ENVY, SHAME, AND SADISM

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In this article, envy is identified as a drive derivative, erupting as a definable behavior in the anal phase of psychosexual development, locating envy as first being experienced during the stage of self-development, separation/individuation. The aim of envy, as identified by the nature of the investment the subject makes in envied objects, is described as “aquisitiveness,” or, following Klein, sadism, defined in terms of the subject wanting to incorporate the envied object, making the aim of envy narcissistic, that is, an aggrandizing of the self. The usual aim assigned to envy, destructiveness, is conceptualized as a defense against the cannibalistic hunger of envy, in response to the regulatory affect, shame. The dynamic of this defense accounts for the dyadic nature of the object of envy (as opposed to jealousy), supporting the “splitting” quality of this defense. This rendering of envy, shame, and sadism promotes the integration of narcissistic urges into normative psychosexual development and deepens an understanding of the splitting defense in pathological narcissism.

INTRODUCTION

To write an article now, in the 21st century, on “envy, shame, and sadism” is to run the risk of throwing down an old gauntlet or, little better, of trying to prod to life a conflict long avoided among psychoanalysts. No one of these entities is included in the “Top 10 Psychoanalytic Hits” for the past decade, and lumping them together might well be considered an exercise in irrelevancy. “Envy,” though remaining a topic of discussion among Kleinians, curiously did not accompany its derived product, object relations theory, as that theory became appropriated into “mainstream” psychoanalytic metapsychology. “Shame,” until recently, was simply not a topic of discourse in the psychoanalytic literature, and what interest has developed, perhaps as we in the West have become more aware of shame–based cultures, is still rather limited. And “sadism,” as a noun, even among Kleinians, has become now almost an anachronism, an avoided remnant of a more passionate time when the
vocabulary of psychoanalysis included verbs like “biting” and “scooping,” leaving its weak adjective, sadistic, to trump the “getting” of mother’s breast with psychoanalytic reports of perverse smearing of her breast with foul epithets.

Part of the problem with these words/concepts is definition. A consensus regarding the meaning of “envy” remains elusive. A connotatively accurate synonym for envy is “covet,” but covet unfortunately is too evocative (of sin!) for dispassionate discussion. The most commonly used stand–in for envy is undoubtedly jealousy. As Erikson might have said, jealousy in our language seems to absorb envy. But it’s more than that: An individual abhors acknowledging jealous feelings, but suggest that he is envious and he will quickly—and vehemently—deny it (see Riviere, 1932, for comments regarding how “jealousy” is used as a defense against envy. Spielman (1971) notes that the etymological root of envy is *invidia* from the verb *invidere*, meaning “to look maliciously upon,” “to look askance at,” or “to look with enmity.” “Envy” itself first appeared in modern English usage, Spielman notes, in the 14th century, when apparently the motivation for “looking with enmity” became linked to what was being looked at, and how. Thus, in the *Oxford English Dictionary* (OED), the definition of envy includes “the feeling of mortification and ill–will occasioned by the contemplation of superior advantages possessed by another,” whereas Webster’s dictionary defines envy as the “chagrin, mortification, discontent, or uneasiness at the sight of another’s excellence or good fortune, accompanied by some degree of hatred, and desire to possess equal advantages; malicious grudging.” And yet, in spite of this lexical consensus, usage continues to provoke controversy regarding what “envy” points to in behavior.

If “envy” as a used word appears to be endowed with inherent ambiguity, “sadism” as a used word (i.e., as used in analytic discourse) has another kind of definitional confusion: a bifurcation. It has two meanings, though each meaning appears manifestly unambiguous (though less so, admittedly, as the language of narcissism has become confounded, more and more, with the language of libido). The first use is limited to sadism as a perversion (with the caveat given above), as in “sadomasochistic behavior,” following upon Freud’s first affirmation of same in his *Three Essays* (1905/1953). I believe we would all agree that this semantic use is limited to sexual behavior that, although denoting motivation to cause pain, most assuredly does not refer to the wish to destroy. Indeed, the literature on the psychodynamics of sadomasochistic activity at the level of perversion, even when branching out into pathological narcissism (a growing trend in this literature), is virtually unanimous in affirming that this activity has a defensive function, and that function, through compromise formation, is the repair of loss, the reso-

I bring up “destruction” because the second use of “sadism” in the psychoanalytic literature, although less clear regarding the boundaries of its definition (which may be a psychological and not an epistemological issue; see below), is consistent regarding its explicit content: Sadism here is used to denote behavior thought to be motivated by hate and the urge to destroy. This was the meaning Freud gave to this kind of sadism, to the point that he built it into an instinct (his word), Thanatos (Freud, 1920/1955). And this is the meaning that Klein, too, gave to it, perhaps even more pointedly than Freud. Since Klein, the analytic community, when talking about sadism, has continued to endorse this meaning: hate and destructiveness (see “Review of the Literature,” below). Here, of course, I am identifying “this kind of sadism” phenomenologically, taking its use in the analytic literature as its definition. As I will present and discuss below, I do not consider the aim of either “kind of sadism” to be hate or destructiveness. Nevertheless, this bifurcation of meaning in the analytic community is a fact and its implications are obviously important. Here, the issue is not ambiguity, as it is with “envy.” It is contradiction (i.e., its semantic use in reference to perversion versus its semantic use in reference to narcissism), and the price is a serious compromising of reliability with respect to the meaning of sadism and thus of its validity. A major task of this article will be to resolve this contradiction by demonstrating how “sadism,” with misplaced assignment, took on this pejorative denotation (of hate and destruction), when in fact the behavior of (this second kind of) sadism marks the intention to build, not destroy.

Shame does not provide significant problems with respect to definition. We all pretty much agree on its meaning and even its behavior (once we actually examine it); we simply haven’t found it, here in the Western world, pertinent and therefore interesting. As it turns out, it is important in terms of filling out, with little controversy (my impression!), the dynamic, the motivational scheme, behind the behavior of envy/sadism. As such, I believe it provides a kind of construct validity to the enterprise of this article.

Let me state the intention of this article: I will pursue workable definitions of envy and sadism by analyzing their behaviors and aligning, in each case, these behaviors consistently with coherent motivational schemata, making these behaviors then more accessible to observation and to identification. I will then use these definitions in a discussion of their psychosexual roots. In particular, I will propose that a conceptual view of envy as a drive derivative, with sadism as its aim, will allow us to
make sense of certain crucial strivings and desires in early childhood that I consider the first move of the child into the realm of narcissistic investment. Finally, I will explore the significance of shame in this dynamic, as it erupted into consciousness in the child as he or she first experienced during this phase of development the wonderful, frightening act of envy accomplished: ownership.

**REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE**

Before Klein (her writings spanned 1921–1963) the subject of envy was limited to what Freud and his early colleagues reported about their observations regarding what girls felt toward boys: penis envy (Freud, 1905/1953). The issue here, of course, was not that such reports were wrong or irrelevant; they were simply (and curiously) limited and circumscribed. Only Abraham, during that first quarter of the psychoanalytic century, began to discuss envy in the context of his reports on oral and anal sadism (Abraham, 1923, 1925).

And then Klein burst upon the psychoanalytic scene with her brilliant, radical, and, admittedly, somewhat misdirected drama regarding her observations of infants, even in the first months of life, as they lusted for and raged against their mothers’ breasts, a drama first presented in her reports of her treatment of Erna, in Berlin (Klein, 1926), and then, in a systemized fashion, in her *Psycho-Analysis of Children* (Klein, M., 1932/1969). At that point in the development of her ideas, Klein placed envy at the center of this drama, conceptualizing envy as a reaction of the infant to his or her frustration in seeking gratification from the unavailable mother (in whatever fashion that occurred: actual absence, neglect, overt hostility, etc.), naming the resulting destructive urge of the infant to get rid of the now bad breast “oral sadism.” Actually, Klein’s articulation of this drama, as she imagined it, was more complicated, and even more dramatic. She had the infant actually perceive the breast (a kind of part-object) as withholding the sought-after milk, declaring thereby the breast’s power and control over the infant. The frustration in this scenario became not just “not getting” milk; it became for the infant, in Klein’s drama, an interpersonal event, in which the denying breast became an object the infant, in envy, wanted to attack, to destroy. Over the next 25 years, Klein continued to expand and amend her ideas, including her developing her “positions” concept (i.e., the paranoid/schizoid position and the depressive position, each position associated with a stage of growth of the infant), culminating, in 1957, in her publishing *Envy and Gratitude*, in which she presented a more developed conceptualization of envy, definitively rooting it in the Death Instinct and unambiguously, more or less, removing it as a “feeling” reactive to frustration.
and marking it instead a primary psychic drive geared to destruction (Klein, 1957/1975). I will return to Klein’s ideas here, as they focus on sadism, below, when I review the literature on sadism.

With respect to the literature on envy after Klein, it is remarkably spare in quantity, highlighting, I believe, not so much neglect as avoidance (again, Riviere’s observation, in 1932, that jealousy is a defense against envy is relevant here! (Riviere, J., 1932). One clear theme in this post–Klein literature is a conflict among analysts regarding the dynamics of envy: those who perceived envy as a “reaction,” to external circumstances, versus those who conceptualized envy as part of some internally located instinctual urge, a la Freud’s Thanatos. Joffe’s (1969) review of this subject is indeed critical, in the best sense, and measured, and he comes down finally on the reactive side, but he does this by noting that envy, dependent as it is on the child’s having reached a stage of neurocognitive development consistent with having the capacity to abstract “object constancy,” makes envy necessarily reactive (i.e., because, the argument would go, if a cognitive skill is required before envy can be expressed, and that skill is not present before age ~2 years, then envy is unlikely to be part of an instinctually–based affect; this, I want to point out, need not be the case: capacity to procreate is not possible, certainly in the female, until puberty, but we don’t question that the urge to procreate is drive–dependent). Joffe himself seems to wonder about this assertion, noting that such a position leaves out much of the passion that makes the Kleinian view so compelling. Etchegoyan, Lopez, and Rabih (1987) do affirm that envy is primary without explicitly explaining or justifying their affirmation. However, interestingly, and, I think, convincingly, they locate the importance of that “fact” in the need to have a focus and a method for dealing with those instances of negative transference that are rooted in envy. Rosenblatt (1988), while addressing mainly the defenses against envy and their role in moving envy toward adaptation, joins Joffe in conceptualizing envy as a reaction to frustration or a perceived lack. Finally, Feldman and DePaola (1994) present an excellent review of the analytic literature on envy, from before Klein through the early 1990s, which review is enlightening in its comprehensiveness and clarity. They also want to ascribe the failure of Klein’s view of envy to become an accepted, mainline dynamic in psychoanalytic discourse to her insisting on envy being rooted in drive, whence they feel called

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1. Actually I think this idea is heuristic and has merit, though I consider “envy as depression” a part of a complex dynamic and not an experienced affect (i.e., in the dynamics of envy, depression, a reasonable accompaniment of envy, is effaced by projective identification); see below.
upon to rescue it from this assigned abyss by renaming it, not drive, not "reaction," but "complex feeling," the origin of which they locate in the "depressive position," where, I'm afraid, they leave it, making envy not destructive but depressing.¹

An aspect of the "envy" literature that receives a moderate amount of attention (relatively speaking), namely, the description of the actual behavior of envy, has achieved a curious consensus (given the lack of consensus regarding other aspects of envy). Almost all commentators regarding this aspect compare envy with jealousy, agree that they are different (which the man in the street doesn't, as noted), and affirm that a main difference is that envy is dyadic while jealousy is triadic (in terms of the participants in the drama of these behaviors). Somewhat paradoxically, given the prevailing view that envy is dyadic, is that those focusing on the "object" of envy assert that what the envier envies is not so much the person envied but more some "possession" of that person (i.e., the paradox here is that this view could be construed as affirming a triadic relationship, among the envier, the envied "other," and the envied object that the "other" possesses—which, as one might anticipate, is my view; Wulff, 1951). In any case, a dynamic has evolved that undergirds this view that envy is dyadic, namely that the source of envy in the envier is some "narcissistic wound" (Rosenfeld, H., 1959) or some "lack" (Rosenblatt, A.D., 1988; Spielman, 1971). This view, of course, posits that envy is motivated by the desire for "repair," and it puts those writers sharing this view squarely in the "reaction" camp with respect to the dynamics of envy. This "puzzle" approach to the paradigm of envy, finding the missing part, is tempting to consider in its simplicity, but if that were the case, we might all tend to conceptualize envy as reducible to those feelings we all have at one time or another when we find ourselves viewing something that another individual has that we don't have and that, in the viewing of it, we want. Clearly, viewing envy as a dyadic enterprise, as simply "my wanting something you have," trivializes envy, equating it with greed. Greed is a subject often discussed when the meaning of envy is plumbed, but no one mistakes greed for envy. Greed is dyadic, involving an individual and the thing he can't get enough of. It may be used as a defense against envy, but it is not envy (Glover, E., 1933).

¹ Curiously, and certainly of significance, of all the seven deadly sins, envy is the only one that stands alone as evil incarnate. All the other sinful behaviors become sins as their behaviors intensify to some "bad" level; only envy is identified as inherently sinful, not in its degree!
This discussion of envy affirms its ubiquity, and ubiquity suggests that envy, like all the other affects, must in some form be normal. And yet, envy, for all its ubiquity, carries with it a particular, persistent valence: It is considered bad. As such, even in the analytic literature (Glover, 1933) discussions of envy often turn to questions of morality, as if envy were a sin (as I suppose most believe!). And no wonder: Envy, consensus declares, leads inexorably toward hateful and destructive behavior. Let us return to the definition of envy in the OED: “the feeling of mortification and ill-will occasioned by the contemplation of superior advantages possessed by another.” Wherefore comes “mortification and ill-will” in the contemplation of another’s good fortune? And the curious phrase, “advantages possessed by another,” who cares? The answer: The envier does. Envy may be normative, one will affirm, but it’s certainly not normal, no more than disease, death, and decay. Considered to be, always, an impulse to destroy, it is considered, ipso facto, pathological. We can’t get away from it: Envy, as familiar to us as sex, seems to be the antithesis of sex.

A final topic to address regarding the literature on envy is its process, that is, does the behavior of envy arise in the child as a developmental phenomenon and, if so, how and when and with what dynamic pattern, if any. Again, as before, we see that this is another issue with respect to envy that is largely neglected or, more likely we now know, avoided—except of course, by Klein, already reviewed. I’ll be referring below to a study regarding the development of shame, which I consider to be related to envy, but I found only one article in the literature describing a study of the development of envy in the child over time. In this study, Frankel and Sherick (1977) did a prospective naturalistic study comparing the expression of envious behavior (using the generally accepted definition/description of envy) as it erupted in stages among four groups of children, grouped by age, over the age span of 12 to 60 months (i.e., spanning the Mahlerian phases of “rapprochement” and “on the way to object constancy’). The results of this study quite clearly demonstrated how behavior referenced to envy moved successively from “rivalry” (my term, not their’s), whence a child, age 12–18 months, wanted the same attention another child was receiving from a mothering figure; through frank envy, whence a child, age 18–36 months, aggressively took some “thing” another child had, as if that other child’s having that “thing” gave it value; thence through a kind of desperate bargaining, whence a child, age 36–48 months, tried to get the “other child” to give him or her the valuable “thing” (i.e., valuable to the envying child) that the “other child” “owned,” and, if denied, the envying child would pout, in helpless despair; to a final phase, of imitation (or perhaps, identification), whence a child, age 48–60 months, would inter-
act almost exclusively with his or her own gender group and envy appeared to morph into admiration and aspiration, with group membership being all important and rejection by the group mortifying. This study is quite remarkable in demonstrating so clearly how envy occurs as a normative behavior, part of a developmental sequence that, parallel to a developmental sequence of object relations occurring intrapsychically, namely, the stages of psychosexual development, nicely traces a developmental sequence of object relations occurring interpersonally, namely the stages of narcissistic development. 3

The literature on sadism follows, more or less, the bifurcation in the definition of sadism described above, between sadomasochistic perverse activity, already reviewed, and sadism itself, which, as I have indicated, I label “narcissistic sadism.” As noted, this narcissistic sadism in the psychoanalytic literature is so closely allied with “destruction” as to make of the two, sadism and destruction, almost an identity. In the P–E–P folio (the electronic compendium that contains, in digital form, a corpus of psychoanalytic journals and some books that are accessible as a computerized database), of a possible 35,000+ reference sources through the year 2000, 2,002 contain a reference to “sadism,” of which 152 cross-reference to “sadism and destruction” and 57 cross-reference to “sadism and incorporation” (to give two logically antithetical reference points, one “destructive,” indeed, and the other presumably constructive). Of this combination, in looking at the context of use, out of this total of 207 articles cross-referenced for either “destruction” or “incorporation,” all but two use “sadism” to refer to destructive activity (i.e., either simply naming the sadistic behavior as an act of destruction or, in the case of incorporation, ascribing to it the motivation to destroy). The two references that reported narcissistic sadism as constructive were Khan (1973), who in this particular paper discussed “cannibalistic tenderness,” and Sternbach (1975), who actually took a position quite close to my own: that the concept of sadism did not at all require an intention of destruction (Sternbach arrived at this conclusion through a consideration of aggression, not envy, but he presents, I think, a good argument for not making an identity between sadism and destruction). Parenthetically, it is telling that all these references to

3. I am aware, of course, that there is no consensus with respect to “stages of narcissism.” Kohut suggests such a structure of narcissistic development but doesn’t name it as such; and Mahler, while identifying a sequence we might call “self-development,” names it, not narcissistic development, but “separation-individuation.” I think Mahler’s work does trace the normative development of narcissistic investment in the growing child, and I am suggesting here that Frankel and Sherick’s study identifies (without, of course articulating this idea) envy as the drive derivative that energizes that development.
“narcissistic sadism” (i.e., cross-referencing “sadism” with “incorporation’) are quite dated, all but 7 (of the 57) occurring before ~1990 indicating the hegemony of the Kleinian view in the literature on “sadism” (i.e., that “sadism = destruction’) during the period when Klein and her first-generation followers were publishing (and, to be noted, a trend during this period even among non–Kleinians; Freeman & Freeman, 1992; Greenson, 1954; Hartmann, Kris, & Loewenstein, 1949; Stone, 1971). Curiously, however, as object relations theory became the new compelling dynamic in psychoanalysis starting in the 1970s, under the influence, indeed, of both the English School (Kleinian) and the British School (Balint, Fairbairn, et al.), this mainstream change was accompanied, in the succeeding decades, by a decline of attention among contemporary psychoanalysts to those very Kleinian conceptualizations that contributed so heavily to the rise of object relations in the first place: envy and sadism (as noted, for example, in Etchegoyen et al., 1987; Feldman and DePaola, 1994; and even Kernberg, 1985, who uses variations on “sadistic behavior’ but minimally “sadism.” Moreover, we are witness now to a further evolutionary development in psychoanalytic metapsychology, evident in the morphing of object relations theory into intersubjectivity, a paradigm now a magnitude still further distant from the original Kleinian energics.

Much more has been written about shame, but it also, as the title of Nathanson’s (1987) book indicates, has “many faces.” It is not regularly tied to envy as a subject area, at least not directly, and I could find only one article where the tie was considered of major importance (J.H. Berke, in The Many Faces of Shame, Nathanson, 1987). Interestingly, shame is hardly mentioned in Melanie Klein’s (1945/1975) opus on “envy” and is not listed in the index of that book at all. Shame is certainly tied to narcissism in the analytic literature, though this tie is usually articulated in terms of the peculiar suitability of the word “shame” to epitomize a negative “sense of self,” making it a kind of epiphenomenon of “self psychology,” or narcissism (Morrison, A.P., 1989; Broucek, F., 1982).

THE MEANING OF ENVY—AND HOW IT WORKS

Affirming that I conceive of the word “envy” basically in Kleinian terms, as a definable behavior expressing a particular feeling state we name “envy” and “behaving” therein as a drive derivative, let me review the familiar terms that articulate the dynamics of drive. Drive, Freud (1905/1953) asserted, is a concept on the border of brain and mind. Its psychological expression is desire. Desire, in turn, can be analyzed into two component parts, aim and object. “Aim” is the process or
activity of desire, and “object,” of course, is that which the aim of desire uses to bring about gratification.

Applying this dynamic to envy, that is, to the aims and objects of envy, I, as indicated, identify the aim of envy as acquisition, or, in more traditional, if misunderstood, psychoanalytic language, sadism. Regarding the object of envy, I have reported how most analysts interested in this topic, in comparing envy with jealousy, an agreed-upon triadic phenomenon, have described envy as dyadic. As noted, in my experience the object of envious desire is always made up of two objects, one of which is perceived to be owned (and not just “possessed’) by the other. I say “owned” because that word dramatizes in everyday language the nature of the relationship between the two component objects. “Owned” here declares that, for the envying subject, the two objects are joined narcissistically; in effect, in getting one object, the owned object, the envious subject has the experience of getting the true object of his or her narcissistic desire: the owning object.4 The owning object, which I will call “the primary object (of envy),” is always a person, though it can be an anthropomorphized thing (i.e., by the envying subject), such as an animal or even an inanimate object (i.e., a totem). The relationship of the envying subject to this primary object is always narcissistic; that is, the subject has narcissistically invested this primary object. In other words, the envying subject, as Klein observed, is intent upon incorporating the envied object. The owned object, which I will call “the secondary object (of envy),” is almost always a substantial thing, but it can be simply an attribute of the owning (i.e., primary) object, such as status, appearance, a talent, a heritage. Under conditions of being defended against (for envy is the acme of a prohibited desire; see below), the tie of the secondary object to the primary object can become quite obscured, for instance, through displacement (whence the secondary object seems to lose its tie to the primary object), or through “a misleading value,” such as when the envying subject devalues (defensively!) the secondary object as if it

4. One might come to the conclusion here that I am making an identity between “ownership” and “narcissism.” I do not see the two as identical. Narcissism I see as a process whereby an individual, in making a narcissistic investment in some object, declares the wish and the intent to incorporate that object, hopefully then to metabolize that object, psychologically, and make it a part of the self (which, in this lexicon, would become “narcissistic identification”). Narcissism is not an act. Ownership is an act. Ownership is here as a metaphor for that part of the narcissistic process that is epitomized in the term “psychological incorporation.” I find, like Freud, a nice metaphor here: the amoeba engulfing some food-object. Full engulfment is “ownership,” still shy of “identification”; in this image, the food-object hasn’t yet lost its nameable physical integrity—and won’t until the amoeba digests it!
weren’t really, couldn’t be, owned by the all-good (i.e., narcissistically invested by the envying subject) primary object. But make no mistake: The value of the secondary object to the envious subject resides only in its being owned (for the envying subject) by the primary object. Consider the following vignette: Two young boys, Billy and Tommy, are playing in a sandbox, attended by Tommy’s father. Billy, playing with his toy truck, suddenly grabs Tommy’s truck, almost identical to his own. Tommy’s father, trying to be objective in the face of Billy’s felonious behavior, declares, “Billy, why did you do that? Your truck is just like Tommy’s. Give it back.” To which Billy, first in rage and then sobbing, cries, “No! I want his!”

As noted, I consider the aim of envy to be acquisition, or sadism. Acquisition conveys the idea of getting something and owning it, essential to the accomplished act of envy. However, acquisition is too inclusive: Certainly not all acts of acquisition are motivated by envy (Fenichel, O., 1945). Sadism, on the other hand, gets closer to the exclusivity of envy. Envy involves not only the desire to get and own; it also involves the desire to get the object unconditionally (see below) and to consume it (i.e., that is, “to consume it narcissistically”; to consume a narcissistically invested object and make it, psychologically, a part of one’s self is the completed narcissistic process). Let me affirm, again, that I am not referring here to sexual sadism. Sexual sadism, of course, correctly defined, is not motivated by the wish to consume. The other form of sadism, narcissistic sadism, does involve the desire to consume. It is, it must be, this aspect of sadism that connotes the noxious sense that sadism is destructive. And, of course, it is, for to consume is to destroy. But this aspect is only half the story of sadism. This form of sadism is not motivated by the desire to destroy. Rather, it is motivated by the desire to build, to aggrandize the self by consuming, if you will, narcissistic food, that is, a narcissistically invested object. Under these circumstances, the catabolism of the object (of envy) is the anabolism of the self (Calef & Weinschel, E.M., 1981; Sternbach, O., 1975).

Let me note here that I am aware that Klein, and most everyone else, in pointing to the presumed destructive urge in the sadistic aim of envy, jump over or ignore the passionate and, literally, consuming, love that motivates the narcissistically sadistic act (as opposed to the sexually sadistic act). And such ignoring, given the material, is of course understandable: Consumption, as noted, must lead to destruction. But that is most assuredly not the motivation for the sadistic act. Nor can it be. One does not want to destroy what one loves. But maybe this dynamic is what makes Klein’s narrative of her view of the infant’s relationship to his or her mother and the passionate feelings the infant has for his or her mother’s breast so compelling. Although Klein’s rendition can only be a
fantasy/projection (by her, of course, given the infant’s cognitive capacity at that age), it articulates what we all have felt, wordlessly, particularly when we were children, under conditions of profound and ravenous desire: It feels, strangely, horrifyingly, dangerous. It feels as if it might, acted upon, end in some . . . disaster. But what then of those instances we all have thought about, heard about, perhaps even participated in, that, starting out as experiences of envy, have ended up with our, or someone else, committing an act of destruction, destroying actually that which we coveted, and doing it violently with a perverse kind of forbidden pleasure? I submit that this act of destructiveness, clearly motivated as such at the time it happens, occurs at the end of the experience of envy, supporting the idea that the destructive intent is a defense against the pain of envy, perhaps against the pain of shame. It is so, given this sequence, that the completed act of destruction does appear to identify sadism, destruction, as an element of envy. I am stating that this appearance is misleading. Here, when envy ends in destruction, it is motivated, unconsciously, not by the wish to destroy, but, in desperation, to bring an end to the unbearable pain of envy. It can be, and usually is, a complex process. Often the object destroyed (almost always a secondary object) has been defensively devalued, again to protect against the prohibited envy, and the destruction then becomes an entitled act, or at least deserved. Or the object destroyed, as a secondary object, has been located, defensively, so distantly from the primary object of the envy that the envier destroyer perceives it, consciously, as totally unconnected to the primary object, worthless and despised, not passionately hated, a pleasure to destroy, as something, or somebody, which/who is simply taking up needed space and energy. We come here, of course, to Klein’s original and brilliant insight, that a narcissistically invested, sadistically desired good object, failing to live up to its idealization, becomes suddenly, through projective identification, a bad object to be destroyed, and with pleasure, because its continued existence (still, in part, inside the self of the envier) sullies the envier. Out, damn object.

All this leads me to elaborate on my assertion that for the envious individual, getting the envied object unconditionally is an imperative (which distinguishes sadism from simple acquisition). First, as I indicated, I consider nonsexual sadism (i.e., narcissistic sadism) to be always a narcissistic activity. In fact, I term sadism the aim, not only of envy, but also of narcissistic desire. But the individual harboring such a desire is faced with a horrible paradox: To have the narcissistically desired object is to destroy it. This is not the paradox of “you can’t have your cake and eat it, too.” From the standpoint of narcissism, you can only have your cake if you do eat it. No, the paradox of sadism is that an act of love, sadistic desire, seems completely incompatible with committing an act of
destruction. Clinical work, however, indicates that a solution to this paradox is conceivable—or at least the hope of one. It lies in the sadistically–imbued individual being assured (by the narcissistically invested object!) that he or she will get his/her narcissistically invested object without condition. The reason this is a solution is not that it makes the sadistic act a guaranteed pardonable offense (the issue of guilt and fear of punishment being influencing factors in the behavior of the sadistically–imbued individual is complex, and obviously pertinent; I’ll return to this issue briefly when I address the roots of envy, and sadism, in psychosexual development). No, the reason is that “unconditionality” protects the quality of the narcissistically invested object, assures, for the sadistically imbued individual, that the narcissistically invested object is free of taint, is all good. Anything short of “unconditional,” any condition placed on the sadistic act requiring permission or entitlement or even exchange means that the narcissistically invested object (remember that the narcissistically invested object is ultimately, essentially, necessarily, always another person) has the power to reject or withhold gratification of the sadistic desire; means that the narcissistically invested object is not all good, is potentially flawed. Incorporating such an object will leave the sadistically–imbued individual not only hungry, but also, worse, “sick,” with a bad thing inside.

Let us now turn to how these ideas about sadism fit into the dynamics of envy. I must anticipate here further discussion below regarding how we defend ourselves against the uncomfortable feeling of sadism. It seems to me that we humans have developed the structure of envy, as uncomfortable as envy is, as a protection against the paradox of sadism. How do we experience envy? We don’t experience it as desiring the primary object. No, we will be satisfied, we feel, with the secondary object, for we perceive it (again, unconsciously!) as a stand–in for the primary object, every bit as narcissistically valuable as the primary object. Venus, envious of Psyche’s beauty, sent her son, Cupid, not to destroy Psyche (i.e., the primary object, whom she wanted to consume, which wish she, in effect, denied having), but to render her beauty superfluous (i.e., the secondary object, which she proceeded to devalue, defensively; that, of course, is not the whole story of Psyche and Cupid, but this part suffices as an example). Interposing a secondary object between our sadism and the object of our sadistic desire serves, at least for the moment, to protect us from the danger of destroying that which we desire and want to keep precious. But, of course, as with all defenses, this use of a secondary object is a compromise, and in this case only a temporary solution. To the extent that the secondary object is not really the primary object, our desire is not gratified. And yet to the extent that the illusion “works,” it re–creates the original conflict: the destruction of that which we love.
The resolution of the conflict presented by sadism (i.e., narcissistic desire and investment) remains elusive—and ultimately for all us humans, tragic (Kohut, H., 1977). (Again, refer to the Psyche myth to see how the Greeks resolved this conflict; it is instructive!)

This brings us in our discussion to the third element in the dynamics of envy, the prohibitive function vis-à-vis envy, shame. Most of us have learned that shame refers to the activity of that part of the Superego called the Ego Ideal, an agency that serves as a “bureau of standards,” a means for assessing whether a particular behavior “measures up.” Such a description serves, too, to distinguish the Ego Ideal from the Superego proper, which has guilt as its expression and a “bureau of judgments” as its function. Again, it has been noted that the Ego Ideal and the Superego seem to use different measuring sticks, with the Ego Ideal having a “good–bad” scale and the Superego having a “right–wrong” scale (Schneider, M., 1988). Finally, most everyone who has been interested in shame has noted that it is somehow tied up with the visual function, the best example of which is the universal experience of wanting to hide when feeling ashamed (as when one has done something “bad’). Associated with this “visual” aspect of shame are two ancillary feelings associated with shame, embarrassment (and its close synonym, shyness) and humiliation. Both of these ancillary feelings (ancillary to shame) provoke the impulse to hide, but each is unique: With embarrassment we experience the pain of exposure but don’t feel demeaned; with humiliation we feel, in addition to the pain of exposure, some impulse to defend ourselves, as if we have somehow been diminished. Finally there is the curious physiological accompaniment of shame, blushing or erythrophobia, which may be more associated with embarrassment than humiliation (Darwin, 1872/1969). So much for the phenomena of shame, though we’ll return to some of these behaviors when we discuss the psychosexual roots of envy. For the moment, let us use these data to examine the role of shame in the dynamics of envy.

How is it that shame evolved as the “sign of prohibition” in reaction to envy, and not guilt? Or is it shame? Four out of five individuals (according to my informal survey) say they are feeling jealous when in fact they are describing a pattern of envy (using the above scheme). In like manner, most name guilt as the prohibitive feeling associated with envy. Only when confronted with the likelihood that they are feeling shame (in terms, for instance, of wanting to hide in reaction to feelings of envy) do they say, “Yeah, you’re right.” The connection between envy and shame appears, indeed, to be reliable (H.B. Lewis 1971).

So, back to the question, whence came shame as the “sign of prohibition” in reaction to envy? There are, I think, two answers to this question. The first answer has to do with how the behavioral patterns of the anal
Phase of psychosexual development, whence envy is considered first to erupt, shape the articulation of that prohibitive function at this stage. I will be dealing with this presently. The second answer has to do with the first manifestation of shame in child development, and what behavior that experience of shame is tied to. Michael Lewis (1992) describes how children first demonstrate a sense of shame at age 2–3, the age at which they first, he claims, become aware that things have owners. He describes this in terms of behavior that signifies shame: how, lacking now innocence, they look around to see if they are being observed before “stealing” something they now know is owned by someone. This tie of shame to the desire to steal makes sense in terms of both these research findings and the logic of the dynamic joining the desire to steal, shameful behavior, and wanting to avoid scrutiny. But is there a tie of meaning between stealing and envy, that is, is stealing a close enough synonym to envy to make shame a reasonable prohibitive feeling for both? I think the answer is “yes,” following the logic of the argument I have given above for a relationship among envy, the owner/owned relationship between the primary object and the secondary object, and the aim of envy being “to get and to own” the secondary object (one form of which activity is certainly “to steal”!). It must be remembered, of course, that the defenses against envy can be manifest without evidence that a shameful affect has occurred, at least to the subject harboring the inferred envious feelings. Still, even with this caveat, shame remains the definitive prohibitive feeling associated with envy. We will get to the implications of this association when we explore the roots of envy in the anal stage of psychosexual development.

ENTITLEMENT REACHED FOR: A STORY OF ENVY

Mr. A, a single white male, middle-aged, an accountant, was born into an upper-middle class family made up of his father, Jewish, also an accountant; his mother, an Italian Catholic, beautiful, a housewife; and a younger sister. Mr. A’s father was not a cold man, but he was depressed, expressed in a kind of bitterness, a conviction that life had dealt him a mediocre hand. At the same time, he had high expectations of his children, that they should do well and that excuses were just that, excuses. His father had died before Mr. A had come into treatment with me, when Mr. A was already an adult, and Mr. A’s memories of him were both ambivalent and idealized. Mr. A’s mother, still alive, was, as indicated, beautiful, a description Mr. A assured me was not his prejudice. His mother, Mr. A lamented, was also very self-centered, epitomized for Mr. A by her great sense of entitlement, an entitlement rooted, it seemed to Mr. A, in her acute awareness of her beauty. Mr. A didn’t like his
mother, but he did love her and, searching for a rationale for his love of this mean–spirted and self–absorbed woman, he of course found it in her beauty.

Mr. A was blind in one eye since birth. He talked about it incessantly, at one and the same time complaining about, even pitying himself, for this cruel blow fate (and maybe his mother!) had dealt him, while affirming, even bragging about how well he had done in school and in his work despite this major handicap. And he had done well. He had graduated from an esteemed college and a leading graduate school, and he had done very well in his career in which he had become a leading practitioner, with a reputation as an accountant who fought hard and successfully for his clients, for instance with the IRS. Also, though not a practicing Jew, he had become active in a Jewish charity, the funds of which he came to control. He was zealous in the management of this fund, and yet curiously he was known, he told me, and correctly, he assured me, as someone who quite openly resented and then resisted the attempt of any applicant to seek a distribution from the fund on the basis of an assumed entitlement. Charity for him had to be earned.

The one area in which Mr. A was not successful was in his getting a girlfriend. He rejected, with great indignation, even the idea that he could pursue marriage, for, he said, he couldn’t even consider burdening a mate with the care of his disability, to say nothing of the fact that with an income limited by his disability (this was clearly a distortion) he could never care for a woman at a level she could with reason expect from a husband. It was not that he didn’t become romantically involved with women. He did, with regularity, and, with the incredible genius of neurotic conflict, these women he sought were without exception rich women, divorced or widowed, whose wealth had come from their ex–husbands. But inevitably, in spite of his attempts to suppress his expectations, he would with any particular woman reach a point of great disappointment and usually rage when the woman would not accept his reluctance to move ahead in the relationship (i.e., to marriage), a reluctance, he would tell the woman, motivated only by his desire to protect her from his becoming a burden on her. And so the relationship would end, and Mr. A’s view that women were insensitive to others and entirely comfortable in their feelings of entitlement was again supported.

What we see here is what we often, usually, see in a clinical vignette: the activity not of drive but of the defense against the prohibited desire. Here Mr. A used as the defense against his great envy of his mother’s sense of entitlement his own semiblindness, which, of course, he had appropriated unconsciously as his own justification for entitlement. His blindness, we might note, was at the other end of beauty: Beauty, in his
case, was not in the eye of the beholder. I tried to identify his behavior here as a resistance, but whenever I took this tack he would become very defensive, imploring me to understand that he really did have a handicap and that he had succeeded in spite of it: How could I think that he used it to any advantage whatsoever. And, of course, in a way he was right: He never could bring himself to use his blindness as a reason, much less a justification, for any consideration. Indeed, the price for using it as a defense seemed to be that he would use it to restrict his desire: He couldn’t have a woman, particularly someone else’s woman, because he wouldn’t impose that burden, of eyelessness, on any woman, certainly not a woman he loved. And finally there was the fact of his semiblindness. He was to a great extent a shameless man, in the sense that he did not consciously experience shame. I always thought that was an extension of his sightlessness: From his point of view, he couldn’t see other people looking at him.

There are, of course, other, I would say, additional, ways of formulating the dynamics of this patient’s behavior, from conflicts over dependency to conflicts over oedipal strivings. This overdetermined quality to the neurotic behavior of a patient is ubiquitous and must always be dealt with in conducting an analytic therapy. However, when envy is a prominent component of a patient’s behavior, as it was in Mr. A, it points, I find, to a particular dynamic configuration, marked by a confluence, in the envious behavior, of both narcissistic issues and neurotic conflicts. The reason for this, it seems to me, has to do with the fact that envy is rooted normatively in the anal phase of psychosexual behavior, during which phase, I am postulating, conflict arises in the context of behavior motivated by narcissistic strivings. So let us proceed to that arena.

ENVY: ITS NECESSARY BEGINNINGS IN THE ANAL PHASE OF PSYCHOSEXUAL DEVELOPMENT

A major, and to my mind the most important, result of Freud’s discovery that an articulated desire was shaped by the erogenous zone from which the experience of the desire arose was the development of his concept, aim. Aim, as I reviewed earlier, is the subjective experience of the activity of a desire. The content of that experience is indeed shaped by the anatomy and associated physiology of the erogenous zone where that experience occurs, plus any particular sensory endings special to that zone. In the case of the oral and phallic zones, the content of the aim is relatively simple in form (i.e., having to do with anatomy) and unambiguous in activity (i.e., having to do with sensation). For instance, at the oral zone the forms of desire are mouthing, sucking, and maybe biting, and the activity is largely one of touch, though of course a kind of touch
that is particularly intense and full of expectation (not least of taste and maybe of a kind of “fulfilledness”). The phallic zone is even simpler in its form/activity, though we undoubtedly make a big mistake in not differentiating between phallic and vaginal zones. With respect to the phallic zone, ‘a la the male, the form of the pleasure must be some kind of “enwrapment” (hence “enraptured”?), while the sensation is a particular kind of touch that has the added fillip of a rheostat that ratchets up the intensity of the sensation unto orgasm, which is a whole other kind of activity. Regarding vaginal aims, I, like other males, must defer to second-hand reports, but it sounds as if it is, in form, “enwrapping,” and, in sensation, not unlike but hardly identical to the activity the male experiences, plus certain stretching/contractile sensations that the male would not have.

My point here is that the aims of erotic activity at the oral and phallic zones are for the most part limited in structure and quality to the anatomical and physiological capabilities of the organs from which they arise. Moreover, because the activities of these organs are “within sight,” the relationship between the stimulation and the sensation at these organs is immediately apprehendable. Another way of putting this is that activity at the oral and phallic/vaginal zones does not lend itself creatively to metaphorical elaboration (not that we all haven’t tried!). In a real sense, what you see regarding activity at these zones is what you get.

This pattern of activity at the oral and phallic zones does not obtain at the anal zone. At the anal zone, “back there” as Erikson so graphically remarked, the activity is mysterious and less easily described. Part of this mystery comes from the difficulty in talking about anal activity. Patients, when they bring up the subject of anal sensations, are embarrassed (not humiliated!), and they resist attempts to pursue the topic. Therapists are perhaps only a little less uncomfortable when this topic arises. All this has led to euphemism and metaphor when talking about anal activity, partly in an attempt to keep the subject material at a distance, partly as a reflection of the incredible plasticity of the verbal elaborations of this activity.

The traditional aims of anal activity are “holding on” and “letting go” (Erikson, E. 1950). Such words, of course, describe the mechanics of anal/rectal physiology, but their pleasurable counterparts would probably be more accurately described by such terms as “stretching” and “contracting,” analogous to vaginal and perhaps mouth/pharyngeal erotic activity. “Holding on” and “letting go,” however, so quickly invoking the objects of such aims, hardly invite one to linger on the presumed pleasures of anal activity (we will, for good reasons having to do with the narcissistic aspects of anal activity, get to this topic presently).
Curiously, the literature places little emphasis on the sensation of touch in the case of anal eroticism, a sensation that is always a large part of any erotic activity. Indeed, any thought/desire of “touching” with respect to the anus is countered, thwarted, by immediate associations to “dirty,” “disgusting,” “germs,” barriers that must be self-consciously denied to be breached. On the other hand, sadism is often mentioned as one of the major aims of anal activity, to the extent that Fenichel (1945) termed the second sexual stage of psychosexual development the “anal–sadistic” stage, a moniker he did not use for the other major stages. “Sadism” and “anal” were originally aligned by Freud (1905/1953) through his preoccupation with opposites: Muscularity, somehow also aligned with the anal phase, was “active,” and the anus was “passive”; “active” meant “mastery” or “subjugation,” hence “sadism”; and “passive” meant being “subjugated,” hence “masochism”; ergo anality has to do with sadomasochism. Somehow since then, we have all fallen in line and accepted this tie between anality and sadomasochism. Although I share the connotative sense that sadomasochism and anality go together, I must acknowledge that that sense probably refers more to sexual sadomasochism than to what I call narcissistic or acquisitive sadism. So, to pursue this inquiry into the tie between anality and what I call “narcissistic sadism,” let us return to the less sexually loaded aims of the anal phase, “holding on” and “letting go,” and their direct tie, as noted, to the objects of anally organized desire.

This brings us back, via “object,” to envy and the relationship between envy and ownership. At this point, then, we need to discern how the child apprehends the meaning of ownership: how something outside me becomes mine, not just something I use, but something I own. I have suggested that we give to the aim, narcissistic sadism, that motivation: ownership. How does the sense of ownership come about? Let me address that question.

There is a general consensus that the anal zone, in terms of marking a stage of psychosexual development, reaches its zenith some time...
around age 2-3 years. What do we mean by this? With respect to hard data used to mark this stage, we mean that during this period the child’s sensorimotor system reaches a level of maturity sufficient to allow the child to control the time of defecation. We then extrapolate from this fact to suggest that, capable now of having such control, the child becomes more and more aware during this period of certain pleasurable feelings associated with “holding on to” and “letting go of” the feces, to which activity we give the term “the aims of anal eroticism.” It seems to me that there are minimal data to support the significance of this extrapolation, but the fact that we are able to build on this base such a coherent and logical and rich and useable story of anal character traits and anal character pathology truly makes this leap of abstraction quite credible. However, there might be another way of accounting for the credibility of this story, using still the metaphors of anality but without having to base it on the flimsy data of childhood anal eroticism. This “other way” is to focus on another kind of development that occurs during this same anal stage of psychosexual development, namely, cognitive development.

At the same time that the child’s spinal cord is myelinating, allowing the child to control the anal sphincter, other parts of the central nervous system (CNS) are also developing. Here, of course, pursuing the origins of the sadistic aim, I must focus on those CNS developments relevant to an understanding of the abstraction of ownership. In this regard, object constancy is certainly the preeminent capability required, for any ambiguity about the reliability of the substance of an object makes the concept of ownership beyond comprehension. A semiotic capacity is also necessary, because of the requirement that an abstraction, in this case, ownership, must be named before it can be apprehended. Piaget (1937/1954) showed that object constancy is at hand by 24 months while Mahler, Pine, and Bergman (1975), from another viewpoint, have put this capacity a little later, around 36 months. With respect to the semiotic function, the ability to grasp the meaning, in this case, of ownership, Michael Lewis (1992), as noted earlier, observed that children, who before age 2 simply took those things they wanted, after age 2 acted as if taking something were stealing, that is, “if it’s not mine, it must belong to someone else.” This fits with Piaget’s observations regarding the age when children begin to develop a capacity to abstract, as seen, pertinent here, in their beginning to apprehend the concept of “conservation.” The point here is that these various capabilities clearly develop during the same age period as the assigned period for the anal phase of psychosexual development. While a child is going through the anal phase of psychosexual development, he or she is also developing the capacity to understand the abstraction of ownership.

The next question is, how, if at all, does a tie occur in a child’s mind at
this age between these two developing capabilities: an awareness of the 
experience of desire organized at the anal stage of development, and the 
capacity to appreciate the meaning of ownership. As noted, an object is 
used by an individual, in concert with the aim, to gratify the feeling of 
desire. During the oral phase of infancy, the objects that a child uses 
orally in pursuit of pleasure are infinite in number and limitless in vari-
ety. However, for the infant at this age, such objects are only libidinally 
invested, not narcissistically invested. At the oral phase of psychosexual 
development, objects are desired, but they are not gotten. They are taken 
in, but they are not owned. The infant at this age has no sense of object 
constancy: therefore, out of mouth, out of mind. (This does not mean that 
objects are not remembered; they are; however, for the child before age 
~2, any one object loses its substantialness when it is no longer per-
ceived.) Now it happens that the anal phase is the only stage of 
psychosexual development that includes a built-in object: namely, fe-
ces. I would suggest, given that the child begins to apprehend object con-
stancy and to develop a capacity for naming abstractions, not just ob-
jects, during the anal phase, as described above, that during this stage he 
or she begins, too, to appreciate that feces are in fact his or her feces. 
Furthermore, with this “ah ha” realization that “these feces are my feces,” 
the child also begins to experience himself or herself as having accom-
plished the act of ownership. This “accomplishment of ownership” 
traces a move from “taking in this (milk),” a doable act at the oral phase of 
psychosexual development, to “having these (feces) inside me,” now an 
apprehendable abstraction at the anal phase. It is the difference, if you 
will, between renting and owning. It is not yet “part of me,” for the child 
still does not know whence, inside, feces come. But now, in the context of 
the anal phase of development, as shown by (and, I suppose, “in’) the 
“battle of the pot,” there is no question about whose feces are at issue. 

At this point, a cascade of psychic events occurs, not quickly but inevi-
tably, which completes the grasping, the apprehending, by the child, of 
the doableness of the act of sadism, of how, to the libidinal, erotic plea-
sure of “taking in,” at the mouth, is added now the narcissistic, consum-
ing passion of “ownership,” at the anus. These events herald, yet to be 
sung, the painful, joyful ode of “me, growing.” I am going to present 
these events as a list, but the order of the list should not infer a serial or-
erd of happening, and it should certainly not be taken to affirm a “post 
hoc, propter hoc” process of causation. These psychic events, occurring 
over weeks and months, can be listened to as a primary process 
narrative. 

This narrative has already included stories about the mouth and the 
“taking in” of mother’s nipple and warm milk, about the anus and the 
“pushing out” of “my” feces. But now during the anal phase, this pri-
mary process narrative expands, to include a beginning appreciation of “ownership,” of “my” feces being now “my feces.” So all this mouthing, this eating, this defecating, would be one item, a first item, on this list of narcissistic development.

Then another item gets added to the list, in which primary process becomes interwoven with secondary process. Now abstractions are conceived, maybe through simple metaphor and imitation, partly to understand and partly in the service of defense. These abstractions include the idea of conservation. A third item is a simple, imperative desire for mother to be present, to be “seeable,” to be perhaps “ownable.” For security’s sake, the desire for mother is accompanied by another desire, more concretely felt and more forcefully expressed, for the blanket toward which others turn up their nose. A fourth item is a curious feeling of anxiety and excitement that accompanies intense hunger. This feeling reaches a crescendo of intensity at the moment mother brings forth one’s favorite food, chocolate ice cream; one grabs it, before even mother can put it down, and starts to lick it off the spoon. A fifth, related item follows, a feeling of anger when one has to wait for the ice cream. Frustrated, one finds oneself, with a rush of fearsome rage, throwing the ice cream on the floor, experiencing then a sudden satisfaction that the ice cream, mother’s ice cream, now is splattered round and is spoiled. And finally, later, a sixth item on the list presses forth, a new feeling, occurring when playing in the sandbox with Tommy, and Tommy’s father is there, of wanting to have friend Tommy’s Darth Vader figure, a feeling of desire that is even stronger than the pleasure one gets from playing with one’s own Luke Skywalker figure. And then, when one tries to take it, when Tommy isn’t looking, and a fight ensues and the Darth Vader figure falls and one steps on it and crushes it, how that somehow is a very thrilling but also a very dangerous feeling. And, of course, more items are added to this list, and some fall away.

I am giving here a rendition of expressions of desire, first libidinal desire developing during the oral phase of psychosexual development, and then, in the anal phase, the development of an additional desire, narcissistic desire, sadism. I am suggesting that narcissistic desire, far from displacing libidinal desire, mixes with it, giving rise to incredibly complex configurations of desire rooted in these two different aims, erotism and (narcissistic) sadism, using and consuming, renting and owning, libidinal and narcissistic. I am asserting that the drama of the second half of early childhood, ages 2-4, is dominated by the eruption of narcissistic desire, and I am indicating that that development is rooted in and shaped by the physiology and anatomy that contains the anal phase of psychosexual development. However, I am also stating that the outcome of development in this phase cannot be fully apprehended without
allowing for a major and decisive role in it for the function of cognition, as it develops in the child during this phase. Finally, I am affirming an exclusive role during this phase for envy as the drive derivative that moves, energizes, drives, the eruption and development of narcissistic desire. I am appropriating, via Melanie Klein, sadism, specifically narcissistic sadism, as the aim of envy, and I am describing the object of envy as a two-part object, made up of a narcissistically invested primary object and a secondary object perceived, by the envying subject, as owned by the primary object. I am speculating that this secondary object serves as a defense against this dangerous, wonderful desire to incorporate the primary object, a desire experienced as destructive. Finally, this desire, as do all desires, requires regulation, and the sentinel prohibiting affect that has evolved to set in motion defensive operations to carry out this regulation during this phase is shame.

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