VICTIMS OF UNFAIRNESS: A NARCISSISTIC OR EMPATHIC STORY?

Before describing Study 4 or stating its central question, two narratives from this study are given, the import of which will soon become apparent. The first narrative comes from one of our youngest participants, a 6-year-old boy, and the second comes from a 90-year-old man.

The 6-year-old was one of three siblings who served as participants. By way of context, his older sisters, ages 11 and 12, wrote about unfair advantages and discriminatory treatment instances over and over again; instances where one got a bigger birthday present than the other, or one had a more lavish party, or one got to do something the other did not get to do. “Squabbling sisters” seemed to characterize these narratives. The 6-year-old was different. He talked about his baby brother, who was not quite 2 years old, who repeatedly had to be taken to the hospital or doctors for some painful and persistent condition in his stomach that seemed to be there since birth. On some occasions, while the boy baby-sat his brother, the child would begin to scream in pain. The boy said that no matter how much he loved his baby brother, no matter how he hugged and cuddled the baby, no matter how soothing his words, he could not make his brother’s pain go away. It seemed unfair that a baby should suffer so much.

The 90-year-old man talked about how the world and this country had changed during his lifetime. He focused on the fact that in a country as wealthy as the United States, one that exports food around the world
and contributes food to humanitarian relief efforts, he found it unfair that there were still pockets of poverty in this country where people were hungry and malnourished. This, he said, was a tragic failure of society, a failure to attend to the most needy. Because we have not evolved to a point where we attend to others who have needs they cannot meet and eliminate hunger in our own country, which we surely can do, this shows him how much further we need to go to be a civilized people.

CONCERN FOR THE OTHER

In both of these examples, the participants are not the victims. In the boy’s case, the victim is someone he knows, his brother. In the older man’s case, the victims are people he has never met. In both examples there seems to be concern and empathy for the other. In neither example is there narcissism. Are these examples typical or atypical? Will we find, contrary to the boy’s narrative, many more narratives like those of his older sisters, where “what have you done for me lately” is the theme, a rather narcissistic-like theme at that.

Based on the findings from our first three studies, we are fairly certain that the critics have it wrong in a number of ways. First, unfairnesses almost never turn out to bogus claims, because objective and independent coders consistently find them to be legitimate. Second, participants neither create dubious entitlement claims nor reveal dubious conceptions of unfairness, for the coders agree about the type of unfairness in the vast majority of instances and these type categories map nicely onto philosophic distinctions about fairness. This interrater agreement and close mapping with the analytical literature should not happen if the critics had a valid point. Third, from the blame codings of participants and outside coders, we find no evidence to support the critics’ claims of victimology, neuroticism, and defensive avoidance of responsibility. To the contrary, the interpretation that best fits the findings sees unfairness as coming from the outside, not from within.

But the critics still have the narcissism arrow in their quiver. Narcissism, as a charge or a disorder, reflects a marked imbalance between the self and others, where self-importance and self-absorption are so excessive that the needs, feelings, and concerns of others are seldom considered, and if they are considered, “they are surely of less importance and significance than my own.” For the narcissist, empathy is all but nonexistent, and perspective is directed from and to the all-consuming self. In their universe, narcissists are fixed at the center, as others are props and supports for the one and only bright star. It is not a pretty picture.

Critics may claim that the narcissistic picture described here fits our data, pointing to recurrent findings of voluminous numbers of unfairnesses,
which, they claim, indirectly attest to the pervasiveness of narcissism, or at least to a hair-trigger readiness to cry "unfair." Perhaps it does. But in fairness, mere numbers are not a good gauge of narcissism, and they may be no gauge at all. Fortunately, we have more direct ways of testing the narcissism possibility, along with its opposite, an empathy possibility.

In Study 4, a variable particularly revealing of narcissism, involving who the victim is (called personal) enters the analysis. This variable has been in our general instructions and embedded in the participants' narratives all along, but it has remained unanalyzed, until now. From our reading of participants' narratives in the earlier studies, our unsystematic impressions were that this personal variable produces differences, depending on whether the victim is the participant, or is someone known to the participant personally (e.g., a friend, spouse, sibling, parent, neighbor), or someone unknown (e.g., those one reads about in the morning newspaper or hears about on the evening news). The 6-year-old boy's narrative about his brother in pain is an example of when the victim is known personally, and the 90-year-old man's narrative about hunger in America is an example of victims unknown. Given the critics' charge of narcissism, this personal variable ought to be dispositive.

Are people more focused on unfairnesses when they are the victims, indicating a "culture of narcissism," such that they write about these far more than any other personal type? If this is so, then participants of all age groups ought to put their own unfairnesses at the center of their unfairness galaxy, dwarfing all others. The narcissistic effect, if it shows, should also be evident in severity ratings, in addition to the frequency with which they cite their own unfairnesses. Not only should their unfairnesses be situated at the center of the galaxy, but they should shine brighter and hotter than the unfairnesses that affect others.

This "me as victim" or "me generation" focus, if there is one, may not be uniform across age groups, but it may be localized at particular ages or generational groups. Will it be most prevalent in the very young, the very old, or the Generation-Xers in between? On the other hand, perhaps this self-focus, if we find it, changes with age. Will we see evidence of developmental change toward an "other focus," such that our empathy grows and extends to those we do not know yet share a human kinship to as our concern for self wanes? In coding and testing this "personal" variable, we also plan to relate it to our familiar variables, of severity, type, and blame.

STUDY 4

In addition to our main focus and set of questions about the personal variable and whether narcissism or empathy shows, there were secondary
questions aimed at increasing the confidence in our earlier findings and extending their range. Overall, three methodological changes were made in Study 4. The first was aimed at extending our age range and increasing our sample sizes. Given earlier findings (Study 2) about unfairness judgments changing with increasing age (i.e., the A and S versus T group differences), the question now was this: Will this pattern continue if we add a sample of older participants (i.e., over 60), a group we have not looked at before? To test this, we asked a new sample of college students to recruit their grandparents for this study. We also wanted to increase the overall sample size of our tot and teen (T) sample above what we had in Study 2, which was not very large, and we wanted to see if those results would replicate here. To increase this sample, we asked our students to recruit a younger sibling, niece, or nephew.2

Our second methodological change was aimed at a finer analysis of participant and coder disagreements. We knew that some of those disagreements revealed perspectival differences. Specifically, we wanted to know if those disagreements could be reconciled, and how they would be reconciled. To explore this, we had the participant and the independent coder meet face to face, after their independent ratings had been made, to “talk out” how each perceived the unfairness, what each focused on, why each came to the judgment that a certain type and blame category fit, and whether reconciliation was possible. By adding this phase, we were able to determine the percentage of disagreements that reconcile and the direction of the reconciliation.

There were a number of possibilities. The obvious guess is that the reconciliation ought to go in the participant’s direction, as we generally grant the participant primacy over his or her experience. The less likely hunch favors objectivity over subjectivity and predicts that participants may yield to the disinterested outsider, as the latter is more objective. Still a third hypothesis would predict that each might see something valid in the others’ perspective, such that the reconciliation would blend both views. Of course, the final possibility is no reconciliation at all, as each participant stays fixed in the view that he or she originally had.

The third change we made in Study 4, and the major one, was aimed at discriminating unfairness instances along a personal-to-impersonal dimension, which we called “personal.” We asked all participants to indicate if this experience happened “to you” (Y), “to someone you know” (K), or “to someone unknown that you heard about” (U).1

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The 172 participants detailed 1638 instances of unfairness (with a mean of 9.5), which was higher than previous studies.1 Looking at the
personal dimension, the Y category ranks second across age groups, accounting for 35.8% of the instances; ranking first is the K category, accounting for 38.6% of the instances; and the U category ranks third, accounting for 25.6% of the instances. This finding—where Y experiences do not dominate the landscape—contradicts the prediction of those who claim that narcissism is at the center of unfairnesses. Furthermore, when the K and U experiences are combined (as these both involve others), this total represents more than 64% of the unfairness instances, which looks nothing like narcissism.

However, looking by age group, we find a significant difference, which adds complexity and nuance to the picture. Regarding age group differences, the T group gives the highest percentage of Y experiences, whereas the E and S groups give a higher percentage of U and K experiences, and this is shown in Table 7-1. Further testing reveals that the difference is between the T group and the S and E groups combined. Almost half (48.6%) of the T group’s instances are Y, with only 17.5% being U; using those figures as a baseline for the E and S group, the latter’s Y percentage falls to one third, whereas the U percentage almost doubles.

What are we to make of such differences? If we assume that the E and S participants once upon a time had roughly the same percentage of Y experiences as our current T group, then the lower percentage of Y experiences may indicate greater forgetting of Y instances, or that newer, impersonal U experiences have crowded out the older and more personal Y ones, or that both forgetting and crowding out are occurring. Whichever hypothesis we opt for, all are consistent with an interpretation that if narcissism exists at the early ages, it seems to wane with age. This is not the finding that the critic predicts.

If the attribution of narcissism is to be made based on these age group findings, it would be pinned on the T group, for one could construe its

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Personal-to-impersonal Dimension of Unfairness</th>
<th>Totals by Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>33.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>48.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals across groups</td>
<td>587</td>
<td>35.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The percentages are calculated across rows.
high Y percentage as reflecting an egocentric train of thought, with narcissism being but a few stops further along on that train. But there are less pejorative ways of viewing this finding that we must consider. For example, perhaps the high Y percentage simply reflects the psychological fact that the T group's world is smaller than that of E and S groups, which is thus naturally composed of a higher percentage of Y experiences. In this developmental rather than pathological view, our world will then naturally expand as we age, as we come to know more people and their stories through personal communication (K), or because we read more newspapers or watch more television news (U). Thus the significant effects (e.g., more Y experiences for the T group, more K and U experiences in the E and S group) may simply represent naturally higher Y percentages at the younger age and naturally higher impersonal experiences accruing with age.

Furthermore, this natural accrual may be enhanced by an accessibility bias, where recent, highly dramatic unfairnesses portrayed by the media come readily to mind, but not to all minds equally. Older participants read newspapers and watch television news more than the youngsters do, and this accessibility bias should favor the older participants.

Whether it is egocentrism, natural accrual, or an accessibility bias affecting our selection, or some combination, we cannot say at this time. Although our conclusions are more modest, they are telling in their own right. First, Y experiences are not repressed: There is no shortage of Y experiences at any age-group level. Second, Y experiences neither dominate nor predominate at the higher age levels. These facts contradict allegations that the "me generation" has arrived, where "whiners" decry their "victimhood" over trifles. Third, the findings that the Y percentage drops with age while empathetic concern for others increases (reflected in the higher K and U percentages) support the view that empathy grows stronger than narcissism, if it is narcissism at all.

Severity Ratings

Now let us put severity into the picture. The mean severity ratings for the personal categories for the age groups are shown in Table 7-2, and there are significant differences. One difference is the age group effect, with the means for the E and S groups being significantly higher than the T group overall. Higher severity rates for the E and S groups suggest that we do not become jaded to unfairness as we age (accommodating to them), because if age produced greater acceptance we would expect the reverse findings.

The picture is actually more complex than the overall age effect indicates. For example, the overall lower ratings for the T group result from lower ratings for Y and K experiences, but not for U experiences. The age group differences for Y and K may reflect the experiential reality of E and
### TABLE 7-2
Mean Severity Ratings for the E, S, and T Groups, for Instances That Happened to the Participant (Y), to Someone the Participant Knows (K), or to Someone Unknown (U)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Personal-to-Impersonal Dimension of Unfairness</th>
<th>Means by Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>67.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>65.9</td>
<td>70.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>56.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Means across groups</td>
<td>64.1</td>
<td>65.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

S participants: Perhaps the Y and K experiences that occur later in life turn out to be more severe than the ones in the tot and teen years. On the other hand, we cannot rule out the possibility that memories are culled: when we learn about new unfairnesses; if these are more severe than our current stock, they may crowd out the old. These possibilities point to a caution when comparing across groups, for even though we may be comparing a set of experiences all designated as Y, this does not mean that they are equivalent: The ones experienced and culled by the E and S groups may be qualitatively different as well as quantitatively hotter than those reported by the T group.

Regarding the Y severity ratings that E and S groups report, we see no evidence that these instances roll off our backs as we age or that some accepting perspective—which comes with age, time, and distance—mutes their formerly intense coloration. We also see that the U experiences are rated more severely than Y and K experiences—for all groups. As we speculated, these U instances may reflect unfairness in extremis, prototypical in readily staying in mind and inflaming the passions, but not necessarily representative of the ordinary and customary unfairnesses. The high severity ratings for the U experiences coupled with the higher percentage of U experiences cited by the S and E groups give added support to the view that empathy for others increases with age. If severity, as I have argued, is some measure of our anger, then we are hotter about unfairnesses that happen to unknown others (U) than those that happen to us (Y), a finding quite at odds with what the narcissist displays.

### Types of Unfairness

Now let us add type to the emerging picture. The data for major types of unfairness are presented in Table 7-3. We again see that the Job-like category (III) is cited most frequently (38%). Ranking a close second and
TABLE 7-3
The Number and Percentage of Instances Where the Experience Happened to You (Y), to Someone Known (K), or Someone Unknown (U), for the Major Type of Unfairness Categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Personal-to-Impersonal Dimension of Unfairness</th>
<th>Totals by Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I + II. Reward/effort + wrongful behavior</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>43.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Punishment/behavior</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Discriminatory treatment</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>40.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Lack of due process</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>47.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals across type</td>
<td>537</td>
<td>34.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The percentages are calculated across the rows, except for totals by type.

third are the discriminatory treatment (IV) and the combined rewards/effort and wrongful behavior (I and II) categories (25% and 23.5%, respectively); and cited least frequently was the lack of due process (V) category (13.5%).

When we analyzed type by the "personal" variable, we found a significant effect. Looking at the Y category first, this category is overrepresented for the I and II, IV, and V type instances, but underrepresented for III. Put another way, Job-like unfairness (III) occur less frequently to the participant than other types. This means that when participants are the victims, they are most likely victimized by rewards not being gotten, seeing wrongful behavior going unpunished or rewarded, being on the receiving end of some sort of discriminatory treatment, and having arbitrary rules imposed on them without due process. For the U instances, the disparity is in the other direction, where "innocents being punished" (III) are cited more frequently, and thus Job is more likely to be the other rather than the self.

Now let us bring severity back into the picture. Severity was significantly related to type in Study 3, and that finding is replicated here. "Innocence is punished" (III) is rated as significantly more severe than the other types. Now we find a severity \( \times \) type \( \times \) personal interaction that is significant. To explicate, first there are no significant differences in severity among Y, K, and U experiences in the discriminatory treatment (IV) and lack of due process (V) categories; but there is a significant difference for the I and II and the III categories: When these occur to unknown others, the ratings are significantly higher than when such experiences befall those we know or ourselves.
Of all the findings to date, this is perhaps the most powerful rejoinder to the "me generation" claim, for these results show that we are more angered and outraged when the unknown other is Job than we are when we see ourselves as Job, and we have greater anger when the unknown other rather than the self does not get the rewards that are rightfully earned by efforts. If participants distort by (a) magnifying their own importance and centrality, (b) relegating others and their claims to the background, and (c) concluding that their own victimizations were the more egregious, then the results should have been opposite to what we found.

Blame

Now we add blame to the picture. In this study, we made one change to the blame categories: We lumped "parent" into the bosses category on the grounds that parents are the bosses of tots and teens. The blame by age group data are presented in Table 7-4, along with the severity ratings. Looking at the totals, we see that the newly combined bosses category ranks first (34.8%); to the society category is cited frequently (25.3), though at a lower rate than in Study 3; and the God category is again cited least. Looking by age group, there is a significant difference in the blaming pattern, which is most notable for the bosses and society categories. With increasing age, bosses (and parents) are blamed less frequently, while the reverse is true for society, a finding that replicates earlier results. For equals, God, and life, the blaming pattern is fairly stable across the age ranges.

The severity findings replicate what we found in Study 3, with significant differences among the blame categories. Once again, although

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**TABLE 7-4**
The Frequency (n), Percentage, and Severity Ratings of Those Blaming Bosses (B), Equals (E), God (G), Life (L), and Society (S), for the Elderly (E), Student (S), and Tot and Teen (T) Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>G</th>
<th>L</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals across groups</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severity ratings</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>70.3</td>
<td>89.1</td>
<td>79.5</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---
God is cited least frequently in terms of blame, when God is cited, the ratings are significantly higher than the other categories. If lower scores indicate a willingness to forgive, then our forgiveness is extended to bosses and equals more easily and charitably than for life and society, which repeats the earlier findings. About God, we remain least forgiving.

There is also an age group effect on severity ratings. Although the E and S groups give higher severity ratings than the T group in general, the effect is not uniform across the blame categories: When we analyze by blame categories, the E and S participants (taken together) give higher severity ratings than the T participants only for bosses (70.4 versus 63.0) and God (90.7 versus 56.2), whereas there were no significant differences for equals, life, and society. For the category of bosses (which includes parents), although the T group cites this significantly more frequently than the E and S groups, the latter groups feel more anger and outrage when bosses produce the unfairnesses. For the God category, we see that the E, S, and T groups cite God with a similar frequency, but when they do, the E and S groups judge God much more severely than the T group. If anger over unfairnesses does mute with age, we see no evidence of muting when we examine the ratings for bosses, God, and society.15

The Complexities of the Emerging Unfairness Picture

We only note in passing some type × blame findings, for these again replicate earlier findings,16 and the number of significant three-way and four-way interaction effects attest to the complexity of the unfairness picture.17 These replications add to our confidence that effects are solid and sound, at least for this population,18 a population that has broadened in Study 4 with the inclusion of an older age group. The personal variable, which was new to this study, was significant as a main effect and significantly related to both age group, type, blame, and severity.19

In Study 3, based on severity ratings, we categorized instances into one of four classes (low, 1–25; medium, 26–50; high, 51–75; and severe, 76–100) and then analyzed the results. In Study 4, we decided on a different break—looking at the extremely high (90–100)20 instances versus all the rest—and we found significant differences by personal, type, and blame categories. The impersonal (U) experiences, the punishment type experiences, and blaming of life (including God) and society were over-represented in the extremely high group.

Finally, we end with findings regarding the categorization schemas, where the interrater reliability was higher for both type and blame here than in Study 3, adding to our confidence in these schemas. We did add
a new methodological feature in this study, having the participant sit down
with the objective coder to reconcile categorization differences. For type
of unfairness, 73% of the time the participant and outside rater agreed; 1%
of the time they both saw merit in the other's perspective, and the re-
cconciliation reflected the views of both; 5% of the time the disagreement
could not be reconciled; most interesting was the finding that 8.3% of the
time the disagreement was reconciled by the participant agreeing with the
outside rater, whereas 12.7% of the time the outside rater switched and
agreed with the participant. This finding did surprise us, for we thought
the vast majority would have been reconciled in the participant's subjective
direction.

For the blame data, 83.3% of the time the participant and outside
rater agreed; 3% of the time they both saw merit in the other's perspective,
and 4.6% of the time the disagreement could not be reconciled. When we
looked at the reconciling switches, going either in the participant's direc-
tion or the outsider's direction, the findings surprised us even more: 6.2%
of the time the disagreement was reconciled by the participant agreeing
with the outside rater, and 5.9% of the time the outside rater switched and
agreed with the participant. Though the numbers get small, we did see a
good number of what we call "God versus life" disagreements between
participant and outside rater. Sometimes the two agreed to disagree, and
these disagreements were not reconciled. When they were reconciled, the
person claiming that God is to blame would more often yield to the one
claiming that "No, it's not God, but life."

LOOKING BACKWARD, LOOKING FORWARD

With four studies now completed, we have data on some 5000 in-
stances of unfairness. We have tested, modified, and retested our catego-
rization schemas for type and blame, and both appear inclusive, reliable,
and valid. Moreover, in Study 4 we took a different approach to disagree-
ments between participants and outside coders, having each articulate the
perspective they took to each other, and we then explored the possibility
of reconciliation and the direction of reconciliation. For both type and
blame disagreements, participants were more open than we predicted to
reconciling in the outside coder's direction. But a repeated disagreement
was noted on the blame categories, which generally did not reconcile,
where the participant blames God but the coder blames life. It is likely
that views on theodicy and misfortunes come into play here, and we mark
this as an open question for further investigation.

In looking back, the findings for the main effects of type and blame
and the type × blame interaction yield a consistent picture across the studies, and though these effects did change with age group, those changes appear consistent across the studies. Regarding our age groups, we bolstered our overall numbers in tots and teens (T) while replicating earlier findings, and with a new group (E), we were able to extend the results. The type and blame and personal patterns were similar for the E and S groups, where previously we found similarity between A and S groups. Based on this work, the conceptions and concepts of unfairness seem to hold steady from college age onward.

When the quantitative variable of severity was added to the picture, the landscape of unfairness took on more detail, color, and complexity, but, most important, greater clarity. With the personal dimension added to the picture, its main effect and interaction effects (with type, blame, age group, and severity) show consistency. Substantively, the results point much more strongly to empathy rather than to narcissism as the answer to our chapter’s question. Even at the youngest of ages, a time when egocentrism is most strong, we did see, as the example that starts this chapter reveals, that individuals can feel for and feel about another. With increasing age, our “me as victim” focus moderates sharply, and empathic concern for the “other as victim” increases in frequency and intensity as our perspective changes. At all age groups, even the T group, participants are angrier about unfairnesses that happen to unknown others (U), a finding that contradicts the narcissism prediction.

In looking forward, we know that there is a significant severity × blame × age group effect, such that some are less angry with bosses, parents, and equals than with God, life, and society. But what do these differences mean? Are we less angry with the former group when the experiences first occur (an “initial” effect), or does our anger fade faster for the former group (a “getting over” effect)? At this point, the evidence suggests that both possibilities are operating, but we can say very little in general about how unfairnesses change over time. We may infer that they do change, but this is speculative, for we do not know for a fact that muting has occurred. What we need to answer the question are measures at two points in time. Such measures, if we had them, could speak to a question that has been lingering since the outset of this work, about whether we get over our “hot” unfairnesses. This is the question we turn to next.

ENDNOTES

2. There were 172 participants overall, 103 females and 69 males, with 59.5% Catholic, 20.9% Protestant, 7% Jewish, and 12.7% other. There were 100
participants in the student (S) group (58 females, 42 males), with a mean age of 20.1 and a mean education level of 14.4. There were 23 elderly (E) participants (12 females and 11 males), with a mean age of 71.0 and a mean education level of 16.1. There were 49 participants in the tot and teen (T) group (33 females and 16 males), with a mean age of 13.3 and a mean education level of 7.9. Although teenagers predominated in the T group, we did have the younger tots as well, which called for us to make a methodological change, as we did in Study 2. When these tots could not write or preferred talking out their unfairnesses, the student participants who recruited the tots would read them the instructions several times and then wrote down their narratives as fully and accurately as possible.

3. There are findings in the discrimination literature that may relate to the frequency and severity of unfairness questions we have raised. One finding is that individuals who are members of a group believe that more cases of discrimination occur to the group as a whole than what individual members report suffering personally. Likewise, maybe more unfairnesses and more severe unfairnesses will be reported in regard to others, rather than having occurred to the person. See, e.g., F. M. Moghaddam, Social Psychology: Exploring Universals Across Cultures (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1998).

4. The explanation for this higher mean can be found in the size of the specific groups comprising our overall sample and the rate of instances produced by each group. The small (n = 23) E group produced 131 instances, with an average of 5.7, whereas the T group (n = 49), approximately twice as large as the E group, produced 292 instances, with an average of 6.0. However, the S group (n = 100), which was approximately twice as large as the T group and four times as large as the E group, produced by far the most instances, 1215, with an average of 12.1. It was this S group increase that accounted for the overall rise.

5. \(X^2[N = 172, df = 4] = 27.02, p < .001\).


9. Unlike Study 2, where there was a significant type by age group effect, with the adult (A) and student (S) groups being significantly different from the tot and teen (T) group, in Study 4 we find that the differences among our age groups failed to reach significance. However, though not significantly different there were, again, the same trends we saw in Study 2: The T group shows a higher proportion of lack-of-due-process (V) claims than the E and S groups, and the E and S groups show a higher proportion of “when innocence is punished” (III) claims than the T group.

10. \(X^2[N = 172, df = 6] = 92.5, p < .001\).

11. Although this appears different from Study 2 and Study 3, we must keep in mind a number of differences among these three studies that, when taken
together, show that there really is no significant difference. First, in Study 4 we combined the former parent category into the bosses category, thereby increasing its frequency and percentage. Second, in Study 2 we found that the T group participants cite parents far more frequently than S and A group participants, and they do so again in Study 4, citing parents (now coded in bosses) far more frequently than the E and S groups, whereas in Study 3 we did not have a T group, which lowered the frequency. When we factor in these differences among the studies, the results appear quite similar.

12. However, this lower rate can be accounted for by the presence of the T group in this study and its absence in Study 3, because we found that the T group cites society far less frequently than S, A, and E groups.


15. We do report, with caution, a significant age group personal interaction effect for one category—that of God. The caution involves the low number of citations of God to begin with, and we will have to see if this finding recurs with a larger sample. But what we found is this: For the T group, the average severity ratings for God in the three personal categories were $84.7$ (U), $54.5$ (K), and $49.7$ (Y), whereas for the combined E and S groups, those ratings were $78.4$ (U), $69.0$ (K), and $63.3$ (Y). It is our youngest group, the T group, that seems angriest when God causes an unfairness to someone unknown, though they are less angry than the E and S groups when the unfairness occurs to someone they know or when it occurs to them.

16. Bosses are blamed predominantly ($60.5\%$) in the lack of due process category (V) and most heavily ($48.1\%$) in the reward/effort and wrongful behavior categories (I and II), though they are significantly cited ($30.1\%$) in the punishment/behavior (III) and the discriminatory treatment (IV) categories ($37.2\%$). Equals are cited for rewards (I and II), punishment (III), and discrimination (IV) moderately ($16\sim25\%$), but infrequently (5%) for lack of due process (V). God is cited almost exclusively ($95\%$) in the punishment (III) category. Life is cited most ($20\%$) in the punishment category (III), occasionally cited in reward and lack of due process categories ($10\sim12\%$), and only rarely in the discriminatory treatment ($5\%$) category. Society is most frequently cited ($41\%$) in the discriminatory treatment category, cited frequently in the lack of due process category ($23\%$), and moderately in the reward and punishment categories ($15\sim18\%$).

17. There are significant interaction effects with age group (e.g., age group $\times$ type $\times$ blame), with the T group overrepresented in the lack of due process category, and the E and S groups overrepresented in the punishment category. We find severity significantly relating to age group, type, and blame as well.

18. We also replicated the sequence effect found in Study 3. There were no significant differences when we tested the order of unfairness instances, as type, blame, and severity remained fairly uniform.

19. There are also variables that have mixed results, such as gender and religion, sometimes showing significant effects, sometimes not. We are less confident, clearly, when results are mixed. The findings with these variables in Study 4
were not easily interpretable. For example, the gender effect we found in Study 3 was not significant in Study 4. For religion, we found a significant effect regarding type of unfairness, but not for blame.

20. To recall the results of Study 3, the most frequently assigned severity rating, the modal value, was 100. With that finding, we wanted to focus in on the upper end.