001; see also Crocker & Park, 2004).

In addition, in a recent review, Bosson et al. (2008) reported that the current popular social and personality psychological account of individual narcissism (the "mask model") suggests that narcissists are motivated to seek external validation of their inflated self-image because their heightened self-esteem is accompanied by suppressed feelings of shame and low self-esteem. This assumption has recently begun to be tested, and the empirical evidence is mixed. Several studies found that a high level of individual narcissism is related to defensive personal self-esteem (Jordan, Spencer, & Zanna, 2003; Jordan, Spencer, Zanna, Hoshino-Browne, & Correll, 2003) or a discrepancy between explicit and implicit personal self-esteem (Bosson, Brown, Zeigler-Hill, & Swann, 2003; Kernis et al., 2005; Zeigler-Hill, 2006), both operationalized as an interaction of high explicit self-esteem (e.g., measured by Rosenberg's, 1965 classic self-report scale) and low implicit self-esteem (measured by, e.g., the Implicit Association Test [IAT] proposed by Farnham, Greenwald, & Banaji, 1999, or the Name Letter Test, e.g., Kitayama & Karasawa, 1997). However, in their review, Bosson et al. (2008) reported meta-analyses of published and unpublished data revealing that the support for the mask model is not consistent. They suggested that both the theory of narcissism and the assessment of implicit attitudes need refinement.

We propose that collective narcissism, analogous to individual narcissism, can be seen as collective self-esteem that is contingent on admiration and acknowledgment from others. Because the need for social admiration is never fulfilled, collective narcissism should integrate high regard for the ingroup with a belief that others do not sufficiently acknowledge it. In Study 4, we tested the prediction that collective narcissism is related to high private (which reflects the positive regard of the ingroup) and low public (which reflects the belief that other people do not evaluate the ingroup positively) collective self-esteem (Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990; Luhtanen & Cocker, 1992). In addition, we tested the prediction that collective narcissism can be interpreted as high but ambivalent collective self-esteem. We examined explicit and implicit ingroup evaluations underlying collective narcissism following the conceptualization of narcissism proposed by the mask model. We tested the hypothesis that collective narcissism is related to an explicit, highly positive evaluation of the ingroup combined with the lack of its positive evaluation on the implicit level. We expected that the level of collective narcissism would be the highest among people who report high private collective self-esteem and low implicit group esteem.

Method

Participants and Procedure

Study 4 was conducted among 262 students at a large Polish university in 2007. Their ages ranged from 19 to 53 years (M = 24.96, SD = 5.72). There were 239 women and 22 men among the participants. In an online study, participants were asked to log in to a secure website, and they were first asked to perform the adjusted IAT that measured their implicit evaluative associations with Poland versus other countries. Next, they were asked to respond to the nine-item Collective Narcissism Scale and the Collective Self-Esteem Scale. After responding to all the measures, participants were thanked and debriefed. They were given a research credit for their participation.

Measures

Collective narcissism. The Polish version of the nine-item national Collective Narcissism Scale (α = .84; M = 3.21, SD = .75) was used, as in previous studies. The maximum likelihood exploratory factor analysis and scree plot indicated a one-factor solution that explained 44.23% of variance (eigenvalue = 3.98; no other eigenvalues greater than 1).

Collective self-esteem. We used the Collective Self-Esteem Scale (α = .85; M = 4.31, SD = .81; Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992) to measure this variable and its four components using Member (α = .56; M = 4.64, SD = .96), Identity (α = .76; M = 3.58, SD = 1.17), Private (α = .85; M = 4.99, SD = 1.22) and Public Collective Self-Esteem subscales (α = .79; M = 4.03, SD = 1.04). Participants were asked to think about their national group while responding to the items.

Implicit national esteem. The Web version of the IAT (see Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998; Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2005) measured positive versus negative associations with Polish symbols versus symbols of other nations. The test was constructed analogously to the implicit self-esteem IAT, where words associated with the self (e.g., *me, I, mine*) are contrasted with words signifying unidentified others (e.g., *he, they*; Bosson, Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000; Farnham et al., 1999; Greenwald & Farnham, 2000; Pinter & Greenwald, 2005; see also Cunningham et al., 2003; Cunningham, Preacher, & Banaji, 2001; Lane, Mitchell, & Banaji, 2003). In the IAT measure constructed for Study 4, Polish symbols (e.g., flag, the outline of the map, typical sites) were contrasted with similar symbols of other countries pretested as difficult to identify and unknown to typical Polish students (e.g., Korea, Indonesia). The pleasant and unpleasant words were adopted from Greenwald and Farnham (2000) following their successful application in earlier studies in Poland (e.g., Maison & Mikołajczyk, 2003). Reaction times were measured when the Polish national symbols versus foreign symbols were combined with pleasant versus unpleasant words. The corrected d coefficient ($d - 2SD$) was calculated according to the algorithm provided by Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003; M = .21, SD = .32; minimum = −0.68, maximum = 1.18). The greater the corrected d, the higher implicit national esteem indicated.

Results

Correlational analyses showed that collective narcissism is positively related to private, identity, and membership aspects of

collective self-esteem. In other words, collective narcissists hold a positive image of their group, and they tend to think that their national ingroup is an important part of their identity and that they are good members of their group. Collective narcissism is negatively related to implicit national esteem, but this relationship is nonsignificant ($p = .46$; see Table 6). None of the aspects of collective self-esteem is related to implicit national esteem. The similar lack of a significant relationship between explicit and implicit measures of attitudes has often been reported (Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt, 2005; Karpinski, Steinman, & Hilton, 2005). Because implicit and explicit attitudes are formed and influenced by different processes, such discrepancies are likely to occur (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000).

Collective Narcissism, Explicit Collective Self-Esteem, and Implicit National Esteem

To test the hypotheses that collective narcissism is predicted by the discrepancy between explicit and implicit national esteem and that it is predicted by high private but low public collective self-esteem, we performed a two-step hierarchical multiple regression analysis looking at private and public collective self-esteem and implicit national esteem as predictors and collective narcissism as the criterion variable (controlling for age and gender). In Model 1, we tested the first-order effects of private and public collective self-esteem and implicit national esteem. On the basis of the theoretical hypotheses, in Model 2, we added the interaction of private and public collective self-esteem and the interaction of private collective self-esteem and implicit national self-esteem (see Table 7).[4]

The results for Model 1 revealed significant main effects of private (positive) and public (negative) collective self-esteem. Most important, the results for Model 2 indicated that the first-order effects revealed by Model 1 are qualified by two significant interactions: between private and public collective self-esteem and between private collective self-esteem and implicit national esteem. The interactions are significant and in the expected direction. The addition of the interaction terms leads to a significant increase in the amount of variance explained by the model, $\Delta R^2(2, 248) = .03$, $p < .01$. After the interactions are included in the equation, the significant negative relationship between implicit national esteem and collective narcissism emerges.

To probe the interaction between public and private collective self-esteem, we analyzed the simple slopes for the relationship between public collective self-esteem and collective narcissism at one standard deviation below (for low level of private collective self-esteem) and one standard deviation above (for high level of private collective self-esteem) the mean of private collective self-esteem, according to the procedure proposed by Aiken and West (1991). The analyses indicated that the relationship between public collective self-esteem and collective narcissism is negative and marginally significant on lower levels of private collective self-esteem ($b = .04$, $SE = .03$, $p = .10$), and it is negative and significant on higher levels of private collective self-esteem ($b = -.08$, $SE = .02$, $p < .001$; see Figure 3). To probe the interaction between private collective self-esteem and implicit national esteem, we analyzed the simple slopes for the relationship between implicit national esteem and collective narcissism at one standard deviation below (for low level of private collective self-esteem)

Table 6
Correlations of Collective Narcissism, Aspects of Collective Self-Esteem, and Implicit National Esteem (Study 4, N = 262)

Measure	1	2	3	4	5
1. Collective narcissism	—				
2. Membership	.25****	—			
3. Private	.44****	.59****	—		
4. Public	.07	.39****	.45****	—	
5. Identity	.54****	.30****	.45****	.26****	—
6. Implicit national esteem	−.05	−.09	.06	.04	.05

**** $p < .000$.

Table 7
Multiple Regression Analysis of Effects of Private and Public Collective Self-Esteem and Implicit National Esteem on Collective Narcissism (Study 4, N = 262; Controlled for Age and Gender)

Variable	*B*	*SE B*	β
Step 1			
Public collective self-esteem	−.11***	.05	−.14
Private collective self-esteem	.38****	.05	.51
Implicit national esteem	−.04	.04	−.06
Step 2			
Public collective self-esteem	−.11***	.05	−.15
Private collective self-esteem	.36****	.05	.47
Implicit national esteem	−.07†	.04	−.09
Public × Private	−.09*	.04	−.14
Implicit × Private	−.08*	.04	−.12

Note. $R^2 = .272$ for Step 1; $\Delta R^2 = .04$ for Step 2 ($ps < .05$).
† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. *** $p < .001$. **** $p < .000$.

[4] Collective self-esteem comprises four facets that we assessed in Study 4: private, public, identity, and membership. The four facets of collective self-esteem are positively correlated. To exclude the possibility that the predicted interactions between private and public collective self-esteem and private and implicit collective self-esteem are affected by these intercorrelations, other possible interactions between the four correlated facets, or interactions between other facets and implicit national self-esteem, we performed a second hierarchical multiple regression analysis that included all four aspects of the collective self-esteem and implicit national esteem in Model 1 and all possible two-way interactions of the five main predictors in Model 2. The results for Model 1 show that collective narcissism is independently predicted by private (positively; $b = .19$, $SE = .04$, $p < .001$), identity (positively; $b = .30$, $SE = .03$, $p < .001$), and public (negatively; $b = -.13$, $SE = .04$, $p < .001$) collective self-esteem. The results for Model 2 indicate that the first-order effects revealed by Model 1 are qualified by two significant interactions: between private collective self-esteem and implicit national esteem ($b = -.10$, $SE = .05$, $p < .05$) and between private and public collective self-esteem ($b = -.09$, $SE = .05$, $p < .05$), $F(17, 245) = 12.06$, $p < .001$, $R^2 = .456$. The addition of the interaction terms leads to a significant increase in the amount of variance explained by the model, $\Delta R^2(10, 245) = .05$, $p < .01$. No other interaction is significant. However, after the interactions are entered into the equation, the negative relationship between collective narcissism and implicit national esteem becomes significant ($b = -.24$, $SE = .11$, $p < .05$).



Figure 3. Interaction effect of two aspects of collective self-esteem (CSE) on collective narcissism (Study 4). *** $p < .001$.

and one standard deviation above (for high level of private collective self-esteem) the mean of private collective self-esteem. The results revealed that the relationship between collective narcissism and implicit national esteem is nonsignificant on low levels of private collective self-esteem ($b = -.001$, $SE = .03$, $p = .85$), but it is negative and significant on high levels of collective self-esteem ($b = -.07$, $SE = .03$, $p < .05$; see Figure 4).

Discussion

The results of Study 4 confirm both hypotheses assuming the complex nature of group-based feelings underlying collective narcissism. The results reveal that collective narcissism is highest among people who hold their ingroup in positive regard but simultaneously believe that other people do not share their positive view of the ingroup. In addition, the results indicate that collective narcissism is highest among people who express positive beliefs about their ingroup and, at the same time, reveal a rather negative (or at least lack of a positive) implicit evaluation of the ingroup's symbols compared with symbols of other groups, which we claim indicates low implicit group esteem. The latter results suggest that the mask model of narcissism can be extended into the intergroup domain. These results, however, should be treated as preliminary. Although they reveal the expected pattern of relationships, they have been obtained using at least one controversial measurement (the IAT).

Although the IAT (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Greenwald et al., 1998) has been successfully used to advance the theory of attitudes, stereotypes (e.g., Greenwald et al., 1998), prejudice (e.g., Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002), self-esteem, and self-concept (e.g., Baccus, Baldwin, & Packer, 2004; Farnham et al., 1999; Greenwald et al., 2002; Greenwald & Farnham, 2000; Schroder-Abe, Rudolph, & Schutz, 2007; for a recent review, see Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2007), it has also been suggested that the probability for diagnostic inferences from the IAT to attitudes may be quite low (Fiedler, Messner, & Bluemke, 2006).

We decided to use the modified version of the IAT to measure implicit national esteem, because the IAT as a measure of implicit self-esteem was used in numerous studies that have demonstrated its satisfactory reliability and validity (e.g., Bosson et al., 2000; Greenwald & Farnham, 2000; Schroder-Abe et al., 2007). The IAT



Figure 4. Interaction effect of private collective self-esteem (CSE) and implicit national esteem (INE) on collective narcissism (Study 4). * $p < .05$.

was also used to measure implicit personal self-esteem in the majority of studies relating discrepancy between explicit and implicit personal self-esteem to individual narcissism. We constructed the national group IAT measure and used the adjusted IAT score following the procedures and precautions provided by the authors of the test (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000; Greenwald et al., 2003; Nosek et al., 2005; Pinter & Greenwald, 2005) to correct for possible misinterpretations of the meaning of the score. We used this score to indicate an implicit attitude toward a nation, arguably in a way that may be questioned on the basis of the argument of Fiedler et al. (2006). In addition, it has been noted that implicit measures of attitudes, such as the IAT, are context dependent, and similar effects may not be obtained in different national and historical contexts (e.g., Bosson et al., 2008). Thus, further studies using different methods of assessing implicit collective self-esteem are needed to replicate our results and provide a reliable account of the relationship between collective narcissism and implicit collective self-esteem.

After analyzing feelings characterizing collective narcissism and describing its correlates and predictions in the intergroup context, in the last study reported here, we tested the assumptions regarding the link between collective narcissism and intergroup aggressiveness.

Study 5: Collective Narcissism, Perceived Insult, and Intergroup Aggressiveness

In Study 5, we extended predictions of threatened egotism theory related to individual narcissism to an intergroup domain and to collective narcissism. We tested the assumption that only collective narcissism, but not related variables such as right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation, is associated with the perception of ambiguous outgroup behavior as an insult to the ingroup, and only collective narcissism is therefore related to intergroup aggressiveness.

Collective Narcissism, Social Dominance Orientation, Authoritarianism, and Aggressiveness in an Ambiguous Intergroup Situation

We have already demonstrated that social dominance orientation, right-wing authoritarianism, and collective narcissism have similar effects in an intergroup situation that is openly competitive and conflictual (the war on terrorism in Study 1). These variables may, however, lead to quite different predictions in ambiguous situations in which the meaning of the actions of an outgroup is not clear. In Study 5, we looked at effects of all three variables in the context of recent developments within American–Mexican relationships, specifically the construction of the wall along the Mexican–American border by the United States. Intergroup relations are not openly conflictual, and the act of constructing the wall can be, but does not have to be, interpreted as an insult to the ingroup by Mexicans. In this context, social dominance orientation, authoritarianism, and collective narcissism may be associated with different perceptions of the intergroup situations and may be related to different behavioral choices.

People high in social dominance orientation are preoccupied with securing the group's position and maintaining a hierarchical social order. In the international context, the position of the United States is more prestigious and dominant than the position of Mexico. People high in social dominance orientation may be motivated to protect this hierarchy and to react positively to the dominant group, especially given that positive relations with this group can advance the ingroup's position: The United States, through commerce, provides an incentive to Mexican economic and social growth. Authoritarians are concerned with the security of the social group and the stability of the social order. Thus, people high in right-wing authoritarianism may perceive a positive relationship with their immediate and powerful neighbor as worth preserving because the latter guarantees ingroup security. However, for the collective narcissist, the assumed greatness of the ingroup is never stable and is always threatened and endangered. No objective achievements can reduce preoccupations with possible criticisms, disrespect, or doubts. Thus, ambiguous actions of outgroups are likely to be interpreted as threatening the image of an ingroup, which is likely to be related to aggressive reactions.

Method

Participants

Study 5 was conducted among 202 students of a large Mexican university in 2006. Their ages ranged from 17 to 33 years (M = 20.10, SD = 2.21). There were 147 women and 56 men among the participants. Data from two participants were not included in the analyses because of unreliable answers (one answer circled throughout the questionnaire).

Measures

Collective narcissism. The nine-item Spanish Collective Narcissism Scale was used (α = .70; M = 3.85, SD = .77). The scale was translated from English to Spanish by a bilingual translator and was back-translated by a bilingual social psychologist to ensure the equivalence of meaning of the items in both languages. The maximum likelihood exploratory factor analysis and scree plot indicated a one-factor solution that explained 27.5% of the variance (eigenvalue = 2.48; no other eigenvalue above 1). Participants answered using a scale from 1 (*totally disagree*) to 7 (*totally agree*) throughout the questionnaire.

Social dominance orientation. The 14-item Spanish Social Dominance Orientation Scale was used (α = .87; M = 2.64, SD = .72; Pratto et al., 1994; Silvan-Ferrero & Bustillos, 2007). Two subscales were also constructed to measure the group-based dominance (α = .84; M = 3.27, SD = 1.12) and opposition to equality (α = .83; M = 2.01, SD = 1.07) aspects of social dominance orientation.

Right-wing authoritarianism. Participants were asked to respond to the items of the Spanish translation of the abbreviated version of the original Right Wing Authoritarianism Scale (see Altemeyer, 1988; McFarland, 2005) used in Study 1 (α = .71; M = 3.16, SD = 0.87). The same method of translation as in the case of the Collective Narcissism Scale was used.

Perception of the construction of the wall as an insult. The following items were used to construct this measure: "The construction of the wall along the Mexican–American border by the U.S. is offensive for Mexico and Mexicans"; "The construction of the wall indicates the lack of respect of the Americans towards

Mexicans"; "The construction of the wall demonstrates American arrogance"; and "The construction of the wall demonstrates the prejudice Americans have against Mexicans" ($\alpha = .86$; $M = 5.52$, $SD = 1.61$).

Perception of the United States as helpful to Mexico's growth. One item was used to measure this variable: "Thanks to the U.S., Mexico can export and grow" ($M = 3.32$, $SD = 1.89$).

Preference for destructive actions toward the United States. We used one item to measure preference for destructive actions against the United States: "Mexicans should boycott American companies and products on the Mexican market" ($M = 4.57$, $SD = 2.27$).

Results

The correlations presented in Table 8 confirm that the perception of the construction of the wall as an insult is positively related to the proposition to boycott American companies, whereas the perception of the United States as helpful for Mexican growth is negatively related to this proposition. Collective narcissism is positively related and social dominance orientation and right-wing authoritarianism are negatively related to the perception of the construction of the wall along the American–Mexican border as an insult to Mexico and Mexicans. Social dominance orientation and authoritarianism are positively related to a belief that the commerce with the United States helps Mexico grow. The relationship between authoritarianism and this belief is marginally significant ($p = .052$). Collective narcissism is negatively related to this beliefs and the relationship is also marginally significant ($p = .10$). Only collective narcissism is positively related to the proposition to boycott American products and companies in Mexico as a response to the construction of the wall by the United States. Social dominance orientation and right-wing authoritarianism are negatively related to this proposition.

It is interesting to note that the results also reveal that, in the Mexican sample, collective narcissism and social dominance orientation and authoritarianism are not correlated, although the latter two variables are positively correlated. In this sociopolitical context, the differentiation between the group-based dominance and opposition to equality aspects of social dominance orientation proved important. The two components of social dominance orientation are significantly and positively correlated, $r(199) = .36$, $p < .001$, and only after the factors are differentiated, a weak positive correlation between group-based dominance and collective narcissism is found, $r(198) = .14$, $p < .05$. The correlation of collective narcissism with opposition to equality is not significant, $r(198) = .02$, $p = .82$. The results of multiple regression analysis that used the components of social dominance orientation as predictors and collective narcissism as a criterion variable (controlling for age and gender) confirm that collective narcissism is independently related to group-based dominance ($b = .13$, $SE = .06$, $p < .03$), $F(4, 192) = 2.92$, $p < .02$, $R^2 = .06$, but not to opposition to equality ($b = -.07$, $SE = .07$, $p = .27$).

Table 8
Correlations of the Collective Narcissism, Social Dominance Orientation, and Right-Wing Authoritarianism Intergroup Attitudes and Perceptions (Study 5, N = 200)

Measure	1	2	3	4	5
1. Collective narcissism	—				
2. Social dominance orientation	.08	—			
3. Right-wing authoritarianism	.02	.34****	—		
4. Wall as insult	.18***	−.22***	−.14*	—	
5. United States helps Mexico grow	−.10†	.16*	.14†	−.09	—
6. Boycott	.20***	−.14*	−.16*	.43****	−.17*

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. *** $p < .001$. **** $p < .000$.

Collective Narcissism, Social Dominance Orientation, Right-Wing Authoritarianism, and Intergroup Aggressiveness in an Ambiguous Situation

To test the hypothesis that the perception of the construction of the wall as an insult to the ingroup mediates the relationship between collective narcissism and preference for destructive actions against the outgroup, we performed mediational analyses (Baron & Kenny, 1986). In addition, using the same analyses, we examined whether the relationship between right-wing authoritarianism and rejection of the boycott is mediated by the disagreement that the wall is an insult to the ingroup and whether the relationship between social dominance orientation and rejection of the boycott is mediated by the perception that the United States helps Mexico grow.

The analyses reveal that the positive relationship between collective narcissism and support for the proposition to boycott American companies and products in Mexico is mediated by the perception of the actions of the United States as disrespectful ($IE = .24$; Sobel's $z = 2.40$, $p < .02$; Goodman's $z = 2.46$, $p < .01$; see Figure 5).

The negative relationship between authoritarianism and the support for the boycott of American companies is mediated by disagreement with the notion that the construction of the wall is disrespectful toward Mexico and Mexicans ($IE = -.15$; Sobel's $z = -1.95$, $p < .05$; Goodman's $z = -2.01$, $p < .04$; see Figure 6). The relationship between social dominance orientation and opposition to boycotting American companies and products in Mexico is mediated by the perception of the United States as helping Mexico's national growth ($IE = -.06$; Sobel's $z = -1.67$, $p < .05$; Goodman's $z = -1.76$, $p < .05$; see Figure 7).

Discussion

The results of Study 5 confirm the predictions resulting from extending the threatened egotism theory (Baumeister et al., 2000; Bushman & Baumeister, 1998) into the intergroup domain and allow for an initial explanation of the link between collective narcissism and intergroup aggressiveness. We assumed that because collective narcissists invest in the grandiose image of the ingroup, they demand its constant validation in intergroup situations and are likely to react aggressively to perceived lack of acknowledgment, criticism, or insult. The results of Study 5 confirm that collective narcissism is related to increased likelihood of interpreting intergroup situations as threatening to the image of the ingroup. The perception of actions of the outgroup as an insult to the ingroup mediates the relationship between collective narcissism and intergroup aggressiveness. These results suggest that



Figure 5. Indirect effect of collective narcissism via perceived disrespect on preference for boycotting American companies (Study 5; $N = 202$). Note that the entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The dotted line indicates the path for simple regression (not controlling for the mediator). ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$.



Figure 7. Indirect effect of social dominance orientation via perception of the United States (USA) as help to Mexican advancement on disagreement with boycotting American companies (Study 5; $N = 202$). Note that the entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The dotted line indicates the path for simple regression (not controlling for the mediator). * $p < .05$.

aggressiveness associated with collective narcissism serves retaliatory purposes. It is important to note that Study 5 reveals that social dominance orientation, right-wing authoritarianism, and collective narcissism are related to sensitivity to different aspects of social situations, and different perceptions of that situation mediate their relationships with different choices of intergroup actions.

In addition, the results of Study 5 confirm that collective narcissism is unrelated to the opposition to equality aspect of social dominance orientation, but it correlates positively with its group-based dominance component. This relationship, however, seems to be weaker in the Mexican than in the American sample in Study 1. Moreover, collective narcissism is unrelated to right-wing authoritarianism among the Mexican participants.

These results seem to corroborate earlier findings suggesting that the effects and predictions of social dominance orientation and right-wing authoritarianism are dependent on social context (e.g., Dambrun, Duarte, & Guimond, 2004; Guimond, Dambrun, Michinov, & Duarte, 2003; Lehmiller & Schmitt, 2007; Reicher & Haslam, 2006; Schmitt, Branscombe, & Kappen, 2003). More important, the finding that the relationship between collective narcissism and group-based dominance is stronger in a group of a higher international position is consistent with earlier findings and the concept of collective narcissism. The level of collective narcissism should be comparable in groups of different social standing; however, the level of group-based dominance is typically lower among members of subordinate and lower status groups (Jost & Thompson, 2000; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Sidanius, Pratto, van Laar & Levin, 2004). Thus, the relationship between collective narcissism and group-based dominance can be expected to be weaker in the context of lower status and less dominant social groups.

The lack of correlation between collective narcissism and authoritarianism in the Mexican sample may be due to the specific form that authoritarianism takes in the Mexican context. It seems to be defined mostly by submission to strong, charismatic, and idealized leaders (*caudillos*; e.g., Garner, 1985) and less related to concern for ingroup cohesiveness. Because concern for group cohesiveness was the main assumed reason for the overlap between the two variables, its lower importance in this context may explain the lack of the expected relationship. Further studies are needed to examine the relationship between authoritarianism and collective narcissism in different sociopolitical contexts.



Figure 6. Indirect effect of right-wing authoritarianism via perceived disrespect on preference for boycotting American companies (Study 5; $N = 202$). Note that the entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The dotted line indicates the path for simple regression (not controlling for the mediator). * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$.

General Discussion

In this article, we introduced the concept of collective narcissism: an emotional investment in an unrealistic belief about the greatness and prominence of an ingroup. We proposed this concept to help explain the capacity of positive group esteem to inspire outgroup enmity. Results from five large samples drawn from studies conducted in four different countries, representing diverse cultural and social contexts and using three different languages, confirm validity, one-factorial structure, and reliability of the Collective Narcissism Scale, which we constructed to assess individual levels of collective narcissism.

Collective Narcissism and Intergroup Aggressiveness

Present results indicate that collective narcissism is a form of group esteem that is reliably associated with intergroup bias and aggressiveness. This link is mediated by the tendency to perceive the actions of other groups as undermining the positive image of the ingroup. Aggressiveness related to collective narcissism seems to be provoked by perceived insult (Study 5) or threat to the ingroup (Study 1). Apart from being related to retaliatory aggres-

siveness in response to the image threat, collective narcissism is associated with prejudice and intergroup negativity. We demonstrated that it predicts ethnic animosity between Black people and White people in Great Britain and anti-Semitism in Poland. We propose that because the sensitivity to criticism is chronic for collective narcissists, the outgroups with which the ingroup comes into frequent contact are likely to be perceived as constantly harming and threatening to the ingroup. Because collective narcissists are not willing to forgive or forget any insults or injustice done to an ingroup by outgroups (Study 1), collective narcissism is related to prejudice against outgroups with whom the ingroup shares a history of perceived mutual grievances and wrongdoings.

We argue that the concept of collective narcissism provides one answer to some of the long-lasting questions of the psychology of intergroup relations: How do peoples' feelings and thoughts about their group shape their tendency to be aggressive toward other groups? And what kind of self-esteem leads to intergroup negativity? In this vein, results of previous studies suggest that high (Aberson, Healy, & Romero, 2000) and threatened (e.g., Fein & Spencer, 1997) or defensive (Jordan et al., 2005) personal self-esteem predicts intergroup bias. Other authors have suggested that collective, rather than personal, self-esteem is responsible for intergroup negativity (Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990). Within this perspective, findings reveal that high-private (Rubin & Hewstone, 1998) or low-public (Hunter et al., 2005; Long & Spears, 1998; Long, Spears, & Manstead, 1994) collective self-esteem predicts intergroup hostility.

We suggest that the effects of private, public, high, and defensive collective self-esteem should be considered at the same time as predictors of intergroup negativity, and collective narcissism provides a framework that integrates them. Collective narcissism is related to intergroup aggressiveness because it increases sensitivity to signs of criticism or unfair treatment in an intergroup context. The results reveal that collective narcissism is a form of high but unstable collective self-esteem that needs constant external validation but accepts no validation as sufficient. We found that collective narcissism is highest among people who hold their ingroup in high regard but believe that others do not recognize its value properly.

Moreover, our findings suggest that collective narcissism may be seen as an explicit, positive regard of the ingroup that is accompanied by unacknowledged doubts about the ingroup's positive evaluation. These results provide intriguing, additional cues for understanding the nature of the relationship between collective narcissism and intergroup aggressiveness. The present account emphasizes that collective, rather than personal, threatened self-esteem is the best predictor of intergroup aggressiveness. We propose that the perceived threat to the assumed greatness of the ingroup may be chronic because, at least partially, it may come from within, rather than from outside. The unacknowledged doubts about the ingroup's greatness may motivate collective narcissists constantly to seek signs of criticism or disrespect of the ingroup. The habitual emotional reaction to such signs is anger related to the tendency to punish those who undermine the greatness of the ingroup. Thus, intergroup aggression may be seen as a means of controlling external validation of the positive image of the ingroup. The interpretation of collective narcissism as discrepancy between explicit and implicit collective self-esteem has to be confirmed by future studies that use different methods of assessing implicit attitudes toward the ingroup.

It is important to note that collective narcissism predicts intergroup prejudice and aggressiveness over and above other robust and powerful individual-difference variables associated with intergroup negativity such as social dominance orientation (Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), right-wing authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1998), and blind patriotism (Schatz et al., 1999) in a national context. In addition, present results indicate that the pattern of relationships between collective narcissism, social dominance orientation, authoritarianism, and intergroup aggressiveness is dependent on the situational context and suggest that reasons for aggressive responses associated with each variable are different. In the context of the war on terror in Study 1, all three variables independently predicted support for military aggression. However, only the relationship between collective narcissism and the support for military aggression was partially mediated by perceived threat to the ingroup. In an ambiguous intergroup situation (construction of the wall along the American–Mexican border by the United States in Study 5), the three variables predicted different perceptions of the situation and different responses. Only collective narcissism predicted support for destructive actions toward the United States, and this relationship was mediated by the perception of the construction of the wall alongside the American–Mexican border as threatening the image of the ingroup.

Future Directions

We derived the concept of collective narcissism from the theory of individual narcissism following the assumption that people can be narcissistic about not only their personal but also their collective identities. The present results confirm that although individual and collective narcissism are positively associated, they are separate variables that make predictions relevant to different levels of individual functioning. Most important, collective narcissism explains a great deal of variance in intergroup antagonism for which individual narcissism does not account. Investigation of whether and how the relationship between individual and collective narcissism is shaped by cultural and situational contexts is an important direction for further research.

We assume that cultural and socialization contexts that allow for the development of a strong ego may enhance the positive relationship between individual and collective narcissism. Specifically, a stronger relationship may be expected in highly individualistic cultures, where the projection of perceived individual greatness onto social ingroups is more likely (e.g., Lasch, 1979; see also Gramzow & Gaertner, 2005). In collectivistic cultures, however, collective narcissism may be related to putting the ingroup before the individual self. Commitment to the ingroup may be associated with the submission of individual needs or goals. In such a context, the relationship between collective and individual narcissism should be weaker.

In addition, in social situations that increase collective but not individual narcissism, the link between both forms of narcissism should be, at least temporarily, weakened. For example, narcissistic identification with an ingroup is likely to be stronger in an intergroup conflict, especially when a tendency to attribute prevalent importance to the ingroup, its survival, value, and honor intensifies as the conflict escalates (e.g., Bar-Tal, 2006). A situa-

tion of acknowledged fraternal deprivation is also likely to increase collective narcissism with reference to the deprived ingroup (Runciman, 1966). Studies indicate that ingroup threat from unfavorable intergroup comparison and high ingroup identification result in increased affirmation of the collective self (e.g., Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999). The recognition of the relative deprivation on the collective level is likely to result in a shared belief that the esteemed ingroup does not receive the treatment, respect, or recognition it deserves. These propositions require further empirical examination.

Other important questions that need to be answered by future studies are: To what extent is collective narcissism a general tendency to form narcissistic attachment to social groups to which people belong? Can narcissistic attachment be evoked only by some groups or experienced only in particular situations?

Collective narcissism can be seen as an individual-difference variable, a general tendency to identify with important social groups in a narcissistic way. It can be expected that people may narcissistically identify with all social groups with which they share common history. It is therefore more likely that they form narcissistic attachment to social groups that have psychological entitativity, that is, a real, reified existence (e.g., national group, ethnic group, religious group, or political party; see D. T. Campbell, 1958; Keller, 2005; Medin & Ortony, 1989; Yzerbyt, Judd, & Corneille, 2004; see also Reynolds et al., 2000). It is less likely that this tendency would apply to ad hoc-created groups, such as in minimal group paradigm tasks. Some time is needed to establish that the favored ingroup is not sufficiently appreciated by others. However, it can be expected that groups that work together for a certain amount of time (e.g., students of a certain university, attendants of a certain course) can elicit narcissistic attachment.

The results presented in this article provide a suggestion that people can narcissistically identify with different realistic social groups. In four studies, participants were asked to think about their national ingroup while responding to the Collective Narcissism Scale, and in one study, they were asked to think about their ethnic group. A validation study conducted in the Polish sample provides evidence that people can also reliably apply the Collective Narcissism Scale to religious or political groups or social class. Further studies should examine collective narcissism in contexts of different social groups and indicate which social groups are more likely to stir narcissistic sentiments and with what effects.

Future studies should also establish whether, in certain contexts, narcissistic identification can be inspired by specific groups without generalizing to others. We assume that there are social situations that are likely to induce narcissistic identification with a specific social group but not necessarily with others (specific collective narcissism). As mentioned above, intergroup conflicts may increase the narcissistic attachment. In such a case, the attachment is related to the particular ingroup involved in the conflict but not to other ingroups. Similarly, specific collective narcissism is more likely with reference to groups experiencing fraternal relative deprivation and feeling powerful enough to acknowledge it and act against it. In addition, socialization in certain sociocultural contexts may emphasize narcissistic identification with some groups rather than others (e.g., the national group in nations struggling for sovereignty, the religious group among members of prosecuted religions, the gender group in a society emphasizing divisions and hierarchical relations between genders, or the ethnic group among members of stigmatized ethnic groups). In addition, arise in political rhetoric emphasizing social divisions and/or idealizing certain group is likely to increase collective narcissism with respect to this group (e.g., nationalistic rhetoric idealizing an ethnic majority as the only true representative of a nation). We suggest that collective narcissism is likely to develop and flourish in social contexts that emphasize the group's greatness and uniqueness and induce downward social comparisons.

Further studies are needed to determine whether collective narcissism is a general attitudinal tendency, whether narcissistic identification is more likely to be formed with realistic ingroups, and what social and cultural contexts encourage development of narcissistic identification with specific social groups. Such studies will improve researchers' understanding of conditions increasing the likelihood of intergroup aggression. Another important extension of the present research should examine whether the habitual link between collective narcissism and aggressiveness as a means of protecting the grandiose group image can be broken. It is plausible that collective narcissists may resort to more constructive strategies of protecting and improving the ingroup image in threatening situations.

Limitations

The present studies provide strong support for the hypotheses derived from the concept of collective narcissism. However, they have several shortcomings that should be considered. First, in most of the samples, except for that in Study 2, there was a disproportionate number of women among the participants. In all analyses, we included gender as a control variable and found no significant effect of gender. In addition, the results obtained in the most balanced sample corroborate the results obtained in less balanced ones (e.g., Studies 2 and 3). Although we do not have any theoretical reasons to assume that men and women differ with respect to their individual levels of collective narcissism, future research should use more balanced samples. Second, the present findings are based on university student samples, which may not be representative of the population as a whole (Sears, 1986). We agree that future studies should extend the investigation of collective narcissism and its effects to different populations. However, it is worth noting that we found remarkably consistent patterns of relationships in different sociopolitical contexts and different geographical locations.

Most important, all presented studies provide correlational data. Experimental studies are especially needed to replicate the results confirming the extension of threatened egotism theory to social domains. These studies should analyze the direct influence of the criticism of or an insult to the ingroup on aggressive responses of collective narcissists. Further experimental studies should also test the prediction that collective narcissists feel particularly threatened by perceived criticism or improper acknowledgment of the ingroup. Such feelings are related to group-based anger and a tendency to resort to intergroup violence when there is a threat to the honor or good name of the ingroup or when the situation can be interpreted in terms of a lack of respect and appreciation for the ingroup.

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