CHAPTER 9

The Dream (Concluded)—Narcissus and His Problem—
Symbols as Timeless Realities—Fundamental Ontology
and the Dream—The Sexes and Their Modi of Being—
Worlds and Ersatz Worlds—Binswanger’s Schizophrenics
—Inwardness and Self-representation.

The dream, and whatever in existence is
dreamlike, as a truthless world substitute and a true world reflection,
narcissism and extra-polarization, in one—how can we reconcile that
contradiction? It is at points like this that objectivism unnoticeably
slips into error by taking it for granted that the contradiction, instead
of inhering in the phenomenon being explored, is a theoretical-
explanatory one, a contradiction posing an alternative of conception
and obliging the scientist to take sides. Yet what appears contradictory
here calls no more for any explanatory solutions than does the mythical
paradigm of narcissism itself: the self-perception of Narcissus in his
water image with which he falls in love. The truth of this mirror
image as what it is—a likeness—is turned into an untruth by the
ensuing existential decision, as Narcissus soon comes to mistake a
reflection of reality for the reality reflected, the self’s shadow for the
self. More subtly, if we re-experience his enchantment in the successivity
of its phases, the myth informs us about the existential origin of
autism: the “accidental” self-encounter is at first an encounter of the
youth not with the image of his body but with the reality of his soul.
In its objectivity, its standing against itself (his soul, significantly,
occurs to him from without), Narcissus’ soul takes on the identity of
the most changeably and plastically receptive of the elements—water,
which as a world-wide and perennial soul-symbol needs no intro-
duction at this point. What the myth thus confirms is the necessity with
which, at the root of all reflectiveness, existence ever has met itself
already, but moreover we are granted insight into the genesis-structure
of the existential error of self-objectification as the never missing starting point for hypertrophic ego-images that the encounter may bring forth. In accordance with the common principle of Gestalt and phenomenological psychology that—in illuminating the inner order of anything whatsoever—its phenomenally evident structural analogy (as essential identity) with another thing of different materiality must be followed to precisely the extent which both phenomena justify in the way in which they are given, the shift in Narcissus' focus from the water to what it reflects is a shift of attention that replaces the true three-dimensionality of the water (in Heidegger's language, its being-to-the-ground) by the projective three-dimensionality of the external presence in it of Narcissus' body image. Only the soul-encounter of the first instant, since it occurs spontaneously, is thus a true confrontation of the self as knowledge with the self as immanence, pretty much as in the dream, but with the "eye" here not submerged in the "water" and thus able to discern what it beholds with the free clarity, comprehensiveness, and distance that distinguish the true space of wake existing; already Narcissus' next look will have by-passed this perception of the ground (himself as soul), centering itself on the externality, only appearing in this medium, of his body. What else—in confirmation of a previous argument—but the starting position for the ego of self-consciousness to arise, the authentic inner identity of being one's body (an existential a priori of all action-seeking spontaneity) to be lost, is this perception of the image of one's body as though seen actually from "without"? The one and only primary condition of existence, under which (if in a widely different manner) this focus would itself be legitimate, be "biopositive": the itself phenomenal "immanence" or "centripetality", the "demand" for attention, for being acted-toward, for care, inherent, according to Simone de Beauvoir, in the structure of the female body, is not given in Narcissus' case, and considering the inner imperative of all love to seek the other, the early dying of the self-lover—the conceivable self-hater of his later hours—which the myth recalls, assumes an utmost of compellingness.

The cited contradiction of the dream, then, inheres in the double role which it plays in existence all at once—to be, as noesis, the most immediate knowledge of the dreamer's situation in the world, whereas as an existential state it is the very incarnation of the peril of world-loss (also of "wetness") in the Heracleitean sense, a submersion in
immanence, a blurring of direction and a dissolution of form, a loss, despite all the nearness, the "transparency" gained, of the focal freedom of decision. What stands out from its noetic accomplishments are such most "general" qualities as the mood, color, and temper of dreaming, its particular modi of temporalization and spatialization, which further differentiate dream time and dream space as qualified before; to the wake memory, all these characteristics stand out more, on the whole, than do specific elements of the dream action, but since the former are marked by a far greater "closeness", concreteness, of their acute presence in the dream than is its action that the dreamer "witnesses", they are far less readily accessible verbally to any retrospective account. In full consistency with phenomenological principle, then, it is on these characteristics of a dream situation, which with drastic literalness tend to chart the actual biographic situation of the existent, that Binswanger's clinical studies of dreams center; the link between the dream and the wake state is never objectifiable, it is only evident; the common denominator of the actual biographic situation and the dream is, with Binswanger's term, the inner life history of the subject, as distinct from a "history" of his life as an objective "functional" process.

The situations, in this sense, in which, in the dream, an existence finds and knows itself may represent its spatialization modus by way of such most comprehensive data of experience as rising or falling—that rising or falling which without exception turns out to be the factual phase of the subject's biography at the time of the dream and his own surest and most intimate but also, for just this reason, usually most tacit knowledge in his wake state; carrier of this knowledge is the dreamer's existence rather than his "subjectivity". What such attributes of the dreaming situation signify in the concrete therefore determines itself according to the qualifying specific circumstances of the "fall", the "rise", the moving in a plain, or whatever direction-modus of movement is met with; the rising upward within a well-structured mountain scenery, the lowering oneself—"falling" can be a movement of settling down—to a chosen landing place, thus are worlds apart from a being suspended in empty space, with the ground fleeing from one, or from a state of helpless falling. Existence is itself action, concerted and self-determining, in the former, passivity in the latter case—either, as in the first instance, in the forms of worldless
isolation, or, as in the second, of an object-like exposure to the objective world forces. In a manner that cuts across their own order, falling and rising as normative possibilities of all existing thus are differentiated again by the polarity of true mundanization versus \textit{Wahn}, self-transcendence versus self-isolation, the self as direction and form versus the self in dissolution, the world as challenge and response versus “world” as a pressing-in or fleeing apart, weighing-down or leaving-one-suspended heterogeneity of the \textit{factual}. Likewise, the specific temporalization modus of existence tends to crystallize itself in dreams—from those phenomena of a \textit{standing} and a \textit{growing-from-within} of the present that correspond to an intensification of experienced spatial \textit{presence} itself (as a pervading being-at-hand of one’s world) to the pressure and rush of time as a presentless precipitation of its passing, as in those states of existential dread which radical self-objectification may induce. Where, as in some forms of acute schizophrenia finally ensuing on such states, the self, no longer able to catch up with \textit{public time},\textsuperscript{9} has quite literally “broken” with, and away from, it, a “death” or standstill of time may be experienced. Having stopped to play along with the intolerable racing of the world of things that pass, the schizophrenic existence, in such cases, finds itself confronted with a vacuum the former occupant of which—\textit{original time}\textsuperscript{10}—has been so lost in that rush of things interminably and senselessly fleeing by that the “negative now” of “no time at all any more” (of there being \textit{nothing present}) becomes its lot.

The temporal and spatial conditions of the self and the world thus cross-differentiate those modi of temporalization that inhere axiomatically in an individual life course, and the self and the world, for their part—the \textit{who} and the \textit{what} of an existence—are differentiated by the ontological spread of the \textit{factual} modi-of-being that occur to the person in the form of the symbolic. Somewhat simplifying, Renato de Rosa, in the passage on Binswanger of his survey of existentialist psychopathology,\textsuperscript{11} puts the entire order of norms of existence and their concrete modifications under the focus of Binswanger’s theorizing in these words: “Knowledge of the fundamental structure of the psyche is, to him, the normative instrument of the analytical judgment. The analysis itself is conducted according to a paradigm the principal concepts of which are the being-in-the-world, transcendence,\textsuperscript{12} the self, and temporalization. Genetically, the different psychotic manifestations
always are traced to a primary modification of the fundamental structure of the psyche. This modification determines the form of existence, as for example the being-hole of many a schizophrenic. All world-regions of psychotic experience and thought are being influenced by this in a characteristic manner. The self of the being-hole, or of existence as a hole becomes, for example, a dried up plant in the world of vegetation, a thrown-away peel or shell in the world of things, a worm in the animal world, a mere tube or gut, stuffed and emptied again, in the body sphere, and so forth. The existing-as-a-hole, of which de Rosa speaks, refers to the published Daseinsanalyse of Ellen West, one of Binswanger's three most famous case studies of schizophrenics, which are singularly representative of his diagnostic thought and method and of which The Case of Jürg Zünd has been referred to before.

In all three cases Binswanger finds an identical over-all characteristic of schizophrenic worlds, a peculiar narrowing and impoverishment, as though a cancerous growth was draining away the potential abundance of Dasein. But the supervalent ideas, the blocking-off Wahn fixations in which in these and all such cases the existents' world accesses are stuck, are fundamentally different in each; even though the patient's existence is pervaded and involved always and inevitably in the entirety of its fabric, the priming points of the abnormal world-modifications met with lie in different spheres of the basic being-in of the person—Jürg Zünd's in the allopsychic, Ellen West's in the somatopsychic, Lola Voss' in the autopyschic spheres previously pointed out. What makes all three cases so instructive is the appearance in them of a universal lawfulness: the symptom-picture of each becomes compelling in its specificity, in the subtlest details of its behavioral and characterological physiognomy, once the perception of its center, of a just as specific primary failure in successful self-transcendence that inheres in each of these existences has clarified itself. Clinical understanding here is clearly no longer a deliberate enactment of any vague empathizing; as spontaneous empathies—emotional participations that are too unconditional to know themselves—are always and necessarily, it is perception and thought, and the more it is only these two, the less can the clinician help engaging his entire being.

The world of Jürg Zünd—prototype of the socially self-conscious—an awkward and frustrated intellectual withdrawing suspiciously
from personal contact, shows all the features of homelessness, of a
severance from the eternal as the true presence of being, which we dis-
cerned as the inevitable implication of a radical objectification of self.
The patient's anxieties, his experience of an unfathomable senselessness
of existence, are traced to a primary splitting-apart of a purely
"judgmental" ego (taking its stand outside of itself as body and in front
of a world consisting of the side-by-side of things\(^{18}\)) from an incal-
culable, irrational self vainly now seeking realization in world contacts:
the patient's attention, upon encountering any opportunity for contact,
is drawn the more inexorably to the "outer" image of his body and
body behavior (as though, in that very situation, seen by others), the
more important that situation is to him, the more, in other words, it
had initially stimulated him toward engagement. Since the self as
original transcendence, as authentic beholder of "world", is a captive
of Jürg-Zünd's ego image geared to the all-powerful phantom, the
pseudo-world, of the being-with as a being-one-among-many, Bins-
wanger finds the dual modus of existence here totally overthrown by
the plural. A purely "worldly" (in the sense of profane) communica-
tion-modus with the others, the things, and oneself, a calculativeness
that sees everything in the image of physical forces and their manipu-
lation, remains as the only conceivable world-contact according to the
innermost conviction in the idea of which the pattern of existence here
is set. Phenomenal space, deprived as it is of the genuine here and
there, the self-thou relation of spontaneous spatialization,\(^{19}\) is stereo-
metric ("objective") space in the case of Jürg Zünd. This means that
things in it collide with one another, tend to displace one another, that
they are mutually uninterpenetrable, and, incapable of reconciliation
and unity, turn space itself into a dimension of danger. Jürg Zünd's
Rorschach, accordingly, is full of such apperceptions as "furniture
where one is liable to bump one's knee", and "centrifugal spheres\(^{20}\)
shooting off from a fly-wheel, that fly into my face, in mine, of all
people's, though they had been fixed to the machine for decades;
only when I approach something happens." "Everything about the
patient", Binswanger writes, "is angular and occurs abruptly. But
between the single jerks and thrusts, emptiness reigns",\(^{21}\) Zünd's
existence is dominated by anxiety in its modus as flight.\(^{22}\) In this modus,
anxiety, as Binswanger puts it, and as we have had occasion to recog-
nize likewise,\(^{23}\) is "compulsory perpetuation of the past"; Zünd's
existence, therefore, is not "ahead of itself" but is caught and constrained by a "being already in the has-been". The temporalization modus of Jürg Zünd's existence, in consequence, is a self- alienation from time per se: the subject, while continuing to find himself "in the world", finds the world devaluated, in a state of disintegration and decay, with his observations of such disintegration and decay serving as building stones in the construction of his Wahn. The Wahn is thus a dialogue of existence with itself that takes place "in the emptiness of time", outside of time as the coming-toward. Time as such is understood as empty\textsuperscript{24} here, which means that it only passes but does not come, that one "watches" it but does not partake in it with what one is, a situation that turns the temporality of the watched, disintegrating world, since it clashes with the inhibition of inner time as stated, into one of pressure or urgency, just as the spatiality modus of the world is turned into one of oppressing narrowness and nearness. The patient's self-objectifying ego preoccupation, which succeeds in rendering him conspicuous in fact, brings forth that effect by means of his trying to be inconspicuous; in the authentic spirit of his self-encounter as pure object, Zünd attempts to be one among many. In alternation with a just as spastic masculinity pose that he assumes at certain times, he cultivates the idea of detached poise, of being just flaneur, of suggesting to the outside that he feels himself to be like any other person, a particle of a crowd, but precisely this idea, since it pervades his motor behavior with the incoordinations of the deliberate rather than inhering in it physiognomically as a truth of his being, makes it "stilted", "awkward", in brief, "gives it the lie". The lie calls for detection, and detections, just as collisions, are sudden; Zünd therefore is the physiognomic incarnation of the idea of suddenness, which as fate—from the side of his world—of guilt and concealment on his own part, partakes in the central theme of his anxiety and his whole Dasein. This theme Binswanger discerns as posed by the patient's fundamental homelessness, his severance from the eternal: since time as inner time depends on participation, the sudden—with Kierkegaard's words, to which Binswanger refers in his study—"cannot be worked into a continuity, nor be transferred into one"; (the sudden) "is there one moment, the next one it is gone, and as it is gone, it is again and completely there." The standing "outside" of time is thus equi-originally a passive state of exposure to time as the
locus of the “accidental”; accidents, therefore, ever breaking into the false security of Zünd’s existence, must trespass and disturb also his isolation from the element of inner time.

Since he senses such invasions as uncanny, as a total threat to his self, which could not be understood unless that isolation, that refusal of world-participation, were aiming to hold the self in a state of concealment, the primary self-interpretation of existence in this its improper modus “has” the self as the secretive per se. As though that-which-conceals would not ultimately be identical with the self concealed, as though it were disposing of those limitless powers of self-manipulation ever only claimed by the ego, the intended self-concealment and the resulting physiognomic conspicuousness of Zünd’s “nonchalant” behavior with its expressive conjuring-away of the sudden ever lurking in the dark, are understood by Binswanger as the two sides of one existential error or riddle, the key to which is provided by the very “wanting” of the secret ever to come to light. “The concealed is the involuntary disclosure”, Kierkegaard writes, and Binswanger quotes him, and “For the weaker an individuality originally is, or the more elasticity is being consumed in the service of concealment, the more easily will the secret break out of the person in the end”. Accordingly, shame and guilt, while emphatic in the case of Jürg Zünd, are just as emphatically non-genuine, that is, passive: the first being a fear of involuntariness, of losing deliberate control, of finding himself “embarrassed” (Zünd’s most violent and most perpetual acute dread), the second a fear of being “mistaken for this or that” by the “others”. The latter line of self-objectification can be traced to Zünd’s tacit determination of his ego as a pure standpoint for judging; in always “taking” others by certain of their social behavioral traits, he displays a horizontlike conviction that implies his own vulnerability to such judgments. His guilt is caught in self-misunderstanding: instead of being what authentically it is, a challenge to existence to take hold of its own ground, it becomes an instrumentality of self-alienation through which a wall of resentment—of distrust, suspicion, envy, and hate—is maintained between the subject and what otherwise could be his world.

As we might expect, a nostalgia for an open encounter of the world and the self pervades the inner life history of Jürg Zünd: he would like to get out of his autism, to be united with the others, the non-self,
in the dual modus of love; senses, what Binswanger terms at one point "the most terrible Gestalt loss that can hit existence", as slowly depleting, destroying him; but already in his visualization of his problem as a whole he again seems caught in its misunderstanding as a primordially calculative-manipulatory, "behavioral", one conceived in the projected image of past-ness. As we recall, a problem of this kind only begins with the projection of that image into an empty, nothing-but-dimensional "future"; the fixation of Zünd's inner set therefore cannot be loosened by any "insight" that continues in the line of his inveterate self-objectification. His case is that of a typically depressed schizophrenic: the ego here is too hypertrophied to allow unsatisfactory ersatz worlds in the crude sense to arise, sever his conceptual and interlocutory contacts with the "others", and thus cloud the existential moorings of his symptom-picture (Zünd's Wahn, significantly, does not behold any delusional "new reality" but only insists on the inner impossibility of the original one). This makes him a paradoxical challenge of the first order to the psychotherapist; existence seemingly having become mechanized throughout in his case, nothing visible is left in it that could affirm itself in front of the mechanisms of the psyche, and psychotherapy would therefore seem to remain without a foothold here that could permit it even to begin. Self-objectification, in Zünd's case, carries to the point (unlike the case of Ellen West, it only does not start out from there) where his body itself has become the enemy; it is the alien per se, the locus of an incalculable immanence calling for calculation, indeed the original and constant source of the threat of sudden embarrassment. Intimately interlinked with his love frustration, his body experience, accordingly, alternates between the theme of the "secret wanting out" (fear of erection in public) and an inability to "believe" that his body can hold together: the patient, without any medical indication, wears a suspensorium at all times. Existence, as Binswanger concludes, is here never itself, has never been chosen, let alone "laid hands on"; the patient "has survived himself", and now, in the dead of time, runs around "as a corpse".

Though the therapeutic problem proper must be deferred, we already recognize a weak point of the mechanisms inasmuch as they involve the patient's self-knowledge in its double status as knowledge of them and as itself part of them: in full accordance with our own analysis of the axiomatic structure of morbid self-consciousness, Jürg Zünd...
"knows" that he "will act awkwardly somehow", but this knowledge is strikingly unlike a genuine one, a knowledge of anything as being what and how it is independently of one's own act of knowledge. For Zünd also knows (or could be made aware) that without his "anticipatory" knowledge of his embarrassments to come, which as knowledge is subject to noetic criteria of proof and thus open to argument, this same knowledge as an existential state could never maintain itself; his problem therefore hinges on the said criteria of proof. Already he knows that without his self-"knowledge" (as a state) the awkwardness anticipated never would materialize to start with, and this, then, is the weak point, the foothold, from which, as will be shown in a subsequent chapter, the entire self-obstruction of unauthentic existences, as always revolving around a fundamental conviction that invalidates itself if the person only dares to think it through, can be fought.

Zünd's objectified self is the "accidental" one-among-many, his ego that objectifies the self the pure Standpunkthaltigkeit ("standpoint-likeness") of the nothing-but-judgmental taking-someone-by-something. A corresponding line of ego-self segregation can be found in Ellen West, but here it divides the ego as an idealized self-image conceived in the spirit of complete liberty from and against the self as formlessly vegetating and weighing-down soma good for nothing but to be destroyed. Accordingly, the ego aspires for the "masculine" status of victorious self-determining action—"aut Cesar aut nihil", is the patient's motto of her adolescent years—while the self is experienced as a pure immanence. As such, it begins in the veil of a receptivity for the active forces of the universe, a longing for liberation, for being kissed dead, to quote a lyricism from her early and ethereal, poetically productive time, when her existence, still holding on to its own unity, still responds to the claim for meaning, liberation, world status, on the part of her femininity, her self-as-body. But inasmuch as a phenomenal polarization of this kind must increasingly identify the soma at its most vegetative, most undifferentiated and thing-like, most "massive", the phenomenal self here finally becomes nothing more than the digestive tract, the body not as a whole but a hole; the "massive", correspondingly, is quite literally the threat of gaining weight by acceding to the demand of this hole to be stuffed. Binswanger resketches the biography of a brilliant and attractive girl gradually succumbing
to what the idea of limitless liberty qua action freedom\textsuperscript{34} must turn out as hiding wherever the existence is feminine; preconstituted as an immanence in want of being-opened, being acted-toward, it \textit{a priori} contradicts that idea in its literalness. The idea of limitless action freedom therefore hides its own opposite but does not hide it for long; the terrors of a just as untrue, only existentially now far more "real", apperception of the world as mere matter and weight, a "merely worldly" world in the sense of what we might term a self-interpretative secularism of existence, breaks through, first gradually, then ever faster. To quote Binswanger: "We could describe this secularization, this ‘profanation’ of world thus: in the place of the freedom of a letting \textit{things happen} there appears the \textit{bondage} of a being overwhelmed by a specific world conception; in the place of the freedom of the formation of the ethereal ‘world’ there ever more appeared in Ellen West the bondage of an \textit{inevitable} drowning in the narrow world of the grave and the swamp. Since ‘world’, however, means not only world-formation, world-design, but, on the ground of such an image and design, means also the \textit{how} of being in the world and of one’s attitude toward it, we were able to register this metamorphosis of the ethereal into the grave-world also in the form of the conversion of existence as a \textit{bird rising jubilantly into the air into one appearing as a blind and slowly creeping worm}.\textsuperscript{35} Binswanger’s last-quoted references are taken from ideations of Ellen West during the opening and closing phases of her illness. What happens in her case is that the “phobia” of gaining weight, the “obsession” that stirs her to do anything, from semi-starvation to a sleepless self-sacrificing in excessive work, to prevent it, gradually, and with the patient herself watching this process in full consciousness, becomes the central and supervalent idea by which the entirety of the original richness of her existence is consumed, while the idea kept in repression, the idea of eating-until-full, at times succeeds in conquering her identity.\textsuperscript{36} Rather than the \textit{massive} as feared (obesity), the \textit{massive} of her compulsion to fixate her attention on obesity accomplishes the cited conversion, \textit{bird to worm}; in the end, in one of her many fits of depression, it was this central, supervalent idea, horizonlike, at this stage, to any thought and action impulse that occurred to her, but discerned at last in its imprisoning power by the patient herself, that drove her to suicide. In sketching that conversion, furthermore, an entire physiognomic and \textit{Gestalt} modus of what clin-
ically tends to be lumped together as flight of ideas undergoes a phe-\nomenological clarification: the "flight" as what, according to Bins-\nwanger, it is in Ellen's case, a thought procedure of *orderly jumping*, is distinguished from the disorganized flight of ideas as an existential *whirl* or *vertigo* that may happen to a person. Like the final "jump" (the suicide), the "orderly jumping" of Ellen West's ideas, which Binswanger describes, can fully be understood as a necessity of her existence as, noetically and therefore factually, her existence has deter-\nmined itself: in order for her being—as idea, form, spirit, action-\nfreedom—to escape at any point a being-glued-down by the ever waiting swa\nmp of materiality, indeed only *jumping* remains as the guarantee of a free exit.

The case of Lola Voss, finally, allows Binswanger to extend his analysis of existence to the auto-psychically centered version of *autism*: a severe hallucinatory persecution psychosis, complicated by "a highly intricate suspicious oracle of words and syllables, according to which the patient acted or refrained from acting" and, at first glance, suggest-\nging the field of interpersonal relations as the home province of its conflict, is traced, beyond its social vestiges, to its true origins in the immediate confrontation with one another of two "absolutes", the self as soul with the world as cosmos: what unfolds in the psychosis of Lola Voss is not a world conception reduced to push and pressure, as in the case of Jürg Zünd, or dynamically laden with incompatible forces, as in that of Ellen West, but, in implementation of Heidegger's word about the "uncanniness", the exposure to nothingness, of the being-in-the-world *per se*, about existence itself as the source of anxiety. Accordingly, Binswanger finds the world apperception of Lola Voss reduced to the categories of familiarity and unfamiliarity (uncanniness). He goes on to say: "Existence here was perpetually threatened and ambush\ned by an impersonal but deeply hostile power. The incredibly thin and threadbare net of artificial combinations of syllables served to protect the existence from being overwhelmed by this power and from the intolerable exposure to it. It then became very instructive to observe how simultaneously with the vanishing of these protections a new and wholly heterogeneous (since not at all *intentional* any more) protection appeared against the invasion of this undefinable *dreadful*—the persecution *Wahn* proper. The impersonal might of the unfathom-\nably uncanny was replaced by the canny (in the sense of snug, intimate,
secretive) machinations of the personalized enemy. Against these, now, the patient again was able to defend herself consciously—with accusations, counter-aggression, attempted flights—all of which appeared like child's play compared with the constant helpless state of being menaced by the dreadful power of the elusively eerie which before that time had been dominating her inner experience. With this new gain of existential security to the image of the others as enemies, psychopathologically: delusions of persecution. I mention this case, first of all to show that we will not understand the persecutory Wahn if we start our inquiry with the latter, but rather must direct our whole attention to what precedes it, be it for months, weeks, days, or perhaps only hours. I am convinced that in other cases, too, we will see that the persecutory Wahn, similar to the phobias, connotes a protection of existence against its invasion by something inconceivably dreadful; it is only in comparison with this unspeakably weird, non-objective power that the definite cunning of the machinations of the enemies are still far more easily tolerated, since the enemies, in contrast to a wholly formless dread, can yet be taken (perceived, figured out, warded off, resisted) 'by' something. The other reason that I mention the case of Lola Voss, is to show you that no longer are we bound today to the dilemma raised by the double status of the ‘life of the psyche’ as open to our empathy and yet hiding from it, but dispose of a method, a scientific instrument through which we can bring closer to scientific comprehension that so-called unintuitable life of the psyche also. It naturally still remains up to the powers of imagery of the individual explorer and physician to what extent his own capacity of experiencing enables him to relive and resuffer what the daseinsanalytic research with the planfulness of method opens as experiential opportunities to his scientific grasp.\[41\]

The clinician's personal powers of spontaneous identification, then, of "intuitive" perceptiveness and understanding, are required, self-evidently, for every single step of his task, yet have no bearing at all on the inner order of that task; just as the independence of the inner order of a musical score from the intuition, the powers of re-experiencing, on the part of a conductor, and the requirement for the same conductor to command an utmost of these same "subjective" powers, do not in the least contradict one another according to the structure of
music and of musicality, so the functionalist's reproach of alleged subjectivism in all clinical qualitativistic theorizing completely by-passes, with the pre-given structure of existing, also that of the relationships between the existences of the clinician and his patient. Reference to Binswanger's definition of the psychological quest—in distinction from the historian's how-has-it-really-been, the natural scientist's how-has-it-come-to-be-this-way—as solely wanting to know, how is it really, has been made before, and the full meaning and logic of that maxim are now fast becoming more tangible: as nothing can be translated from one language into another without first being fully understood in the original, so also no "translation" of occurrences of and to the psyche into the language of any theory is admissible as scientific unless the "original", the authentic inner state of the subject, is understood (re-experienced) first; the first task of psychology, then, is a re-actualization of inner states according to the specific clues lent in each individual case by what of them is communicable—understandable—at all. Wherever, now, there is communication, wherever there is understanding, there is world; what constitutes world is precisely the transgression of the absolutely immanent, the in-itself of Sartre, which the cited concepts connote. The re-actualization of experience-worlds, as the first principle of Daseinsanalyse, is therefore not just a postulate for the end of obtaining greater immediacy of cognition; no other way of gaining psychological cognition is genuinely open to start with. A verification of this statement does not require any closer acquaintance with existentialist literature; nothing may corroborate it quite so well as any analysis just of what in the objectivistic theories themselves and in their nomenclature makes them communicable, that is, open to comprehension.  

But this concentration of existential analysis on the actuality of inner states in their presence—always the presence of a world—is anything but a neglecting of the genetic aspects of existence; Binswanger's own concept, one of the categorial center-pieces of his whole theorizing, of the inner life history of an existent, in counter-distinction only from the same "history" as an ever-hypothetical functional process, connotes the exact opposite of such a view. The childhood trauma of Freudian fame is not even denied its direction-setting import; what is realized is rather something far simpler and more fundamental, namely that just the direction-setting capacity of experiential events belies their
causal-mechanistic interpretation as in Freud’s doctrine. A true cause-effect connection, in order even to be made out as one, requires the isolation of a process supposed to have its form from its topographical embankments set for it by the conditions of the field wherein it takes place; the latter, regardless of whatever happens “between” them, have set the direction of that process from the start, so that the cause-effect connection as such is a purely one-dimensional affair by an a priori of its own definitive constitution. A direction, contrariwise, presupposes a multi-dimensional domain wherein it is one, and accordingly it can never be constructed without its whereto, the locus of all of its possible goal-points; that which in the future “will result” from the childhood trauma, must be given already in order to be “explained”, and this requirement is visibly at odds with the natural-scientific meaning of causality. This difficulty, now, is precisely the one met with in the case of the psychoanalytic usurpation of the principle of strict causalism: in order to claim to know that B is the effect of A, one must be able to deduce from an objectively given A that its effect will be (rather than has been) B, a requirement psychoanalysis never meets since its whole interpretation, even its “knowledge”, of A is, vice versa, determined by its knowledge of B as a datum. As partaking in the patient’s present state (B), his own mnemonic knowledge of A objectively belongs to that datum; but this means that just objectively the knower and the known can never be disentangled. What causally is thus never reducible to any of its states of the past, the referent of his own inner life history, the who of an existence, registers, pre-reflectively, what amounts to a reversal of “causality”—a reversal of the objective functional order of genetic evolutions qua processes: in phenomenal time, not a childhood trauma A is the cause of an adult symptom picture B, a connection which only mnemonic reflection can establish here as phenomenal causality with all its misleading implications that we reviewed before. On the contrary, what A is is wholly determined by the present state of the existence (B); for being presupposes presence, and what is present here of A but a memory that, as such, belongs totally to B?

An at least equally important observation of the psychology of immediate experience discerns the dimension of focalized vs. horizon-like, which has been introduced before and which renders in phenomenological terms the actuality of the conscious-unconscious polarity;
since the latter, despite Freud's misunderstanding to the contrary, does not cover such mechanisms of the psyche as underlie hysterical fugues and amnesias, neither does its phenomenological correlate just referred to. Coordinating our earlier observation46 of a “horizontal” rather than “vertical” splitting of the psyche in hysterical and other paroxysmal states characterized by temporally alternating rather than (as in dementia praecox46) simultaneously clashing whole “ego” sets with the results of our inquiry into the problems of inner identity and of its changes,47 we recognize that what in fugues and amnesias is banished from the center of the field of awareness is not primarily certain memories or other experiential contents, but rather their beholder, namely that particular who of the paroxysmal existence to whom as focal relevancies they themselves refer. In most instances, this does not mean two sharply segregated but only two overlapping fields of awareness; or we may speak of one field with two or multiple sometimes rigidly fixed “selves” as focalizing centers (“here positions”; cf. p. 205). The incisive difference between this and the normal structure of attention does not lie in the variability of the phenomenal heres as such, which is constitutive to any psyche, but rather in the person’s inability to shift fluidly between them and thereby retain a continuity of orientation: as throughout his staccato-form existence on both its inner experiential and physiognomic-behavioral sides, the paroxysmal—hysteric, epileptic and so forth—must alternate perseverate and, tearing himself violently away from what binds him in his perseveration, must jump also from one specific temporary identity of his self to another. This presupposes the availability to him of these different specific identities, as distinguished from the successivity of their actualizations; what determines the central tendency of an existence is never the past of process time nor, as a misinterpretation of modern biological finalism has it,48 its “future”, but what in an existence, in ever-recurring biographically, is timeless.

What is timeless here? An orientative norm, a paradigm of believing, the essence of an apperception of world as the implicit and inherent idea of one's whole being. If Heidegger’s dictum concerning existence as a “throw”—of being into its Truth, of being as immanence into being as knowledge—were really a speculation and nothing besides, the entire morphological aspect, not only of humanity and the human individual, but of the animal kingdom as well would remain incom-
prehensible; but instead, biology now finds that the stepladder of phylogenesis culminating in man implies that very tenet. The evolution of its forms can be explained by the well-known mechanistic theories only in its mechanics; the forms as such and their unfolding (concretion), which is not identical with the objective procedure of their actualization in time, refer to a dimension of "inwardness", of self-representation, self-interpretation, of the making apparent of a specific conception of being, that rises in importance from the lower animals toward the higher.49 Far from discarding genetics, then, phenomenology only for the first time allows the facts of a genesis to speak for themselves; and what it finds that they utter where the genesis is a course of human life is a pervading unity of existential themes. These themes, in turn, occur as dimension-setting alternatives at once of the existent’s biography and of his innermost and most enduring preoccupations, a truth which Binswanger exemplifies by many of his cases but most poignantly perhaps by that of a young girl, “to whom, in her fifth year, when taking off her ice skate, it happened that the heel of her shoe remained stuck in the skate, which caused an inexplicable anxiety and a fainting spell”.50 Let us quote from Binswanger’s comments once more in extenso.

Since then the now twenty-one year old girl is seized by indomitable anxiety whenever she notices that a heel is not firmly attached to the shoe, that someone is touching his heel or even only speaks of one (the heels of her own shoes had to be nailed on). If she cannot run away in such instances, she faints. Psycho-analysis showed with all desirable clarity that behind the anxiety—revolving around the loose or severed heel—were birth-fantasies, both in the sense of being born—severed from the mother—and of the birth of a child of her own. Among the many severances of continuity which the analysis produced as frightening, the one between mother and child turned out to be the one most properly meant and dreaded. . . . Before Freud one would have declared that the event on the ice in the fifth year of life, though in itself it is entirely harmless, had caused a ‘heel phobia’. Freud, as we know, showed that it is the fantasies attaching themselves to such an event or preceding it that are ‘pathologically’ effective. But both before and since Freud still another explanatory reason was kept in readiness to make understandable why the event—or those fantasies—just affected this particular person, namely his or her constitution or predisposition; for everyone experiences the ‘trauma of birth’, and many a person loses a heel without getting a hysterical phobia. Even though we do not propose by any means to unfold the problem of predisposition in its entirety at this point, let alone to solve it, I confidently claim that what we call predisposition can to some extent be illuminated further from the side of our anthropology. What happened is that
In later studies we could show that one still can go farther, penetrate 'behind' the fantasies, precisely by searching for and examining the world design that constitutes the primary possibility of such fantasies and phobias. That particular category now which serves the world design of our little patient as a guide line is the category of continuity, of contiguity, context, and cohesion. This means an immense narrowing, simplification, and voiding of the world content, of the otherwise so exceedingly complex totality of its relations and relations. Everything that makes the world significant submits to the rule of this one category. It alone is what makes the world and the being in it stable. Therefore the dread of any severance of continuity, any rent, any tearing and disjoining, separating and being ripped apart. Only this 'world image' makes it understandable why that common human experience, the severance from the mother, as the arch-separation of human existence, could become so 'supervalent' that any severing event was fit to represent symbolically the dreaded separation from the mother, drawing on to itself, and activating, the fantasies and day dreams. We only must not believe that this situation is really mastered by our understanding if we define the excessive ('pre-oedipal') mother-attachment as the explanatory reason for the appearance of the phobia; rather we are forced to the insight that such an excessive mother-attachment is possible only on the basis of a world design founded on the exclusive category of contingency, continuity, and cohesion. Such a world apperception, always implying such a mood (or timbre) also, must of course not be 'conscious'; neither, however, must we call it unconscious in the psychoanalytic sense, for its place is beyond that polarity. In itself, it is nothing psychological; its reference is to a world, to what only makes possible the psychological facts as one finds them. It is here that we encounter the actually and properly 'abnormal' of this existence; yet, and with this we return to our 'psychological' point of start, all the less must we forget that wherever the world design has become so narrowed, the self must also be hemmed in and be prevented from maturing. Everything here shall remain as of old. If the new, the severance of continuity, yet forces its approach, it becomes evident that this can only mean catastrophe, panic, the acute anxiety fit; for now the world in plain fact collapses, and nothing stable is left in it at all. In the place of inner or existential maturing, of authentic temporalization opening itself to the future, there appears here the over-weight and dead weight of the past, of the being-there-already. This world must stand as it is, nothing may happen, nothing change; its contingency must be guarded as it ever has been before. From this temporalization-modus alone it is that we can hope to comprehend that the world-temporal phenomenon of suddenness gains the enormous significance always attained by it in such cases; for suddenness is the time-character of what rends, fragments, cuts into pieces the thread of continuity, thrusting existence as it has been out of its tracks and putting it in front of the awful, naked horror, an event that psychopathology most summarily simplifies by referring to it as anxiety attack. The severance of the heel from the shoe on the ice does not constitute an 'explanatory reason' for the appearance, which we are forced to infer, of this pre-occupation prior to any
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severance of continuity; nor do the fantasies concerning birth and the maternal body. Only because (as self-evidently holds true for the infant) the attachment to the mother meant world stability per se, could those fantasies gain such import, and for the same reason it was that the event on the ice attained its own traumatic portent; for precisely here it was that the world took on a wholly different physiognomy, that it showed itself from the side of suddenness, of the totally different, the new, the unexpected. None of these phenomena has any 'place', any steady home in the world of this person, nor can it fit itself in with her design of one; they therefore must remain on its outside, so to speak, without being integrated, mastered, and absorbed. Instead of being, in the word's full sense, wieder-holt (Kierkegaard), that is, fetched back into the inner hold of existence, so that its meaning and content may be lifted and spelled out, what here becomes of it is the existential senselessness of a merely 'worldly' repetition of the same, the ever-repeated inroad of the sudden into the standstill of the world clock. This world-design, it is true, does not appear prior to the traumatic occurrence—it manifests itself, to use the Kantian expression, only on the occasion lent to it by that event; yet, as the transcendental forms a priori of the human mind only make experience possible as what it is at all, so also the form of that world-design alone is what creates the axiom, the constituent condition, for the event on the ice to be possibly experienced as traumatic.52

The implications are clear; never contenting himself with the operational order of categoriality, the psychodiagnostician, as explorer of existences, must look through and beyond the surface of his patient's words in the manner more of a poet than of either a lexicographer or psychoanalyst. The phenomenal content of what in an existence is categorical must be clarified in his inner experience in accordance with the patient's own, an effort which the tendency of words severed from their phenomenality first to freeze in their objective connotations, then to lose their meaning altogether, hampers, but which is aided and supported by another trait of the psychodiagnostician's and psychotherapist's first-hand material. Wherever there is a true existential idea, an entire dimensional alternative, and with it a scenery, a world, is opened; a mere term devoid of any points of ecological reference that define its meaning in the concrete can occupy wholly different positions of phenomenal significance in the patient's and the therapist's world apperception. A preoccupation with the ground on the part of a subject, unchecked as to its elaborations within each of the three spheres of existing and their counter-parts in imagery previously pointed out, can mislead the clinician into orienting himself to a vertical polarity,
pneuma versus chthonic depth, rising versus going down or falling, as a spatial scheme of reference for his understanding of that subject; in the case here referred to, the case of a patient whose clinical history the present author had occasion to study, "ground" had the entirely different connotation of horizontal expanse. It encompassed the simple dimensional alternative of an existence-axiomatic here and there; gods and demons stayed in their places in his world, they never ventured forth. Favored by a monosyllabic attitude of the patient, the psychiatrist's thought fixation endured dangerously long; what allowed to correct it in the end were three—only "spherically" different—manifestations of the patient's unitary mode of being.

The patient, first dreamt—and recalled his dream—of a cavalcade of the many countries he had lived in, lands which, instead of his passing from one into the other, now were passing in front of him, with his own position at rest. It was at the same time that his migrations, stopping in space, were internalized, "temporalized" into an entirely new passion: historic studies and collections were taken up by the subject, a line of interest that contributed a great deal in the end to his conquest of the depression for which the therapist's assistance had been sought. The traces of his motor behavior, second, which by-passed—in his handwriting—every opportunity for either pressure or ethereality, reaching up or digging down, towering or tumbling, showed a totally "flat" type of enlivened variation; what appeared in the skeletal directions of its letter-figures was a timeless characteristic of the world of the wanderer, an existence image such as actualized in old-Egyptian murals and reliefs. Finally, there was the Rorschach—interpreted by a Rorschach worker who through a year's course in scoring and rating had somehow managed to maintain his vision and his grasp of those relevancies of experience that only its contents lay bare. The theme that determined the patient's apperceptions in the specificity of what he actually saw in the cards was that same dynamic horizontality: roads, riverbeds, and railroad tracks appeared throughout the performance. Had that idea failed to express itself clearly in his original utterances with their repetitions of the word ground? It had not, as it appeared—his verbal economy notwithstanding. It only had failed to register on a mind preoccupied, for its part, with the ground as the one of interment—of decay and germination, ghouls, and, aye, all ıds.
NOTES

1. Throughout the virtually countless number of documented intuitive beholdings of this symbol in the myths and the literatures, it is the psyche in its objectivity only which is seen as water; the identities of other phenomenal elements (fire for states of compassion or divine inspiration, air, of free action or thought, altogether of world-facing courage, with the forces of fate seen as winds, earth, of submission in the sensuous and the demonic) are assumed by the soul whenever, in transcending itself toward world, it is its own authentic self. As water, on the contrary, it either remembers (reflectivity) or waits (for the winds of fate to stir and ripple it) or does both of these at once. Heraclitus’ astonishingly modern insight into the perils of “narcissism”, of the psyche in its objectivity, becomes most telling in his warning that for souls to become wet is their “delight, or rather death” (Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 30).

2. Cf. also the previous discussion on inner identity, pp. 206-08, and on the essence of symbols, p. 171. A soul symbol of such richly documented universality as water very evidently is not a “symbol” in the Freudian sense—not an allegorical substitute for the soul—for no concrete eidetic appearance of the soul as a reality that would either be more immediately intelligible or closer precisely to the objective phenomenality of that entity is even conceivable, hence none is there to be replaced allegorically to start with; it is indeed more than anything the simplicity of this pre-given fact of existence that shows up in the axiomatic status of the water symbol throughout the range of its historic documentation.

3. Since the psyche just in its objectivity, its “stillness”, is primarily memory, reflection of images that like slowly wandering clouds shape up against the empty “sky” (emptiness-unreality; concerning the no longer as a “dimension”, cf. p. 114) of an hour of windless quiet, what the psyche reflectingly beholds “prior to” and “around” the emergence of the narcissistic ego image is, quite literally again, the cavalcade of its own “evaporations”—its past. Supplementing at this point the phenomenal evidence of the water symbol, its genetic explanation—epistemologically quite in order here precisely on account of the factual “objectivity” of this particular state of the psyche—likewise becomes available, as objective evolution simply verifies this qualification of the phenomenally beheld past (the “objective” soul, or life) as in fact arising from the water.

4. Cf. p. 286. The first “glance” of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, which resolutely centers on the ground of existence, yet disposes of all the freedom of orientation and minuteness of perception of the “position above surface” here pointed out, equals the narcissistic focus only in its direction but decisively differs from it in terms of its attention-set, as it “blinds itself systematically” precisely for the ego image as a reflective surface effect of the focalized true self. Except as a perceptual “obstacle”, a “misunderstanding” (if an ordinarily necessary one), the ego is first of all ignored here in order to penetrate the actual “three-dimensionality” of the true self, discern its own being and its transparence for being—which, in turn, are recognized as the constitutional premises even of
what hides them, the "reflectiveness" of the self as condition of the ego as an image.
7. Accordingly, the actual female equivalent of male narcissism does not center phenomenally on what here would rather preclude it, the self as *external* body image, but neither on what spontaneous female love, as active receptivity, discerns as the dimension of existential transcendence set in its case—in an "inverse" direction, the world here "being toward" the self—by the "polar" image of the male. The comparable phenomenal focus of female inhibitive self-consciousness, the basis of ego hypertrophy here, is the self not as *immanence* in Beauvoir's sense (as body image) but as a "dynamic", "aggressive" counter force to receptive *transcendence* striving to undo the stated reversal of the latter's direction. Dependent on the degree of its power over the subject's apperception of her *being-in-the-world* is the degree of masculinity appearing; correspondingly, in male narcissism, the degree of appearing femininity depends on the power of the ego as external body image over the self as *self-identity*. The male self as a mode-of-being thus strives to tear-into whatever *immanence* blocks it from the *open*; the female, to open itself as, be the opening of, *immanence*. These axioms of existence have nothing to do with functional determinants in any causal sense; they are ontic possibilities or *norms*, determining—"equi-originally"—the spirit and the *essence* of the person.
12. *Transcendence here* translates the *Über die Welt sein*, being-over-or-beyond-the-world, a concept which Binswanger takes over from Jaspers; in distinction from Heidegger's world concept which implies transcendence already in its very constitution as the "open" into which existence "ex-sists", Jaspers, as similarly Sartre, conceptualizes "world" *per se* as contingency or *immanence*. While the distinction may seem definitive and therefore "academic", it assumes the most burning existential actuality in the "dialectics" of the world of the manic-depressive where it unfolds in the form of a periodical alternation of the horizon of existence between a *being-in* demanding an *exit* and a *stepping-out* demanding an "obstacle", a "receptacle", and thus once more the fulfillments of a *being-in*. For some facets of the problem, cf. L. Binswanger, *Über die manische Lebensform*, Zurich, 1944. It is on the same ground that de Rosa's reproach of eclecticism in Binswanger's doctrine, which he raises at this point, may miss its aim.
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20. Literal translation of Zentrifugalkugeln, a schizophrenic neologism of the patient.
22. Cf. p. 121.
24. It is of the most critical importance to arrive at a clear distinction between the schizophrenic experience of dead time and the normal experience of boredom; catatonsics, significantly, are not bored even by those of their most drawn-out petrifications of posture which "suggest" the idea of inevitable boredom to their first-hand observers. In boredom, which especially in retrospect can appear as creative period inasmuch as it necessarily challenges creativity, existence finds itself exposed, not to the emptiness but on the contrary to the abundance of time, to time as coming-toward the existent, without his having only an appropriate "receptacle" at hand to "dispose" of this wealth.
25. Quoted from Binswanger, "Der Fall Jürg Zünd".
28. Ibid.
30. Namely in front of groups; he does not seem to see the single person as such, or when he does, that single person has significance only as a group representative; true inter-subjectivity in Marcel’s, the dual modus of existence in Binswanger’s term, has no chance here to open up anything like a true world.
32. L. Binswanger, "Der Fall Ellen West", Schweiser Archiv für Neurologie und Psychiatrie, .
33. Cf. p. 223.
34. Cf. p. 249.
37. We recognize here the threat to the soul, pointed out earlier in the dream-theoretical section of this chapter, of one of the “four phenomenal elements”—earth or mud—to assume its identity. In the psychoanalytic literature, this entire theme of the specific dynamisms of the four elements as inherent in the phenomenal constitution of each of them is penetrated most profoundly by the studies of Bachelard (La Psychanalyse du Feu, Paris, 1942, Lautremont, Paris, 1939, L’eau et les Rêves, Paris, 1942), but without the results yet being anchored in the only possible scientific ground they themselves refer to, that of an anthropology, phenomenology, ultimately an ontology, of existence as being-in-the-world; instead of it, and despite his own actually phenomenological achievements in the mentioned studies, Bachelard still refers the whole matter to the immanence of a somehow given sphere of the “forces imaginaires du l’esprit”, a reified subjectivity or “psyche-object”.
40. Binswanger's own footnote at this point: "I deliberately avoid the expression attempt at self-cure since neither an intentional attempt at all nor actual progress was involved; the patient at present is more uncured, even more incurable than ever. All we can say is that the existence now has entangled itself in a specified world design, that no longer it stands as an authentic self in front of the intolerably, intangibly horrible, but is delivered up to the world of the enemies as an improper, self- alienated self." (Italics supplied.)
44. Cf. pp. 36, 180.
46. Cf. p. 228.
47. Cf. p. 206.
48. Cf. p. 82.
49. The extent to which this is verified by the most recent advances of modern holistic biology is illuminated with much cogency by Adolf Portmann in his studies; esp. Die Tiergestalt, Basel, 1948; "Etudes sur la Cérébralisation chez les Oiseaux", Alauda, Bd. 14 (1946), 15 (1947); "Um ein neues Bild vom Organismus", in Offener Horizont. Festschrift für Karl Jaspers.
50. L. Binswanger, Ausgewählte Vorträge und Aufsätze, p. 204.
51. Literally: repeated (wiederholt). Binswanger, alluding here to Kierkegaard's interpretation of the origin of the word, which its composite structure lays open, hyphenates it deliberately to make visible, in the tenor of Kierkegaard's analysis, at once its own phenomenality (the image of a fetching-back or -again) and the latter's implications for the authentic phenomenality of existential time. Concerning what constitutes the background of Kierkegaard's and Binswanger's hermeneutic of the concept (expressed in Danish and German by words of the same origin and composite structure), cf. our discussion of the phenomenological approach to language, pp. 9, 124-25.
52. L. Binswanger, op. cit., pp. 204-7.
54. Cf. p. 156.